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Abstract 
 
In the post-Charter era, Canada’s national high court has developed a distinct political 
philosophy that guides the manner in which they dispose of federalism disputes.  
Although adherents to the “pendulum theory” of judicial review believe that federalism 
“balance” is created and maintained through a series of offsetting federal-provincial 
“wins” and “losses,” I suggest that the Supreme Court’s tolerance and embrace of 
legislative concurrency flows out of a deeper, conscious desire to facilitate 
intergovernmental relations in Canada.  This approach is implicit in both the doctrines 
they apply and the policy statements they make. The Court is reluctant to declare laws 
invalid and avoids application of what they refer to as the “constraining” 
interjurisdictional immunity and paramountcy doctrines.   
The Supreme Court’s decision-making philosophy in federalism cases is not 
value-free, however.  While the Supreme Court’s post-Charter preference for “balance” 
and “flexibility” reinforces the practice of intergovernmental collaboration—a political 
convention—it simultaneously undermines the political ideals the Fathers of 
Confederation intended federalism to serve.  The jurisprudence of “restraint” suppresses 
the civic virtues that naturally emanate from a classical, originalist reading of the division 
of powers.  In Judging Federalism I seek to bridge the gap by attempting to understand 
the Supreme Court’s federalism case law vis-à-vis the moral underpinnings of our 
Constitution. 
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 8 
Introduction 
 
One of the primary functions of Canada’s national high court is to resolve jurisdictional 
disputes that arise from time to time between federal and provincial levels of government.  
Over the past few decades, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms has taken center stage 
and come to define the political and constitutional landscape of modern Canada.  Yet, lost 
in the aftermath of the “Charter revolution” can be found a steady and substantive flow of 
federalism developments.  Despite the disproportionate attention given to Charter cases, 
the Supreme Court’s federalism jurisprudence continues to be an important and relevant 
topic.   
This project provides a “full circle” account of the Supreme Court’s post-Charter 
federalism jurisprudence by judging the judgments of judges.  This analysis is full circle 
because four layers of inquisition or “rotations” take place: moving from the broad to the 
particular, I examine the 1) nature of the judges and the institution that creates decisions; 
2) the manner in which disputes over legislative authority originate; the 3) nature and 
substance of the decisions that are created; and the 4) impact of those decisions on 
government and society.  The ultimate goal of this thesis, therefore, is twofold: first, to 
illuminate the decision-making philosophy or approach that underpins the federalism case 
law of the post-Charter era, and second, to “judge” the political implications of this 
philosophy according to the political ideals the Fathers of Confederation intended the 
federal principle to serve.   
In this thesis, I suggest that the Supreme Court’s tolerance and embrace of 
legislative concurrency—indeed, their reluctance to uphold clear jurisdictional 
boundaries—stems from a conscious political philosophy that aims to facilitate 
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intergovernmental cooperation and balance in Canada.  This approach is implicit in both 
the doctrines they employ and the policy statements they make.  On the flipside, 
however, the Supreme Court’s approach to federalism frustrates the moral principles 
embedded in our constitution.  While much ink has been spilled on how Charter 
decisions undermine the political mandate of elected officials—and hence, the will of the 
electorate—I suggest that the Supreme Court’s handling of the division of powers has 
just as important an impact on responsible self government, only we live out the 
consequences without fully knowing it.  
I will rely on the “circle” analogy as a means to present the structure and layout of 
this project.  In the subheadings below, I have provided a brief summary of the four 
major “rotations,” or analytical layers, that take place over the course of this thesis.  They 
are grouped according to chapters.  They include “the context,” “the criteria,” “the 
cases,” and “the findings.” 
“The Criteria” 
Chapter I establishes the theoretical framework of this project by fleshing out the 
federal principles inherent in Canada’s constitutional design.  In this chapter, I discuss the 
instrumental benefits of federalism as understood by the Fathers of Confederation.  There 
are four main benefits or “ends” that the founders identified.  They believed that 
federalism would i) protect local interests, ii) increase the clarity and focus of the national 
legislature, iii) close the gap between individual choice and consequence, and iv) foster 
heightened levels of government responsiveness.  However, it is not until Chapter VIII 
that I use these benefits as a criterion to evaluate or “judge” the implications of Supreme 
Court’s post-Charter federalism jurisprudence, which I discuss in chapters V through 
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VII.  While Chapter I establishes the criterion upon which judgments will be judged, 
Chapter VIII involves the application of that criterion on the case law of the Court. 
However, much needs to take place before we are able to apply the insights of 
Chapter I to our findings in Chapter VIII.  That is, if the goal of this thesis is to “judge” 
the jurisprudence of the Court, we need to know who the Court is, and what they create, 
before we are in a position to render any “judgments.”  
“The Context” 
Chapters II and III go hand in hand and fit into the overall picture by helping us to 
understanding the decision-making context through which the gestation of judicial 
reasoning takes place.  In this “rotation,” I discuss the decision-making approach of 
judges as well as the distinctive characteristics of the post-Charter era.  It is important to 
understand the methodology of judging, because, as I contend, written decisions are the 
product of the political dispositions of the justices who create them.  By seeing Supreme 
Court judgments as a political enterprise we are better positioned to investigate and draw 
out the overarching decision-making philosophy of the Court.   
While Chapter II looks at the nature of the judiciary and the judges who staff it, 
Chapter III examines the academic citation patterns in federalism cases.  This exercise 
gives insight into the intellectual arena in which the Supreme Court operates and decides.  
If the ultimate goal of this thesis is to understand the decision-making philosophy of the 
Court, we need to look to their academic citations for insight into the types of thinkers or 
schools of thought to which they subscribe, ignore or reject.  Indeed, the authors or 
sources that justices incorporate reveal multitudes about their political dispositions. Do 
they cite and discuss political scientists, historians, and philosophers?  Or do they stick to 
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the “nitty gritty” and confine themselves to legal scholars instead?  In sum, this chapter 
provides insight into whether a decision-making philosophy or tendency can be 
discovered from the Supreme Court’s use of secondary sources.             
“The Cases” 
In Chapters IV and V, I move from decision-making context to docket discovery.  
It is in this circular “rotation” that I explore the division of powers caseload of the Court.  
In Chapter IV, I examine the federalism caseload frequency of the Court, the issues they 
encompass, and the courts of appeal from which they originate.  To do this, I read 
through and coded each of 81 reserve judgments handed by the Court since Brian 
Dickson became Chief Justice in 1984.  I then turn my attention to the legal positions 
assumed by the federal/provincial litigants in Chapter V.  As part of this discovery, four 
steps, or determinations, are made.  First, I examine the ‘dispute initiation’ process and 
uncover the type of litigants that are most responsible for initiating a dispute.  Second, I 
examine the frequency at which governments intervene in the disputes that unfold.  
Third, I examine the nature of intergovernmental conflict contained within each dispute.  
Fourth, I discuss the notion of “winners” and “losers” and demonstrate the limitations of 
viewing federalism cases through the lens of a zero sum game.   
“The Findings” 
Chapter VI discusses the function of disagreement and measures the level of 
fragmentation or unity amongst judges in federalism cases.  This chapter serves two 
roles.  First, it identifies divides within the Court, which is where ideological divides are 
most likely to surface.  An analysis of written disagreements is significant for our 
purposes because it reveals alternative perspectives, identifies the jurisdictional territory 
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and intellectual axis from which potential dispositions could be reached; and thus 
elucidates the arguments and legal positions that receive traction and the ones that do not.  
Second, this chapter identifies the mayor players in federalism cases, that is, the 
frequency at which judges contribute written reasons.  This reveals the judges or blocs of 
judges that create the jurisprudence that is studied in the chapters that follow.     
In Chapter VII, I examine the doctrinal frequencies of the Court as it relates to a 
traditional division of powers analysis.  My research indicates that the Court is reluctant 
to declare laws invalid, inoperable and inapplicable.  In contrast, the Court is committed a 
modern, flexible approach to the division of powers—one that generously interprets both 
heads of legislative power simultaneously.  More profoundly, their doctrinal selections 
are informed by the Supreme Court’s underlying decision-making philosophy.  No longer 
“umpires” that carve out specific jurisdictional lines, the approach of the modern judge is 
that of a “facilitator.”  Supreme Court judges in the modern era facilitate 
intergovernmental relations through a “restrained” approach that tolerates and embraces  
overlapping jurisdiction and intergovernmental cooperation.  This is evident in the 
doctrines they utilize and/or ignore and in the policy statements they make.   
In Chapter VIII, I juxtapose the federalism values espoused in the Supreme 
Court’s post-Charter federalism case law with the political virtues the founders believed 
that federalism would serve.  Despite the restraint with which their approach is lauded, 
the Supreme Court’s tolerance of legislative concurrency creates a new set of 
implications that are neither considered by judges nor the litigants that appear before 
them.  Indeed, a “soft” jurisprudence invites the very political vices the Confederation-
makers intended to combat and avoid.  The Supreme Court’s approach over the past 
 13 
quarter century makes government i) less responsive; ii) erodes the relationship between 
individual choice and consequence; iii) diminishes the focus and intent of the national 
legislature; and iv) weakens local autonomy.   
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Chapter I 
The Ends of Federalism 
 
Canada owns the distinction of being the first federal parliamentary democracy, though 
the path to which this unique institutional arrangement took place was neither easy nor  
simple.  The Fathers of Canadian Confederation exhibited a diversity of political 
persuasions across the landscape.  They were Liberals and Conservatives, Catholics and 
Protestants, confederates and anti-confederates—politicians, in short, who represented a 
broad range of political values and ideals.  However, despite their differences, almost all 
agreed that the parliamentary system, and in particular, the constitutional principle of 
responsible government, was desirable and indeed compatible with political liberty, 
individual freedom and equality.1   
In contrast, the prospect of making Canada a federal union produced a passionate 
and polarizing debate.2  Unlike deliberations on responsible government, the “federalism 
issue” ignited responses that struck at the heart of age-old grievances and sectarian 
political alliances.3  Indeed, the federal principle was the ultimate “deal breaker;” the 
future of Canada hinged on this fundamental issue.4  But why federalism?  Surely 
                                                
1 Janet Adzenstat, The Canadian Founding: John Locke and Parliament (Montreal and 
2Indeed, many politicians who supported the principle of responsible government were 
skeptical of the ability of representative institutions, in a unitary system of government, 
to satisfy provincial needs and desires.  And while many viewed responsible government 
as a viable political system on a small scale, provincial level, fewer were convinced that 
it would work on a national level amidst a diversity of competing views and interests. 
3 Christopher Moore, 1867: How the Fathers Made a Deal (Toronto: McClelland & 
Stewart, 1997): 101. 
4 Marc Chevrier, “The Idea of Federalism among the Founding Fathers,” in 
Contemporary Canadian Federalism: Foundations, Traditions, Institutions, edited by 
Alain-G Gagnon (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009): 11-19.  Chevrier argues 
that there was little to no chance that Canada was going to adopt the legislative union 
Macdonald coveted, for the idea of a federal union was entertained long before the 
confederation proposals were debated and ratified.  
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everyone knew that a “legislative union” was “properly British,” and that any discussion 
of a federal union, which was prone to “instability and strife,” was “suspiciously 
American.”5  Yet, at the end of the day, we know that Canada became a federal union; 
that the central government and provinces were assigned separate and “exclusive”6 
spheres of jurisdiction; and that Canada remains one of the longest functioning federal 
countries in the world.  What we are not so clear on, however, is what makes our 
federalism “effective” despite what proponents of a unitary state contend.  
  In this chapter I will answer the question by analyzing the confederation debates 
as a means to illuminate the principles and logic underpinning the federal design of 
Canada’s constitution.  I begin with a look at the context of the Confederation debates 
and dispel the common misperception that the founders were less than thoughtful 
pragmatists who had little regard for the federal principle.  Alternatively, I submit that the 
founding fathers not only had important and substantive things to say about fundamental 
political questions, but made the conscious decision to make Canada a federal union 
because of the political ideals that it facilitated.  To support this contention, I explain the 
rationale of their decision, flesh out the principles that form the bedrock of our federal 
constitution, and discuss the benefits of federalism that stem from the practice and logic 
                                                
5 Moore, 1867: How the Fathers Made a Deal, 101-104.  Proponents of a central, unitary 
state pointed out repeatedly that federalism was the flaw that had led the United States to 
civil war.  Not unlike today, accusations of being ‘American-minded’ were commonly 
used to drum up criticism for impending constitutional proposals—an ad hominem attack 
intended to cloud the reality of the issues being debated.  John A. Macdonald, for 
example, recognized the nation-building potential of a unitary state: “I have always 
contended that if we could agree to have one government and one parliament, legislating 
for the whole of these peoples, it would be the best, the cheapest, the most vigorous, and 
the strongest system of government we could adopt” (Canada’s Founding Debates, 279).  
Many others, such as D. Ford Jones, believed the federal structure of America, and in 
particular its principle of state sovereignty, was a principal cause of civil war (312-13).         
6 Ss. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867 
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of self government.7  At the conclusion of this chapter, we will see how and why the 
distribution of legislative powers in Canada is instrumental to fostering heightened levels 
of civic engagement, individual responsibility, government responsiveness and 
accountability.  In addition to discussing the benefits that the founders identified, I will 
discuss the negative consequences that arise when federal institutions are tampered with 
or destroyed.   
This chapter fits into the overall thesis because it makes us aware of the 
ideological origins and political principles that underpin the division of legislative powers 
in Canada.  This is relevant because at the end of this project, we will be able to “judge” 
the implications of the Supreme Court’s post-Charter federalism case law and determine 
the extent to which it frustrates or reflects the political ideals the founding fathers 
intended federal institutions to serve.         
A. Contextual Considerations 
Before getting started, however, it is important to clarify the context in which the 
Confederation debates proceeded.  This is an important starting point, because our 
                                                
7 This approach draws from an insight that scholars like David Walsh have made, that 
liberalism in general must be understood as a unique combination of theory and practice 
working together, reciprocally illuminating each other.  In The Growth of the Liberal 
Soul, for example, Walsh confronts the difficulty of the liberal democratic tradition to 
justify or explain itself by illuminating the “experiential reality” that unfolds from its 
practitioners.  Despite its longstanding and unrivalled success, “[S]uspicions about its 
vacuity cannot but be reinforced when one contemplates the strange inability of virtually 
all exponents to identify the sustaining strength of the liberal democratic tradition,” 
(University of Missouri Press, 1997): 3.  In short, Walsh looks to the benefits of the 
practice of liberalism as means to help explain its goodness.     
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understanding of context influences the manner in which we draw out, or make sense of, 
the unstated principles that stem from our historical political practices.8   
Unfortunately, most political scientists and historians are of the belief that the 
federal elements of the Constitution Act, 1867 were chosen in the absence of principle.  It 
is not uncommon for domestic and foreign observers alike to question the federal 
sincerity of the framers by pointing to the centralist nature of the Constitution Act, 1867.  
Frederick Vaughan observes, for example, that “[I]f there is one feature of Canada’s 
constitution that has been under critical scrutiny from the very beginning it is the 
‘federal’ character of the document.”9 Sir Ivor Jennings, a leading British Constitutional 
authority over the past century, referred to Canadian federalism as a “vague doctrine 
scarcely worthy of judicial notice.”10  K.C. Wheare, another constitutional scholar, 
understood Canada’s division of powers to be “quasi-federal’ in law because of the 
inequitable distribution of power between the federal and provincial legislatures.11  There 
were also a few vocal delegates, on the periphery of the Confederation debates, that 
believed the authority granted to the central government was too great.12   
                                                
8 Peter J. Smith, “The Ideological Origins of Canadian Confederation,” Canadian Journal 
of Political Science 20, No. 1 (March, 1987): 4. 
9 Frederick Vaughan, The Canadian Federalist Experiment: From Defiant Monarchy to 
Reluctant Republic (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003), 91.  Although 
Vaughan does not subscribe to this view himself, he acknowledges that it is a common 
and longstanding outlook among scholars.     
10 As stated in Vaughan, The Canadian Federalist Experiment, 91. 
11 As cited in David E. Smith, Federalism and the Constitution of Canada (Toronto, ON: 
University of Toronto Press, 2010): 159.  
12 Robert Thomson of New Brunswick feared that by “adopting this scheme,” the rights 
of provinces would not be respected because the “federal government” would have a 
“veto power” to quash provincial legislation (Canada’s Founding Debates, edited by 
Adzenstat et al., 269).  Albert J. Smith, a representative from New Brunswick, referred, 
indirectly, to the central government’s “residual powers,” was also concerned about the 
unresolved and open-ended status of provincial jurisdiction: “They have also left us the 
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However, if observers are predisposed to viewing federalism as a pragmatic 
compromise—a “concession” that was used to “get by” for the “time being”—they 
eschew the deeper principles and political realities that were at work prior to, and during, 
the ratification debates.  In this section, I provide three points that help illuminate the 
political context and underlying principles of Confederation.  I counter the suggestion 
that the Founding Fathers were ignorant of political philosophy, offer reasons why they 
were relatively mum on the subject of federalism, and provide a case for federalism as a 
“first practice” of Confederation.     
Rationalizing Brevity  
There is a lingering perception that while the American founders were 
distinguished philosophers who produced voluminous justifications for their institutional 
preferences, the Canadian founders were politicians devoid of intelligent reflections on 
the fundamental matters upon which they quibbled.  E.R. Black remarks, for example, 
that “[C]onfederation was born in pragmatism without the attendance of a readily 
definable philosophic rationale.”13  In a relatively recent article, Ramsay Cook 
concluded: “It is well known that the Fathers of Confederation were pragmatic lawyers 
for the most part…more given to fine tuning the details of a constitutional act than to 
                                                                                                                                            
power of managing our own private or local affairs, but the question may be raised what 
is private and local, and then who is to determine?” (Canada’s Founding Debates, 272).  
Such ambiguity led other members, like A. A. Dorian, for instance, to refer to the 
impending resolutions as a “Legislative Union in disguise,” in which “the Federal 
Parliament will exercise sovereign power inasmuch as it can always trespass upon the 
rights of the local governments without there being any authority to prevent it” 
(Canada’s Founding Debates, 295-6). 
13 E.R. Black, Divided Loyalties (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 1974), 4.  
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waxing philosophical about human rights or national goals.”14  Philip Resnick states that 
“[I]t is hard to get excited about the handiwork of railway buccaneers and their kept 
lawyers.”15 And F.H. Underhill, who was perhaps the most blunt, concluded that the 
“Canadian Fathers…were ignorant of philosophy.  [The] lack of a philosophical mind to 
give guidance to the thinking of ordinary citizens has been a great weakness of our 
Canadian national experience throughout our history.”16  While these sentiments 
represent a subset of scholars, the important question is whether Supreme Court judges, 
who are tasked to review federalism cases, agree.17  
Upon reviewing Canada’s founding debates, I arrive at a different conclusion.  
The Fathers of Confederation were not ignorant of political philosophy, but brought to 
the discussion table vast knowledge about comparative constitutionalism, political 
regimes, history and political philosophers.18  Consider, for example, what George Brown 
had to say before the House of Assembly: 
We are endeavoring to adjust harmoniously greater difficulties than have plunged 
other countries into all the horrors of civil war.  We are striving to do peacefully 
and satisfactorily what Holland and Belgium, after years of strife, were unable to 
accomplish.  We are seeking by calm discussion to settle questions that Austria 
and Hungary, that Denmark and Germany, that Russia and Poland, could only 
crush by the iron heel of armed force.  We are seeking to do without foreign 
                                                
14 Ramsay Cook, “Canada 2000: Towards a Post Nationalist Canada,” Cite Libre (Fall 
2000): 81-82. 
15 Philip Resnick, Parliament vs People (Vancouver: New Star, 1984): 16 
16 F.H. Underhill, The Image of Confederation (Toronto, ON: Canadian Broadcasting 
Publications, 1964): 3. 
17 In Chapter 3, I provide an exhaustive examination of the Supreme Court’s academic 
citation patterns.  In this chapter, I discuss whether its judges pick up on the thinkers 
above, and if they do, whether they embrace their insights or reject them.  Such an 
exercise helps draw out the political assumptions of judges.       
18 Marc Chevrier, “The Idea of Federalism among the Founding Fathers of the United 
States and Canada,” in Contemporary Canadian Federalism: Foundations, Traditions, 
Institutions, edited by Alain-G Gagnon (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 
2009): 26-28. 
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intervention that which deluged in blood the sunny plains of Italy.  We are 
striving to settle forever issues hardly less momentous than those that have rent 
the neighbouring republic and are now exposing it to all the horrors of civil war 
(Hear, hear).  Have we not then, Mr. Speaker, great cause of thankfulness that we 
have found a better way for the solution of our troubles than that which entailed 
on other countries such deplorable results?  And should not every one of us 
endeavor to rise to the magnitude of the occasion, and earnestly seek to deal with 
this question to the end in the same candid and conciliatory spirit in which, so far, 
it has been discussed?19   
 
Here, Brown provides an excellent comparative account of failed political institutions. 
Notwithstanding the political cheers he attempted to ignite—indeed, the support he was 
trying to drum up—Brown demonstrates a working knowledge of international affairs.   
Other members cite and discuss the works of John Locke, the American Founders, 
and most extensively, John Stuart Mill.  As Janet Ajzenstat reminds us, “[A]lthough they 
seldom quote directly from the seventeenth-and eighteenth-century political philosophers, 
they are clearly steeped in the thought of Thomas Hobbes…Montesquieu, and 
Rousseau.”20  This is evident in their discussions of responsible government, liberty, 
representation by population, and the protection of rights, especially minority rights—all 
of which can be found in the Legislative Debates.  
So how, then, do the writers above, arrive at such dismissive conclusions?  It 
stems from erroneous inferences that are made about the political context in which the 
Confederation debates unfolded.  One such inference is that because there is no Canadian 
equivalent to The Federalist—nothing even close—much less thought and deliberation 
went into the institutions of Canada.  However, a lack of commentary is not tantamount 
to ignorance.  It is difficult to compare the Canadian and American experiences because 
                                                
19 Confederation Debates in the Province of Canada, 1865, edited by P.B. Waite 
(McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006): 36 
20 Janet Ajzenstat et al., “Introduction,” in Canada’s Founding Debates, 2.   
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they are not truly parallel.  It is true that Macdonald, Cartier and Brown have never been, 
nor ever will be, idolized to the same extent as Madison, Hamilton, Jefferson and Jay, but 
what their circumstances tasked them to do was different.  Were Canada’s founders 
capable of coming up with the “Confederation Papers?”  It is possible.  But they did not 
need to.  Much of what they knew and stood for in the British tradition was already 
“known.”  They were not embarking on a new “experiment,” like the Americans, so there 
was no need to reinvent “first principles,” such as responsible government.  Their job was 
to clarify and explain, however delicately, the novel features of the British tradition that 
they were adapting, namely, federalism.  I will explain the delicate nature of the “novel” 
features in the section below.   
If the American founders were political “inventors,” Macdonald, Cartier and 
Brown—among others—were political “modifiers.”  As Robert Vipond reminds us, the 
Fathers of Confederation “were not ‘founding’ a political state in the way it is often said 
the American constitution-makers were ‘Founders.’”21  Unlike the circumstances that 
gave rise to America, there was no need for “Canada” to make the same deliberate and 
decisive break from its past, and therefore, “no need to expound first political principles 
or to weave together a set of authoritative public values in the way Publius did.”22  The 
Canadian founders wanted greater continuity, which is why they sought to create a 
“constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom.”23  However, it became a 
                                                
21 Robert C. Vipond, “1787 and 1867: The Federal Principle and Canadian Confederation 
Reconsidered,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 22, No 1 (March, 1989): 6. 
22 Vipond, “1787 and 1867: The Federal Principle and Canadian Confederation 
Reconsidered,” 6.  
23 Constitution Act, 1867, Preamble. 
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matter of how much of a break from their origins they were willing to entertain and the 
extent they were willing to go to explain it.   
Canadians “celebrated what the Americans held in contempt: faithfulness to 
English political language.”24  But they did not need to provide a luminous defense of 
responsible government, for the citizens of British North America already viewed it as an 
“essential principle”25—a “magnificent instance” of political progress.26  In Canada, 
fundamental political choices had already been made.  Yet, because they did not have to 
justify their first principles of government, “the best opportunity for the Fathers of 
Confederation to establish themselves as self-conscious, deliberate founders”—thinkers 
about politics—had passed.27  But it is not as though they had nothing to say; there was 
simply less they needed to say.  There were additional obstacles that surrounded 
explanations of novel features like federalism.    
The Wisdom of Prudence 
This brings us to our second point, the role and importance of statesman-like 
prudence.  The Fathers of Confederation understood philosophy, but they also understood 
the political realities and constraints they were working under.  They had to mindful of 
existing factions—especially those between Upper Canada and Lower Canada—as well 
as fears precipitated by the perceived “causes” of the American civil war.  From these 
two reasons alone, the Fathers of Confederation had to engage in an intellectual tap dance 
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that was mindful of the passions and worries of its colonists.28  Due to necessity, any 
deviation from British traditions had to be thoughtfully explained, and any similarities to 
America, carefully qualified.  Because of these constraints—and the high potential for 
further discord and divide—the founders necessarily had to be cautious in what they 
wrote and how they presented themselves.  Accordingly, two identifiable patterns 
emerged.   
First, the Fathers of Confederation—Macdonald, Cartier and Brown in 
particular—attempted to trivialize their differences so as to give the illusion of unity.    
Prudence alone dictated the need for this strategy, otherwise it would invite opportunities 
for old rivalries to rekindle and flourish.29  As Paul Romney reminds us, “the point of 
federation was to depoliticize the contentious issues that had led to sectional deadlock in 
United Canada.”30  Vipond concurs: Macdonald, Cartier and Brown “went out of their 
way to exaggerate what they had in common and to abstract from or simply ignore their 
differences.”  Given the imperative to maintain their uneasy coalition, “it was crucial to 
confine the discussion as much as possible to the most general level where agreement 
could be assured, rather than descending to a detailed examination of the proposals, 
where disagreement almost certainly would have surfaced.”31  Having the tripartite bloc 
of Brown, Macdonald and Cartier at the forefront was at once a great advantage and a 
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significant liability.  It was an advantage if they chose to set aside their differences to 
work in collaborative unity; but risky in the sense that much political carnage would 
ensue if they allowed debates over fundamental political differences to derail their 
efforts.  
This intellectual avoidance strategy spilled over into how they approached the 
issue of federalism, the institution that was held responsible for American civil war.  As 
Vipond reminds us, “[M]ost speakers were little inclined to explain how precisely the 
local was to be distinguished from the general; how conflicts of jurisdiction were to be 
resolved; and whether federalism was compatible with the protection of minority 
rights.”32  But the reluctance to make more explicit the details of their proposals was 
deliberate.  First, they had to be careful that the federal institutions they proposed were 
not misconstrued as being suspiciously American.  While a number of delegates were 
familiar with The Federalist, and in particular, the insights of Hamilton,33 a “pro-
American” stance in those days, like a “private healthcare” stance today, would surely 
quash any hope of passing a resolution.  Even if the Americans got something right, it 
was politically imprudent for them to say so.  Hence, if one were to articulate the benefits 
of federalism, he would, by necessity, have to work tirelessly to “distinguish” it from the 
American model.34 
     Second, with idealizations of nation building at the forefront, the founders 
often overemphasized the strong central nature of the proposed resolutions to dampen 
fears that the instability created by divided jurisdiction would not jeopardize the grandeur 
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of empire.35  It is in this vein that critics of Confederation often point to the abundance of 
affirmation for British principles as evidence that the inclusion of federalism was 
secondary—a watered down “comprise” that temporarily quenched the appetites of 
French Canada and smaller Maritime regions.36  However, this view is problematic 
because it fails to take into consideration the close attachment the colonists had with local 
autonomy and misconstrues the spirit in which multitudes of ‘centralist’ arguments were 
expressed.  For many founders, a strong central government represented the means to 
achieve nation-building objectives—a new nationality, in the words of Thomas D’Arcy 
McGee, “bound, like the shield of Achilles, by the blue rim of the ocean.”37  But as 
Vipond warns, the expressions of such zeal stem from nationalizing desires, and 
therefore, should not be interpreted as antagonism toward the federal principle.  Support 
for nation building and federalism are not mutually exclusive.  As we shall see in our 
analysis of the Founding Debates, a sizeable number of founders believed that federalism 
would facilitate, as opposed to frustrate, nation-building objectives. 
The Seeds of Federalism  
There are important reasons why Canada’s founders avoided philosophic 
discussions of federalism.  But they “did not begin with a tabula rasa when they drew up 
their union proposal.”38  They had preconceived notions about the kind of institutional 
mechanisms that were required to secure the “good life”—and federalism was one of 
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them.  Not for a moment during the rhetoric of strong, central institutions did the 
colonists waiver on their desire for a federal union.  While talks of nation building 
dominated political speeches and news headlines, federalism was the forgotten certainty 
that prevailed from the shadows of Confederation.  Before we answer the question—
“why federalism?”—I will say a few words on how the “enduring existence of provinces 
with their own governments and powers” was a first practice of confederation in the 
1860s.39 
The idea of federalism was non-negotiable from the start, for it was brought about 
by the longstanding practice of local autonomy, the roots of which predate the 1840s.40  
The fruits of what the federal principle promised to deliver did not need to be stated, 
because many colonies were already living it out.  As Marc Chevrier notes, in “both the 
United States and Canada, the idea of federalism went through a long period of gestation 
before the birth of a federal regime as such.”41  It was a prerequisite—a protective 
mechanism that secured the long-standing practice of local autonomy.  From Upper 
Canada, Lower Canada and the Maritimes, colonists were deeply attached to the practice 
of self-government, which is why the thought of surrendering provincial authority “was 
an absolute non-starter, never for one moment to be take seriously at Charlottetown or at 
Quebec.”42   
To bolster this suggestion, one need not look much further than the insights by 
provided by historian, civil servant and expert on parliamentary procedure, John George 
Bourinot.  In his book Federal Government in Canada he discusses the importance, and 
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indeed the vibrancy, of local institutions in pre-Confederation Canada.  Long before talks 
of Confederation had entered the minds of statesmen,  
Municipal institutions of a liberal nature especially in the province on Ontario, 
were established, and the people of the provinces enabled to have that control of 
their local affairs in the countries, townships, cities and parishes which is 
necessary to carry out public works indispensable to the comfort, health and 
convenience of the community, and to supplement the efforts made by the 
legislature, from time to time, to provide for the general education of the country; 
efforts especially successful in the province of Upper Canada where the 
universities, colleges and public schools are so many admirable illustrations of 
energy and public spirit.  The civil service, which necessarily plays so important a 
part in the administration of government, was placed on a permanent basis and 
has ever since afforded a credible contrast with the loose system so long prevalent 
in the United States….43   
 
Attachment to the way of life that control over local institutions facilitated was not 
something British North Americans were willing to give up.  Rather, it was the strong 
and persistent fear that such institutions would vanish that posed the greatest difficulty 
for the “dealmakers” of Confederation to overcome.  In fact, as Bourinot continues, 
“[T]he discontent that existed in Canada for so many years had the effect, not of 
diminishing but of enlarging the political privileges of the Canadian people.”44  The idea 
that local interests could be secured by Confederation through the concept of mutual 
security became a critical selling point.     
Confederation stemmed from the pre-existing desire of both French Canadians 
and Upper Canadians to “federalize” United Canada such that they may become 
“masters” of their “own house.”  The idea of Confederation was the nation-building light 
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bulb moment that came long after discussions of federalization originated.45  As Romney 
reminds us, the point of federation was to “depoliticize the contentious issues that had led 
to sectional deadlock in United Canada….The crucial thing was to write a constitution 
that gave the local legislatures ample power and confined the federal authority to matters 
of general interest.”46  To view Confederation as a ‘centralist’ achievement 
misunderstands our history and the political constraints the founders were working under.  
It is true that they say little about the philosophical undercurrents of federalism.  But the 
intensity with which they defend local autonomy speaks louder than words.  For decades, 
the colonists experienced the benefits of what the federal principle promised to secure.  
As we will see, it was not just the protection of local interests that drew them to 
federalization; there were additional benefits they envisioned.   
B. The Practice of Federalism  
Now that we have had the opportunity to expose common misconceptions about 
Confederation, we are now in a position to discuss the practical benefits that stem from 
federal institutions.  I will refer to Canada’s founding debates and explain why the fathers 
believed the federal system was a superior form of government—and indeed, a better way 
of life.  This section will be confined to analyzing the arguments the founders made in 
support of a federal union.  That is to say, I will only address what the founders said.  The 
unstated benefits and implications of federalism will be addressed in a later section.   
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To borrow the words of Martin Diamond, federalism is “a political arrangement 
made intelligible only by the ends men seek to make it serve.”47  The founders identified 
four ends they intended federalism to facilitate: the protection and control of local 
interests; heightened government responsiveness; greater unity, focus, and reflection in 
the national legislature; and a closer relationship between political choice and 
consequence.  Only by understanding the connection between ends and means can one 
appreciate the role that federalism plays in Canadian government and society.  By 
looking to Canada’s founding debates we are reminded of this connection.   
Protection and Control of Local Interests  
 
I will begin with the most obvious and recurring argument that was presented in 
support of federalization: the protection and control of local interests.  Given the diversity 
of customs and mores across the vast landscape of British North America, it is not 
surprising that local autonomy was at the forefront of Canada’s founding debates.  
Section 92 (and to a certain extent, sections 92(A) and 93) of the British North America 
Act (as it then was) enumerates the “classes of subjects” “exclusively” assigned to the 
“Legislatures of the Provinces.”48   While some representatives wished for even greater 
provincial authority than what was presented, several legislators pointed out the benefits 
and safeguards contained within it.  William Henry, for example, emphasized the matters 
that would remain under the legislative control of Nova Scotia: “Education, roads and 
bridges, control of our jurisprudence, and other subjects in which we take the deepest 
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interest are left to our own control” (emphasis added).49  In reference to the laws and 
religion of Lower Canada, N.-F. Belleau found the “guarantee of all these things,” 
including the “control of all matters relating to its institutions,…its manufactures and its 
autonomy.”50  George Brown, in a lengthy and eloquent speech, stated: Confederation 
“secures to the people of each province full control over the administration of their own 
internal affairs….Each province is to have control over its own crown lands, crown 
timber, and crown minerals—and will be free to take such steps for developing them as 
each deems best.”51   
From these statements, and the arguments identified by other delegates, it is clear 
that local autonomy was a principle in which the provinces were unwilling to part.  
Consider what Charles Tupper, a delegate and “insider,” had to say: “a legislative union 
was really not practically before us—for there were difficulties lying in its path such as to 
render its adoption impossible.”52  George Etienne Cartier, another architect of the 
legislative proposals, agreed with the status of the situation: “We had either to take a 
federal union or drop the negotiation….There was but one choice upon us—federal union 
or nothing.”53  He raises this point because the founders knew that a federalized system 
allows us to answer the question: how should we live?  
In addition to possessing the constitutional authority to shape and control local 
affairs, a federal union protects local interests from the pitfalls of “representation by 
population.”  It protects the interests of smaller provinces from the influence of larger 
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provinces. George Howland, a representative from Nova Scotia, agreed with the proposed 
remedy: a “federal union” protects local interests and enclaves from having to “contend” 
with more populace regions.54  T.H. Haviland echoed Howland’s support because there 
“would be no degradation of any of the provincial legislatures and governments….The 
power of the federal government to interfere with the exclusively internal affairs of any 
of the confederated provinces would be of the most limited and inconsiderable 
character.”55  Absent a federal system, it was feared that provincial interests would be lost 
in the shuffle, that their “institutions and laws might be assailed,” and that the “ancestral 
associations, on which they prided themselves, attacked and prejudiced.”56  With the 
protection and control of local issues followed a sense of security.     
Heightened Government Responsiveness  
 
Second, the founders believed that a federal union established heightened levels 
of government responsiveness because it provided to each province a legislative forum 
that dealt exclusively with local affairs.  This in turn allows provincial representatives to 
focus their energy and attention upon matters that are of the “deepest interest”—
education, infrastructure, natural resources, culture and the like—without having to 
contend with the interprovincial interests or the counteracting influence of representatives 
from other provinces.  In a federal system, elected officials are less bogged down and 
more accessible to constituents; have a greater working knowledge of the culture, needs 
and habits of the province in which they are serving; and are able to process bills, and 
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establish mandates, with a more efficient and decisive flair.  A few words on why the 
Founders believed a unitary state was a poor fit for the people of Canada.   
It in the Confederation debates, it was frequently pointed out that in legislative 
unions such as Britain, significant time is required for general assemblies to process local 
bills.57  They create unmanageable workloads for elected officials and unrealized 
expectations for constituents.  George Etienne Cartier said as much in his speech before 
the Assembly: “It is impossible to have one government to deal with all the private and 
local interests of the several sections of the several provinces forming the combined 
whole.”58   The founders also realized that problems with government responsiveness 
worsened in countries with vast territory and cultural diversity.  While Britain is 
geographically small and relatively homogenous, many argued that if a legislative union 
were “proposed for a country with the area and extent of territory that British American 
possesses, its realization is attended with great difficulties, if not with insuperable 
obstacles.”59  The concern is that if representatives address scores of local matters while 
they are in session, rarely would they be “home” or available to constituents to address 
additional needs and concerns.  To maintain the pace of requests, along with the duties 
associated with the “great and leading questions”60 of the day, is neither sustainable nor 
good government—and the founders knew that. 
However, the preoccupation of busyness under a legislative union is not the only 
factor that diminishes government responsiveness.  It is not good practice for local 
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matters to be addressed in national legislatures because representatives who are “foreign” 
to the area whose interests are in question vote on matters in which they are ill 
acquainted.  They are not attached to the issues that are presented before them, nor are 
they immersed in the customs of the region from which the bills originate.  Political 
disengagement from the customs that are being affected frustrates the benefits and virtue 
that self-government otherwise invites.  If citizens in smaller provinces are unable to 
influence government to reflect the needs, customs and principles that they most cherish, 
they will be less likely to engage on issues at the “national” level.    
Perhaps a greater problem than indifference to local customs and priorities is the 
potential for regional strife.  With but one national purse to govern the priorities of the 
entire country, competing interests within a legislative union would inevitably dominate 
and detract from the effectiveness of Parliament.  The reason for this is that political 
representatives are predisposed to protecting the interests of their own constituency.  
Local issues are diverse, distinct, and at times, contradictory; and when local advocacy 
and competing interests cloud the objectivity and focus of political deliberation, 
disappointing outcomes typically arise.  This is precisely why it is difficult to address 
competing local issues in a national legislature, for what one region desires, another 
opposes.  As T.H. Haviland reminds us: Confederation has the “means of happily 
extinguishing those little waspish political feuds and jealousies which had so long acted 
as a drag upon our progress and been a disgrace to us as a people.”61  The same 
legislators making administrative decisions for French Canada should not be making 
education and infrastructure decisions for Western Canada.  Those decisions should be 
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left up to the provincially-elected representatives of the provinces whose needs are in 
question. 
In contrast, a unitary state with a single parliament is inefficient, and at times, 
ineffective because local and general issues are addressed under the “same roof.”  For 
example, the range of issues Britain has to address under one legislature Canada gets to 
address under several legislatures.  As a result, the British House of Commons has less 
time to address matters of “great importance” because it is distracted or bogged down by 
multitudes of “unimportant” local issues.  On the flip side, the British Parliament may 
focus a great deal of energy on “general issues” at the expense of local ones.  It does not 
appear, therefore, that a legislative union is well suited for multitasking: it lacks the time 
and institutional muscle to simultaneously address both types of issues.  
In sum, it follows that if one level of government is based exclusively on issues of 
a local nature, government will be more responsive to the electorate because federalism 
narrows the range of issues to which federal or provincial governments can legislate.  
Elected decision-makers would thus be from the province of the citizens they represent, 
and in turn, would be better equipped to handle the local issues in which they were 
entrusted.  This has the end consequence of heightening government responsiveness and 
creating a closer connection between citizen and state.  In light of the Canada’s diverse 
population, the founders wanted to avoid creating a ticking time bomb in the House of 
Commons.  They wanted Parliament to function efficiently and effectively, not to be 
overrun by the passions of populist desires.  In short, they wanted the representatives of 
the national legislature to be deliberative and focused.     
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National Unity, Focus and Reflection  
“Focus” and “reflection” are words not often associated with parliamentary 
proceedings, but that is precisely the outcome the founders believed that federalism 
would deliver to its national legislature.  They saw the creation of provincial legislatures 
as a means to de-clutter Parliament from having to process countless and monotonous 
local requests.  The functional implications of this benefit are three.  First, the removal of 
local issues from the national decision-making table enhances the focus and efficiency of 
Parliament.  It follows that if the workloads and priorities of politicians are 
unencumbered by local affairs—speed limits in playground zones, or the capital funding 
priorities of rural municipalities—they will be better equipped to deal with the rigor 
demanded by issues of general or “great importance,” like national defense and 
international trade.  Several representatives echoed this sentiment. 
H.-L. Langevin, for example, pointed out that because there “will be no questions 
of race, nationality, religion, or locality,” Parliament will only “be charged with the great 
general questions which will interest alike the whole confederacy and not one locality 
only.”62  Charles Tupper also weighed in: “The difficulties in the way of a legislative 
union are that the legislature has not only to be occupied with the discussion of the great 
and leading questions which touch the vital interests of every section of the country, but 
to give its attention largely to matters of merely local concern.”63  George Brown 
understood the profundity of the federal provision.  He stated that it “sweeps away the 
boundary line between the provinces so far as regards matters common to the whole 
people—it places all on an equal level—and the members of the federal legislature will 
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meet at last as citizens of a common country.”64  Ambrose Shea of Newfoundland 
recognized its unifying elements: the “aggregate” of representatives who pontificate in 
the absence of local issues greatly increases the “efficacy for common purposes of public 
advantage.”65  From a time management view alone, legislatures would benefit from 
federalism.  They would have more time to concentrate on the great and leading 
discussions of the day instead of using their time to lobby for special interests, which 
brings us to our next point.      
Removing local issues from national consideration removes the deep-seeded 
passions that typically accompany politics.  As we alluded to above, no longer will 
provinces need to compete for ideas or a finite share of resources under a single 
legislature; how they deal with their local affairs is now up to them.  The founders knew 
that when politicians try to play two conflicting roles simultaneously, neither role gets 
done well.  Either a representative is too preoccupied with national issues to bother with 
local ones; or he is too caught up with local zeal to objectively and properly concentrate 
on national issues.  Consider what George Brown had to say: “We have thrown over on 
the localities all the questions which experience has shown lead directly to local jealously 
and discord, and we have retained in the hands of the general government all the powers 
necessary to secure a strong and efficient administration of public affairs.”66  In other 
words, by reducing the number of opportunities for regional “jealousies” to enter the fold, 
politicians at the national level have less reason to be distracted.  And if they are less 
distracted they will more thoughtfully and strategically engage in national affairs.  
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Third, it is easier for a country to unite over issues that do not involve, alter, 
jeopardize or call into question the habits of its people.  The founders knew that national 
unity would not exist if local matters were addressed under a single legislature.  
However, by meeting the basic needs of citizens through the principle of local authority, 
provinces are in a better position to unite over matters that provide a general advantage, 
such as national security, for the federation system “was the best and most practicable 
mode of bringing the provinces together so that particular rights and interests should be 
properly guarded and protected.”67  As George Etienne-Cartier aptly summarizes:  
It sweeps away the boundary line between the provinces so far as regards matters 
common to the whole people—it places all on an equal level—and the members 
of the federal legislature will meet at last as citizens of a common country….No 
man need hereafter be debarred from success in public life because his views, 
however popular in his own section, are unpopular in the other—for he will not 
have to deal with sectional questions; and the temptation to the government of the 
day to make capital out of local prejudices will be greatly lessened, if not 
altogether at an end…a most happy day will it be for Canada when this bill goes 
into effect, and all these subjects of discord are swept from the discussion of our 
legislature.68 
 
Indeed, it is easier for a national representative from (what would become) Quebec to 
collaborate with a national representative from Western Canada if they are not at odds 
over how best to prioritize public infrastructure projects.  While they may not agree on 
every national issue upon which they deliberate, it follows that “waspish political feuds” 
over local matters will no longer derail them.     
In the absence of local matters, politicians will be more focused on “high level” 
issues, which demand deeper deliberation and debate.  In turn, this creates an 
environment that is conducive to reflection.  And reflection is needed to make sensible 
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decisions.  Removing the trivial and mundane lessens the level of distraction and the 
potential for grandstanding.  When national issues get decided, it is for the country as a 
whole.  Federalism, in short, better lends itself toward unity over issues that have far-
reaching national implications.    
Political choice and consequence  
 
The fourth and final benefit that the fathers ascribed to federalism is that 
provincial control of local affairs bridges the gap between political choice and 
consequence.  It was understood that if the people of a province, through the principle of 
representative democracy, are in charge of managing their local affairs, they must live out 
the consequences of their political decisions.  If the ruling party of a province 
mismanages its finances, for example, the people of that province will hold the ruling 
party accountable and vote them out of office.  In the alternative, if the electorate wishes 
to vote in a government that makes social programs a priority, they must devise a strategy 
on how to fund, and subsequently, sustain it.  The founders understood that with local 
control, a greater level of responsibility followed.     
Fortunately, under a federalized system, the mismanagement of affairs of one 
province does not affect, or take away from, the fiscal standing of another.  Indeed, the 
founders understood that federalism protects fiscally prudent and industrious provinces 
from having to bailout or subsidize the political mismanagement of other provinces.  
George Howlan, a member of Prince Edward Island, was uneasy about Confederation 
because he was concerned that the hard work and enterprise of his colony would be for 
naught: “It is well enough for those to go into Confederation who have not been able to 
manage their own affairs, but for us to do so in the prosperous state of our revenue would 
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be but committing political suicide.”69  Howlan was concerned that the fortune of his 
people would get mixed into the pot, and that the less prosperous regions would benefit.  
This, he said, would not be a favorable pitch to the people of Prince Edward Island.   
Last, under a federal union, provinces must pay for what they wish for.  That is to 
say, if provinces desire programs or infrastructure initiatives, they must use the local or 
provincial treasury to fund them.  George Brown, for one, was frustrated by the 
inequitable distribution of resources: “We have complained that local works of various 
kinds…have been erected in an inequitable and improvident manner.  Well, sir, this 
scheme remedies that; all local works are to be constructed by the localities and defrayed 
from local funds….Local governments are to have control over local affairs, and if our 
friends in Lower Canada choose to be extravagant, they will have to bear the burden of it 
themselves”70  Although his comments point to the long standing hostility between 
French Canada and English Canada, his point nevertheless rings true: if a province 
wishes to administer costly social programs, they alone must pay for it.  On the other 
hand, if one lives in a province that fails to provide adequate health care services, he or 
she can move to a province that does.  At the end of the day, it is up to the constituents of 
a province to measure the success of the decisions of their elected representatives.  If 
taxes must increase in order to pay for initiatives that are desired by its constituents, the 
legislature must justify a tax increase to its voters.  Upon seeing the consequence of 
greater service levels (i.e. tax hikes), voters will have the opportunity to evaluate whether 
that is a political course they wish to sustain. 
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C. The Virtues of Federalism Rightly Understood 
As we learned from the discussion above, federalism provides the institutional 
apparatus that facilitates the moral conversion from individualist to citizen.  The growth 
of the liberal soul is therefore tied to the preservation of the ends that federalism is 
intended to serve.  Since 1949, the Supreme Court of Canada has been tasked with the 
responsibility of federal judicial review.  How they shape the division of legislative 
authority—as well as the type of intergovernmental arrangements they tolerate or 
embrace—determines whether the ends of federalism survive or perish.        
Political Accountability and the Expression of Electoral Will  
A moral defense of federalism thus begins with a recognition that a legitimate and 
distinctive division of legislative power exists.  In order for responsible government to 
work under a federal constitution, citizens must have a clear understanding of the division 
of powers, because “an electorate ignorant of which order of government bears 
responsibility for what policy lacks the capability of expressing its political will.”71  That 
is to say, if the courts permit distortions to federal/provincial authority—for example, 
through conditional grants by way of the controversial federal spending power—citizens 
lose the ability to hold government accountable because it is unclear which level of 
government is responsible for what.  Under such circumstances it is difficult for voters to 
evaluate the failure or success of ruling parties because track records are masked by 
federal contributions.  Conditional grants also have strings attached to them, which 
contradicts the principle of local autonomy.  Additional political developments, like 
equalization payments, also interfere with the ends of federalism.  In the paragraphs that 
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Stephen Harper Matters (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 2009): 185. 
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follow I will explain how a disregard for exclusive jurisdictional boundaries crushes the 
spirit of citizenship, promotes dependency, the universalization of services and standards, 
and the groundwork for individualism and entitlement.   
A federal constitution informs citizens of the issues subject to their control.  A 
clear understanding of provincial jurisdiction is essential, therefore, because it outlines 
what exactly, on the local level, is “at stake.”  Through the lens of exclusivity, the 
mismanagement of the economy in Newfoundland, for example, is not the problem of 
Alberta or British Columbia; likewise, the mismanagement of local affairs by Alberta or 
British Columbia is not the problem of Newfoundland.  Individual provinces are a 
reflection of their electorate; what they choose is what they get.  The intent of the federal 
system, and in particular, the provision of local control, is that if a province desires 
socialized medicine, they must devise a means to pay for it without relying on the coffers 
of other provinces to do so.  If a province wishes to invest large sums of tax dollars into 
arts and high culture, at the expense of education and infrastructure, they must find the 
provincial means to pay for it and allow the electorate to judge the merits of their 
decision.   
It follows that, to violate provincial jurisdiction unavoidably undermines or 
compromises the fundamental principle of political accountability.  Responsibility is not 
learned when a province is not subject to the consequences of the management of it local 
affairs.  In turn, this erodes individual responsibility, which in turn, destroys liberty by 
creating dependency.  However, it is important to realize that the ability to assert one’s 
will is not a good in itself.  Assertion in the absence of deliberation is dangerous.  On the 
one hand, popular sovereignty is a fundamental principle of Canadian government: the 
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political executive is responsible to the legislature, the legislature to the voters.  The 
government, therefore, is a reflection of its electorate.  
Educative elements of Federalism      
“Local liberty is a rare and fragile thing... [T]he strength of free peoples resides in 
the local community.  Local institutions are to liberty what primary schools are to 
science.”72  Federalism teaches one to use liberty constructively because it closes the gap 
between individual choice and consequence.  Drawing on Tocqueville, Marvin 
Zetterbaum makes the insightful observation that the responsibility and communal 
associations facilitated by federalism transforms “the atoms of democratic society into 
citizens…whose first thought is not of their private interest, but of the common 
good….By learning to care about and cooperate on political matters that affect him 
directly, each citizen is to acquire the rudiments of public responsibility.  The township is 
thus the locus of the transformation of self-interest into a species of patriotism.”73  
Another way of looking at it is that civic responsibility is engendered by closing 
the proximity between what is private and what is public.74  In other words, the gap 
between public and private is narrowed because federalism teaches cooperation through 
necessity and mutual dependency.  Using Delba Winthrop’s illustration, we can see that 
federal instruction begins when man sees that he “cannot meet all his needs by himself 
and, therefore, that his good is linked to the good of others.  The others comprise the 
township, the community of which he is a part.  In the township the link between private 
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and public good is most visible, as when one must impose a tax on oneself to pay for a 
new school that benefits everyone’s children.”75  However, that is not to say that federal 
principles are inherently opposed to individual rights and liberties, nor is it a utilitarian 
justification of federalism.76  Rather, through the cooperation enlarged by political and 
civil associations, citizens will be more inclined to direct their interests (and actions) with 
the welfare of the community in mind.  Not only will they see the consequences of their 
own actions, but the actions of others.  
Federalism as Means of Combating the Universalizing Tendencies of Modernity 
According to Tocquevillian scholar, Harvey C. Mansfield, the “greatest danger to 
democracy comes out of democracy itself.”77  The Fathers of Confederation were 
skeptical of the tendencies of pure democracy.  They believed that federal institutions 
were an important, though by no means exclusive, means of protecting democracy from 
the despotism to which it was prone.  Diamond states that by its very nature, democracy 
“destroys the variety and strength of associations, localities, and individuals.”78  By its 
deepest tendency, the tendency to “individualism,” Tocqueville reminds us that 
democracy threatens quite literally to dehumanize mankind, utterly to isolate men from 
one another, to render them “alike and equal, constantly circling around in pursuit of the 
petty and banal pleasure with which they glut their souls,” leading to apathy and civic 
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disengagement, “forever thrown back on himself alone…shut up in the solitude of his 
own heart.”79  
Because federalism narrows the gap between choice and consequence, it works to 
combat individualism because it forces one to live in (and see the consequence of) his or 
her own actions and the actions of the whole.  In contrast, in centralized democracies that 
address both local and general issues, everyone is in the “same boat.”   At first glance, it 
appears that such countries are better suited to the ideals of “unity,” because they are not 
“fragmented” by the diversity and competing ideals of semi-autonomous units.  This 
contention is problematic, however, because it does not take into adequate consideration 
the inherent individualism that is commonly found in democratic unitary states.   
There is a relationship between the political institutions and the habits of its 
people.  Because one is lost in the sea of “mass man” he becomes a number, a statistic in 
the latest census, losing the ability to discern what it means to be an individual.  He 
becomes an anonymous nobody, disconnected with community not only because unitary 
states destroy them but because one’s personal wellbeing no longer depends on them.  
Although other factors are at work, it appears that the institutions of unitary states are 
fundamentally predisposed to centralization and universalization, which is influenced in 
no small part by the forces of equality.   
Unity under these circumstances is only a façade; the only thing shared is that 
everyone is equally unimportant.  In turn, there is less civic virtue and a more oligarchic 
structure of society.  Individual actions become absorbed into the abyss.  As a result, men 
become less social and more private, less community-minded and more self-centered.  
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And when the pursuit of private pleasures become the driving force behind individual 
actions, unity will be unattainable because shared goals and the common good are 
replaced by conflicting goals of pleasure and acquisition.  This does not provide a strong 
basis for combating tyranny; it invites it.  
D. Conclusion 
 
It is important to acknowledge our founding principles because those who view 
the Constitution Act, 1867 as a pragmatic compromise prematurely disregard the 
principles inherent in its design.  That is not to say that negotiation and compromise were 
altogether absent, or that future change is ill advised or impossible.  However, the 
benefits of federalism—and the fathers’ vision for it—are lost by incorrect readings of 
history.  Although the founders’ federal perspectives are stated less directly than their 
American counterparts, the principles contained within them are neither absent nor a 
JCPC afterthought; they are intertwined in the broader assumptions and institutional 
mechanisms of responsible government.  Therefore, an erroneous understanding of 
Confederation not only loses sight of our founding principles, but also the benefits they 
were meant to secure and the behavior they were intended to encourage.   
Self government depends for its existence on individual responsibility and civic 
engagement; federalism facilitates these virtues.  As Edward Freeman once stated, “[A] 
Federal Union must depend for its permanence, not on the sentiment but on the reason of 
its citizens.”80  Contemporary society would be wise to ponder the significance of his 
statement.  When the Courts apply the division of powers in a pure, plain form—that is to 
say, their original intention—our founding constitutional principles are naturally 
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manifested throughout politics and society.  However, when the Court inserts its own 
principles into the federation, or rely heavily on a pragmatic approach to resolving 
disputes, the intended design of the founding is compromised.   
As we shall see in the next chapter, the modern Court does not confine itself to an 
originalist reading of the Constitution Act, 1867.  Judges are policymakers who select 
doctrines based on consequences that are informed by “political rather than legal 
notions.”81  In the post-Charter era, Supreme Court judges have become active 
participants in fundamental questions of law, which, in turn, raises the question of which 
values or principles to expand or classify as rights.82  While Charter issues may dominate 
the constitutional arena of the post-Charter era, the same judges who settle Charter 
matters decide federalism cases.  And just as Charter decisions involve the selection of 
competing values, so too, does the federalism questions that come before them.   Judicial 
decisions are the byproduct of the political attitudes of the judges that create them. 
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Chapter II 
The Post-Charter Decision-Making Climate of the Court 
 
Former U.S. Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes once stated: “We are under a 
Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is.”83  His statement, delivered 
in a speech in 1907 before the New York Chamber of Commerce, provides an excellent 
backdrop to post-Charter case law and the decision-making ideology of the justices who 
create it.  As unelected decision-makers in an age of judicial power, the role and function 
of the modern judge has become closely tied to concerns about the legitimacy of judicial 
review.  While Canadian society is governed by statutes and a constitution—documents 
created by politicians who are elected by the people—it is up to judges, when making 
decisions, to determine what they mean and how they are applied.  That judges interpret 
laws and resolve disputes is not controversial in itself; however, it is the decision-making 
determinants of Canada’s National High Court that has sparked much research, 
controversy and debate.     
In order to better understand judges—and the creation and impact of judicial 
decisions—one must first understand the climate through which the gestation of their 
reasoning takes place.  What is the Court, who are its judges, and what do they do?  What 
is the nature of the decision-making climate upon which they operate and decide, and by 
what measures are judges accountable and protected from outside scrutiny?  This chapter 
provides a contextual overview of the post-Charter era.  It begins by surveying the major 
schools of thought that attempt to understand the factors that contribute to modern law 
interpretation, and then examines recent developments in judicial behavior that take place 
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both inside and outside the Court.  In turn, this reveals the evolving role of judges as well 
the liberties and securities they enjoy as unaccountable, appointed decision-makers.  To 
be sure, if the ultimate goal of this project is to understand the decision-making 
philosophy that underpins the Supreme Court’s federalism jurisprudence—and the 
subsequent impact it has on the moral purpose of federalism—one needs to gain a firm 
understanding of our judiciary and the judges who staff it.    
A. Institutional Considerations 
The post-Charter era is unlike that of any other in the history of Canadian 
Constitutional discourse.  Its creation produced not simply an additional string of 
entrenched rights for judges to work with and apply, but ushered in a decision-making 
culture that significantly altered the way judicial business was conducted.84  Gone are the 
days of judges as simple interpreters of the law, quiet law-finders who are heard, and 
usually only seen, delivering statements from the bench.  On the contrary, the post-
Charter era represents a new style of judging that involves a more broad based network 
of ideas and interactions which encompasses previously unchartered waters: 
policymaking and law creation within the court; academic contributions and political 
opinions outside the court.  With almost complete docket control—and a level of 
independence unrivaled internationally—modern judges wield considerable discretionary 
power.  While it is not inherently problematic for judges to exercise discretion, it is how a 
judge behaves in light of this discretion that is up for discussion.  Indeed, what is to stop a 
judge from siding with the litigant or idea that most accurately aligns with his or her 
personal beliefs?   
                                                
84 F. L. Morton, Law, Politics, and the Judicial Process in Canada, edition 3 (Calgary, 
AB: University of Calgary Press, 2002): xi. 
 49 
In light of the institutional measures that protect the judiciary from external 
pressures, how can one be assured that judges are acting in an impartial, objective, and, 
above all, an apolitical manner?  Before we can look at the principles and political 
choices that are embedded in the Supreme Court’s federalism case law, we must first 
look at the institutional norms and provisions of the judges who create it.  
Judicial independence 
 
Central to the rule of law in liberal-pluralist democracies is the institutional 
provision of an impartial and independent judiciary.  In its most basic form, 
independence can be said to exist if judges are able to take actions, and make decisions, 
without fear of interference by another.  It is the idea that “a judge ought to be free to 
decide the case before her without fear or anticipation of (illegitimate) punishments or 
rewards.”85  In Canada, judicial independence is firmly entrenched in legal tradition, 
statutory provisions and case law, which, at its most elementary level, provides for a 
judge’s security of tenure, a judge’s financial security and independence from 
administration.86  This is important, because in order for the courts to have the 
opportunity to adjudicate impartially, independence from citizens and government alike 
is a necessary prerequisite to effective lawmaking.   
Traditionally, judicial independence is the primary institutional fortress by which 
legal decisions are protected from potential political backlash.  In the post-Charter years, 
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however, significant questions about the purpose and boundaries of judicial independence 
have surfaced.  While the Court built upon the traditional English style embodied in 
sections 96-100 of the Constitution Act, 1867 it has adopted a far more expansive and 
nuanced application of the concept, which received its most controversial and far 
reaching elucidation in Reference re: Remuneration of Provincial Court Judges.87  In this 
decision, and the ones that followed, the Court conceptualized independence in terms 
unparalleled in other western democracies—a decision that changed the culture of the 
Court as well as the relationship between judges and government.88  
In the Remuneration reference, the Court entered unchartered territory when it 
created for itself a newfound function.  No longer simply the resolver of disputes, the 
Canadian courts became the “protectors of the constitution,”89 which necessarily implies 
a more activist role.  Further, this decision rested on a new institutional discovery—the 
“separation of powers,” an American phrase that is neither found in the Constitution Act, 
1867 nor its founding debates.  Unlike the American system, however, the Court 
enunciated a doctrine to which the obverse—“check and balances”—was replaced by 
“protectors of the constitution.”  This is unlike other systems, and for not so flattering 
reasons.  With the separation of powers doctrine, the “point is not just that political 
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authority is divided between the branches of government, but that each branch has the 
capacity to check, and suffers the frustration of being checked by, the others.”90   
As the institutional measures for judicial protection go, concerns about the conduct of 
judges continue to linger.   
With judicial power at an all time high, what recourse does government have, say, 
when the Court oversteps their boundaries through policy creation?  Does separation in 
the absence of checks and balances promote activism?  In an article published in 1996, 
Schmeiser and McConnell spoke of “a time of unparalleled conflict between Canadian 
Provincial Court systems and the governments which established them.”91  This has the 
potential of being problematic, for today’s judges “enjoy more power over more matters, 
which they apply with more discretion, and in circumstances of greater insulation and 
immunity from negative feedback, than ever before.  This carries profound implications 
for the future of Canadian politics; judicial power has not yet achieved its full size.”92  
That the Court gets to determine the nature and scope of its caseload in light of this 
independence is the subject of the section that follows. 
Docket control     
 
In Canada, the Supreme Court maintains tight docket control, a development 
which stems from a 1974 amendment to the Supreme Court Act.93  Since then, the 
number of cases granted leave to appeal spiked from 15 percent to 85, far surpassing the 
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number of appeals heard by right.94  Procedurally, almost any case can make its way from 
a lower court to the Supreme Court, provided said application is granted by the Court’s 
docket review committees.95  
The emergence of such a trend can be explained by two key interrelated factors.  
First, a statutory change in 1975 altered the criteria underpinning the classification of 
appeals, where the leave to appeal process “became the central avenue to the Court’s 
docket.”96  Prior to this revision, for example, an appeal of right existed for any civil case 
involving a dispute in excess of $10,000.  This had the unintended effect of bogging 
down the Supreme Court’s docket, thus making it difficult to concentrate on more 
pressing concerns.  Since the Supreme Court Act was amended in 1975 to allow the Court 
to filter out that which was frivolous, the “leave to appeal” process became the primary 
vehicle through which Canada’s highest court of appeal could be reached.  While appeals 
as of right still exist for some criminal matters, most civil and constitutional issues are up 
to the discretion of judges.97  
Consider what the most recently amended Supreme Court Act has to say:  
                                                
94 Charles Epp, “Do Bills of Rights Matter,” American Political Science Review 90 
(1996): 75-77;   
95 Ian Green et al., Final Appeal: Decision-Making in Canadian Courts of Appeal 
(Toronto, ON: James Lorimer & Company, 1998): 107-112; McCormick, Supreme at 
Last, 86. 
96 Roy B. Flemming, “The Selection of Cases for Judicial Review in the Supreme Court 
of Canada,” in Law, Politics, and the Judicial Process in Canada, edited by F.L. Morton 
(University of Calgary press, 2002): 546; James G. Snell and Frederick Vaughan The 
Supreme Court of Canada: History of the Institution (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1985): 233. 
97 In criminal cases, unlike civil matters, a considerable range of appeals as of right exist; 
for example, this right comes into effect whenever a dissenting judge, who sits on a panel 
involving criminal activity, takes issue with a “question of law.”  There is, however, an 
exception: an appeal as of right exists when application for habeas corpus is denied (s. 
784(3)) or when a verdict of acquittal is reversed (s.691(2)), regardless of whether a 
justice at the appellant level dissented (Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 253.  
 53 
With respect to the particular case sought to be appealed, the Supreme Court is of 
the opinion that any question involved therein is, by reason of its public 
importance or the importance of any issue of law or any issue of mixed law and 
fact involved in that question, one that ought to be decided by the Supreme Court 
or is, for any other reason, of such a nature of significance as to warrant decision 
by it…[emphasis added].98        
 
And subsequent to that, Chief Justice Lamer, speaking on behalf of the Court stated his 
position on whether written reasons would accompany the decisions to affirm or deny 
requests for leave:   
The ability to grant or deny leave represents the sole means by which this Court is 
able to exert discretionary control over its docket.  In order to ensure that this 
Court enjoys complete flexibility in allocating its scare judicial resource toward 
cases of true public importance, as a sound rule of practice, we do not produce 
written reasons for grants and denials of leave [emphasis added].99   
 
A few noteworthy phrases jump out from the paragraphs above.  On whether a case 
should be appealed or not, the amendment to the Supreme Court Act reads that cases 
should be granted “leave” if they are of “public importance.”  However, the Act does not 
define “importance” in any way.  That is solely up to judges to determine after they 
weigh the merits of the leave to appeal applications that they receive.  Unlike judicial 
decisions, the Court does not provide, nor, as Lamer reminds us, does it need to provide 
reasons for its decisions to grant or denial requests for leave.  The energy involved to 
fulfill such a task would hinder the Court’s ability to focus on cases of “true public 
importance.”  From these statements, three important considerations emerge.   
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First, the Supreme Court has the freedom to “set its own agenda.”100  With 
tremendous discretionary docket control, the Court has the ability to regulate the size of 
its caseload and timing of the cases it releases.  Indeed, there is an implicit double 
message behind almost every case the Court delivers: that the case was important enough 
for them to hear, and second, that it was important enough for them to direct resources to 
produce reasons to resolve it.  As we will discuss in more detail in Chapter 4, this is an 
important consideration when reviewing the federalism caseload of the Court: with the 
exception of reference questions directed from Parliament, every federalism case that 
appeared before the Court since 1984 was heard after leave to appeal was granted.  
Further, eight of the 81 federalism cases that were granted leave were dismissed at oral 
argument.  Of course, the Court never states at the onset why they chose to hear the case 
that they did, which bring us to our next point.        
When the Court makes the decision to grant or deny an application for leave, it 
does not need to justify that decision.  In most cases, written applications for leave are 
rejected outright, or, after a brief oral hearing in the presence of a small panel of judges, a 
verbal decision is given, and the parties go their separate ways.101  While the giving of 
reasons would do much to clarify the direction of future litigants, it is important that one 
not read into leave to appeal decisions aspects that are not there.  For example, “a denial 
of leave to appeal does not imply that the leave-denying panel of the Supreme Court 
thought that the lower decision was rightly decided.”102  The fact that a case is heard or 
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not says little about the merits of the case, if it is dismissed; or the probability of it 
succeeding, if it is allowed.  
Third, the Court does not define nor does it provide any jurisprudence or hints 
that outline how it conceptualizes “public importance.”  Former Supreme Court Justice 
Sopinka’s book The Conduct of an Appeal is the best and perhaps the only resource to 
consult.  Although his account lacks detail, it lays out “hints” to attorneys about what 
constitutes “importance.”103  Among some of his rather vague observations, importance 
can encompass: “novel” constitutional issues, “significant” federal statutes of general 
application, conflicting decisions in lower courts, the need to revisit important questions 
of law, and provincial statues “similar to legislation in other provinces.”104  Like the 
phrase “public importance,” words like “novel” and “significant” remain ambiguous.  
Sopinka’s book does not provide any concrete examples, which would serve to 
contextualize the criterion that he identified.   
Interestingly, however, there are numerous researchers who attempt to uncover 
the variables which increase the probability of successful leave to appeal applications.  
One subset of research, for example, looks at the impact of “lawyer persuasion,” that is, 
the ability of litigators to persuade the Court to hear an appeal.105  This involves analyses 
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of which buttons to push or which buzz words to say.  In short, researchers suggest that 
the intellectual packaging of provocative legal arguments influences the Supreme Court’s 
decision to hear an appeal.  While the impact of such persuasion is less pronounced in 
Canada than in the United States, it is significant that attorneys are armed with research 
that guides how they craft oral argument so as to maximize its impact on the ideological 
compositions of the pre-hearing panels of the Court.  The point that stands out from the 
rest is that the political attitudes of judges influence the choices they make and the 
arguments they are willing to consider.       
B. Internal Dimensions 
There are three major schools of thought that attempt to place the chief 
determinants of judicial decision-making into an intelligible framework.  These 
approaches tend to fall along a legal/political continuum and can be referred to as the 
legal model, the attitudinal model, and the strategic or “rational choice” model.  Each 
approach carries with it distinct presuppositions about the law in general and the factors 
that shape how it is created or interpreted in particular.  According to one scholar, these 
models are divided fundamentally along intellectual or disciplinary lines, that is, between 
legal scholars and political scientists.  “The former,” Emmett Macfarlane notes, “tend to 
view law as autonomous from politics and consider judges as generally capable of being 
impartial or objective arbiters while the latter generally see law and legal interpretation as 
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inherently political.”106  In the paragraphs that follow, the main features and criticisms of 
each outlook will be highlighted.  As we will discuss in more detail in Chapter 6, the 
Supreme Court is a political institution that, in the words of Christopher Manfredi, makes 
“policy not as an accidental by-product of performing their adjudicate function but 
because a majority of their members concludes that one set of legal rules is more socially 
beneficial than another.”107  Attitudes, it can be said, inform judges, and from those 
attitudes judges negotiate and compromise—and form alliances or disagreements—
amidst competing conceptions of the public good.  In federalism cases, litigants attempt 
to convince the Court of one conception over another.         
The Legal Model 
There is an expectation in society—and in the legal profession more 
specifically—that judges use precedent, and rely on tradition, to justify decisions.  Not 
surprisingly, for much of our history judging was viewed as a “mechanical” process 
whereby judges interpreted and applied laws that were created by elected officials.  
Through strict adherence to precedent, judicial decisions were assembled in an objective, 
scientific-like manner.  The distinction between politicians and judges was clear, and the 
Court, it could be said, quietly went about its business.  Those who believe that judges 
find law, and render decisions that are based upon the discovery of the pure and original 
intent of statutes and precedents, are said to fall under the formalist, interpretivist, 
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doctrinal, or legal tradition.108  Fundamentally, decisions are said to derive from 
precedent, framers’ intent, and a “plain meaning” of statutes and the constitution.109  
Formalists believe that judicial decisions are devoid from the ideological attitudes, policy 
preferences or personal values of judges, who, in the classic rendering of Sir William 
Blackstone, are tasked “to determine, not according to [their] own private judgment, but 
according to the known laws and customs of the land; not delegated to pronounce a new 
law, but to maintain and expound the old one.”110  Although very few embrace the 
“purist” principles identified by Blackstone, the majority of those who subscribe to this 
model view law as independent of judicial decision-making.  That is, instead of reading 
into statutes and creating new laws, the practice of judging is “an objective, rationally-
bounded process…[where] judges apply and rationally elaborate upon the appropriate 
pre-existing rules, established precedents, and settled legal principles.”111  
                                                
108 Raymond A. Belliotti, “Is Law a Sham?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 
XLVIII, No. 1 (September, 1987): 25.  There is a gamut of definitions and synonyms to 
the legal purist lens to lawmaking.  For the purposes of this paper, formalism, 
doctrinalism, interpretivism, rationalism and positivism, can be collectively “construed to 
include any commitment to a method of legal justification that can be clearly 
distinguished from open-ended ideological and political argumentation.  One such 
commitment is the belief in the presence of a deductive or quasi-deductive method 
capable of yielding determinate answers to legal questions” (cf. 28).  
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 59 
  In light of these reasons it should come as little surprise that the legal model is 
most commonly embraced within the legal community.  Such a framework is viewed as 
“correct,” because of the assumptions upon which it purports to rest, and most law 
professors, lawyers and judges subscribe to the “textbook” notion that judicial decisions 
are informed by precedent and the letter of the law.  To be sure, no judge is going to 
boast about his personal views on same-sex marriage in a same-sex marriage decision, or 
her preferences for immigration reform or capital punishment in a case involving the 
same.   
Although judges may have strong political opinions about how the law ought to 
be decided, they save such explicit elucidations for interviews or publications that happen 
outside the bench.  Indeed, the failure to “mask” personal opinion in the reasons for 
judgment would “give the lie to the mythology that the justices, their lower court 
colleagues, and off-the-bench-apologists have so insistently and persistently verbalized: 
that judges exercise little or no discretion; that they do not speak; rather, the Constitution 
and the laws speak through them.”112  As we shall see later, the same judges who deliver 
political opinions outside the bench—in interviews, publications, speeches, and the 
like—are the same judges making rendering decisions inside the Court.  The underlying 
question, then, is whether judges can separate the “personal” from the “professional.”   
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Outside the legal community there is little support for a formalist conception of 
the legal model.  Critics point to the fact that judges, “working with an identical set of 
facts, and with roughly comparable training in the law,” often arrive at conflicting 
conclusions, and that such divisions “grow out of the conscious or unconscious 
preferences and prejudices of the justices.”113  Indeed, the selection of precedent is a 
value statement in and of itself.  While “Judge X,” writing for the majority, may cite 
cases “A, B, and Z” to substantiate his reasons, “Judge Y,” in dissent, may cite cases “D, 
E and F.”  Both judges, in this case, adhere to precedent, but the cases they select, and the 
manner in which they are applied, is discretionary in itself.   
Hence, the legal explanations contained within written reasons “serve only to 
rationalize the Court’s decisions and to cloak the reality of the Court’s decision-making 
process.”114  With institutional provisions like security of tenure, independence and 
docket control at the forefront, critics have all the more reason to doubt the merits of an 
interpretivist framework.  The question, then, “what causes Justice A to select precedent 
X and conclusion Y as opposed to precedent B and conclusion C” raises a fundamental 
issue of judicial behavior: do the personal ideological preferences of judges dictate or 
influence in any manner the precedents they select and/or the decisions they deliver?    
In the early 1920s, well-known American legal scholars Karl Llewellyn and 
Jerome Frank raised very similar questions.  Aware of the changing nature of society, 
both thinkers emphasized the “conception of law in flux, of moving law, and of judicial 
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creation of law.”115  While they were not interested in hypothesizing whether or not 
judges had underlying ideological motives or political agendas (that came later), they 
were some of the first to point to law creation as an “inevitable fallout from an ever-
changing society.”116  Not long after, the behaviouralist revolution took hold within the 
social sciences, which led to the creation of a testable, methodological framework that 
allowed political scientists to measure the policy preferences and voting patterns of 
Supreme Court justices.117 
Attitudinal Model  
Over the past half-century, “attitudinalists” have dominated the theoretical 
landscape of our judiciary.118  Drawing on the intellectual origins of “legal realists” and 
behaviorists, attitudinal scholars begin with the assumption that written reasons and 
adherence to precedent serve to rationalize or mask a judge’s advancement of his own 
beliefs.  Moving from an understanding of decisions as “self-evident or self-enforcing 
logical deductions,” J.R. Mallory was one of the first who articulated the other important, 
dimension to judicial decision-making: personality and ideology.  As Gerald Baier 
summarizes, attitudinal “observers have come to disassociate the reasoning in decisions 
from their political impact.”119  By examining the voting patterns of judges in relation to 
the ideological outcomes of decisions, behaviorists have created theories and complicated 
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quantitative models to substantiate their hypotheses.  To add context, breadth and 
validity, they explore other areas, such as the judicial appointment process,120 profile of 
the pre-judicial careers, policy-preferences and worldviews of current judges;121 the role 
and impact of interveners and interest groups;122 the impact of law clerks on the assembly 
of materials; a look at judicial citation practices, and the like.  Understanding the 
decision-making psychology of judges, as well as the institution through which they 
channel this psychology, is crucial.  
 The fundamental issue for attitudinal subscribers is the factors that inform law 
creation.  Written reasons, while important for accountability reasons, simply serve as a 
guise for a more personal agenda.  “Political outcomes are better explained by the 
behavioral and attitudinal characteristics of judges than by the post hoc justifications 
found in judicial decisions.”123  As Rohde and Spaeth note, “the primary goals of 
Supreme Court justices in the decision making process are policy goals…and when the 
justices make decisions they want the outcomes to approximate as nearly as possible their 
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own policy preferences.”124  Walter Murphy, who is less subtle about the matter, says that 
law creation is conducted by a “Justice who is aware of the impact which judicial 
decisions can have on public policy, realizes the leeway for discretion which his office 
permits, and is willing to take advantage of this power and leeway to further particular 
policy aims.”125 Attitudinalists thus “find the key to judicial behavior in what the justices 
do, [rather than] what they say.”126 
 While the attitudinal model correctly acknowledges the reality of policymaking 
on the Courts, there are validity concerns inherent in the reductionist methodology of the 
approach.  Critics argue that it is difficult to quantify ideology into simple categories like 
“liberal” or “conservative;” for such ambiguous terms are too simplistic a measure to 
capture the complexity and individual motivations that underpin the outcome of 
decisions.127  Indeed, who gets to define “liberal” and “conservative?”  To list but two 
examples, there are libertarian “liberals” who emphasize both social and economic 
freedom, and there are socialist “liberals” who may embrace the welfare state in the 
economic sphere but may be more socially conservative in the moral sphere.  Further, 
behavioral predictor models have been shown to produce spurious findings because, as 
McFarlane notes, a “judge’s legal consistency could produce results that attitudinalists 
interpret as political consistency,” falsely attributing the underlying intent of a 
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decision.128  Three additional criticisms are well founded in the literature.  First, the 
attitudinal model has difficulties explaining the impressive lengths to which justices go to 
write separate concurrences and dissents.  As Cross writes, “a concurrence is exclusively 
a legal model activity, because the ideologically favored result is reached, yet the judge 
expends her resources to write an additional opinion.  The pure attitudinal model fails to 
explain why a judge would prefer any particular legal rationale for a given result.”129  To 
say that judges only make decisions that are purely consistent with their worldviews, 
oversimplifies the complexity and “behind-the-scenes” component of judging.  Second, 
given the impressive length and depth of most written reasons—the number of doctrines, 
principles and issues of law that are in handled in a single decision—it is difficult to 
determine which aspects of a decision that a judge agreed or disagreed, and/or which 
items, in the spirit of collegial negotiations, were “deal breakers” and which ones were 
“compromises.”  Indeed, attempting to correlate votes with political preferences 
oversimplifies the behind-the-scenes discussions that occur throughout the gestation of a 
decision.       
A third criticism, first developed by J. Woodford Howard, is that the attitudinal 
model does not adequately account for, nor take into consideration, judges who alter their 
strategy or approach throughout the course of a decision.  Such a gap led Howard to ask: 
“If a vote or an opinion has changed in response to a multiplicity of intra-court influences 
before its public exposure, how reliable is that vote of opinion as an indicator of attitude, 
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ideology, or, if one pleases, predilection?”130  With ideological motivators at its core, the 
attitudinal model fails to account for “group interaction” as a viable decision-making 
determinant.131  Political ideology is more complex than pitting liberal versus 
conservative, and public policies are complex and involve a mish mash of social and 
economic dimensions.  While it is outside the scope of this paper to discuss the attitudinal 
model any further, the relevance of our discussion thus far lies in the fact that judges 
make decisions with policy implications in mind.132  
Strategic Model 
The strategic or rational choice account of judicial decision-making acknowledges 
many of the conceptions held by attitudinalists, but present judges as rational actors who 
strategically wager personal policy preferences against the (perceived) aims of 
colleagues, external actors and other branches of government.133  Walter Murphy’s 
seminal work, Elements of Judicial Strategy, is said to have been the first to postulate that 
judges often strategically maneuver behind the scenes and temper what is “most desired” 
so as to avoid an outcome that is “least desired.”  Thus, the strategic model grants that the 
end produce of judicial decisions “cannot be exclusively attributed to justices’ strict 
reading of the law, simple accounting of justices’ policy preferences, or strategic 
calculation about the response (or non-response) of political actors exogenous to the 
                                                
130 J. Woodford Howard, Jr., “On the Fluidity of Judicial Choice,” The American 
Political Science Review 62 (1968): 44. 
131 Howard, “On the Fluidity of Judicial Choice,” 49.   
132 It is important to note that this chapter is not so much concerned with uncovering the 
type of political ideology that leads to outcome X or outcome Y, but that political 
attitudes inform decisions.  It is from this discovery that an examination of the Supreme 
Court’s federalism jurisprudence will be made.      
133 Lee Epstein and Jack Knight, The Choices Justices Make (Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Quarterly, 1998): 10. 
 66 
Court.”134  More accurately, judges are the business of forming coalitions, which are 
created after some level of negotiation and compromise has taken place.  Indeed, judges 
may not always vote according to ideals if it means avoiding an outcome that contradicts 
the very essence of their decision-making philosophy.  
That judges make compromises as a means to garner the support of colleagues, or 
in return for signing onto the reasons of another, is well founded in both theoretical and 
anecdotal research.  Many scholars believe that the process of giving reasons in Canada 
and the United States—“the collegial game”—demands at least some level of 
strategizing: “because outcomes on the Supreme Court depend on forging a majority 
coalition that for most cases must consist of at least five justices, there is good reason to 
expect that final Court opinions will be the product of a collaborative process.”135  As we 
will discuss in more detail in our disagreement section in Chapter 6, the collegial game 
involves various stages of strategies to which judges typically engage.136  Some observers 
believe that various draft “decisions” are circulated amongst members of a panel, and 
through internal memos and the subsequent circulation of drafts, judges show their 
support and/or voice their concerns with one another.  From this stage, the author of the 
initial draft judgment must weigh the substance of the final product vis-à-vis the feedback 
received by others, which, in the pursuit of a majority coalition, necessarily involves at 
least some level of accommodation, bargaining and compromise.137  While the strategic 
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model is well established in the social sciences, a similar school of though is emerging in 
the legal field.138    
The primary criticism of the strategic model is that there is little “empirical 
evidence” to support it.  There are no “systematic studies,” as critics contend, that explore 
“the patterns underlying such interdependent behavior.”139  Most related research is 
anecdotal in nature and based on case studies, interviews with current and former judges, 
and internal memorandums of the Court.  While little research has been conducted on the 
Supreme Court of Canada, Maltzman, Spriggs and Wahlbeck contend that the collegiality 
or dialogue that is apparent in a national high court’s reasons for judgment reveals more 
about judicial behavior than does the simple correlation of judicial votes with political 
ideology: 
Supreme Court opinions are crafted in a collaborative environment among the 
justices, and thus justices act strategically in order to get opinions that as closely 
as possible mirror their policy orientations. Our findings that justices spend the 
time and energy trying to influence the shape of the final opinion is consistent 
with these postulates. Justices care about more than just the disposition of a 
particular case. Although case outcomes are important, the strategic model also 
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suggests that justices – as rational actors – put considerable care into their choice 
of tactics for shaping the Court’s final opinions.140  
 
As rational actors, judges strategically temper their sincere policy preferences in order to 
avoid worst possible outcomes.  They make compromises, vie for signatures and, at 
times, appear to contradict themselves because no ideology can be reduced to a common, 
predictable denominator.  Judges adapt to create majorities or, in the alternative, to split 
votes to prevent one from happening.  In short, “the strategic focus moves beyond the 
narrow focus of vote outcomes,”141 and when institutional analyses are: 
…placed within the logic of rational choice, not only can theoretically sound 
hypotheses be generated, positing relationships which explain a significant 
amount of variance in judicial dissent behavior, but the rather disparate finding in 
the judicial literature on dissent behavior can be comprehensively integrated. 
Quite simply, the neo-institutional perspective bridges the gap between traditional 
institutional analysis and attitudinal theory.142  
 
Despite these insights, critics maintain that contemporary rational choice studies 
are problematic because they are unable to predict outcomes before they actually happen.  
While both approaches offer insight into the psychology of lawmaking, for federalism 
cases I contend that the best way to predict an outcome is to understand the decision-
making climate of the Court and to identify the decision-making philosophy that unpins 
its disposal of a specific subset of decisions.   
Doctrines have consequences and policy implications.  For federalism cases, some 
lend themselves to greater levels of centralization while others have a more middling 
effect.  The doctrine the Court chooses in the past is an excellent predictor of the ones 
they will use in the future.  As we will discuss at length in Chapter 7, the Supreme 
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Court’s decision-making philosophy as it pertains to federalism matters directs the 
doctrines that are used to dispose of disputes.  In Chapter 6, this observation is reinforced 
by the finding that while judges may share similar policy goals, the path they envision to 
attain those goals differ at times.  Although these differences are not often significant, 
Supreme Court judges sometimes write as if they are.  
In reflecting upon the departure of Justices La Forest and Sopinka, McCormick’s 
summary is insightful: 
Is La Forest or Sopinka a Canadian version of Lewis F Powell, Jr., the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s quintessential “swing voter” whose cautious preferences 
frequently dictated the overarching direction of the Court?  Of a Canadian 
William J. Brennan Jr., in the sense of being a wily strategist who fashioned 
enduring voting coalitions despite major ideological cleavages?  Or a Canadian 
Thurgood Marshall, stubbornly and passionately championing a cause (capital 
punishment, affirmative action, whatever) so relentlessly as gradually to draw the 
entire Court in his direction?  Or a Canadian Rehquist or Scalia, doggedly 
committed to an ideological position, his relative influence waxing and waning as 
the vagaries of the appointment process reinforce or deplete the ranks of his 
allies?  Or a Canadian Burger, transparently tactical in his voting so as use to the 
maximum the power his seniority gives him to write the words of the majority 
opinion, or on the basis of crafty calculation to assign the writing to someone 
else?143         
 
That judges develop decision-making tendencies, noteworthy strategic behavior and, 
above all else, “reputations,” reinforces the notion that judging is neither scientific nor 
mechanical but a task performed by individuals who exercise the freedom to incorporate 
personal preferences into the decisions they craft.  While judicial decisions possess a 
much more formal flare than would a regular newspaper article or interview on CBC, the 
tendencies of judges are revealed by both their vote patterns and doctrinal preferences.  In 
written decisions, the attitudinal preferences of judges are more discreet, for no judge is 
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going to explicitly say, “I will therefore allow the appeal because I am a staunch 
supporter of movement X.”  Although a judge may still “allow the appeal,” he cannot do 
so on conviction alone; he needs to select and incorporate the necessary precedents and 
doctrines to support it.  The same rules do not apply outside the bench, however.  
Supreme Court judges give speeches and write articles, which are far more pointed than 
what their more “formalist” institutional constraints would otherwise allow.  They have 
opinions, and when delivering speeches or writing articles, they possess the freedom to 
unapologetically and indiscreetly present positions that support their worldview and 
political assumptions.   
C. Judicial Behavior Outside the Court  
 
Perhaps more so than any other study on judicial behavior, what judges say 
outside the bench provides a far more explicit picture of what they believe than do close 
examinations of the decisions they author.  But are judges able to separate from their 
decisions what they write about outside the Court?  While judicial independence is an 
important institutional safeguard that allows judges to “interpret the law regardless of the 
extralegislative preferences of the legislature, the executive, or the people,” it does not 
guarantee sound lawmaking nor does it eliminate the “contaminants” inherent in one’s 
opinions.144   
We know from previous research that judges have difficulties distinguishing 
personal preferences from established common law.145  That judges disagree and that 
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appeals are overturned—that lawyers dread some judges while secretly hoping for 
others—goes to show that decisions vary, and vary according to the person charged with 
giving the decision.  Why is this?  Should it be reason for concern?  Is there a way to 
separate the “personal” from the “professional?”  The section below shows that just as 
judges have “reputations” inside the Court, they have strong political opinions outside the 
Court.  As we shall see, the opinions they espouse in their academic writing conflate 
policy desires and political concerns in the context of legal doctrine.       
Backgrounds and Opinions of Judges  
The book Final Appeal provides an excellent primer to the practice of judging.146  
In it, a chapter is devoted to addressing the personality of judges and their outside-the-
bench behavior.   However, the focus of that chapter is not so much concerned with 
biographical factoids—like whether justice Y was introverted or extroverted, a jokester or 
a straight-laced professional—but whether the backgrounds, work experience and formal 
training of judges “might dispose them to use discretion differently than elected 
officials.”147  This raises an interesting question: to what extent does a judge’s gender, 
ideological stance or legal specialization infiltrate judicial decision-making?       
The issue of “gender bias” is worthy of note, not because it is an issue to which 
one should become overly fixated or worried, but because of how certain prominent 
female judges see the issue of gender and admit how it colors the way they decide or 
approach certain issues of law.  After being appointed to the Supreme Court in 1982, for 
example, Bertha Wilson wasted little time before discussing the issue of “gender bias” in 
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the courts.  Relying on anecdotal evidence and the research findings of University of 
California sociologist Norma Wikler, Wilson made the case that gender differences play 
a large role in the decision-making tendencies of judges.148  Not long after, Justice 
Beverly McLachlin (as she then was) came under fire after she delivered a speech that 
criticized the male bias in “gender-related” issues such as prostitution and abortion.  She 
faced criticism from several groups, most notably REAL women.149  In yet another 
example, Justice L’Heureux-Dube delivered multiple speeches urging judges to strike 
down laws that, in her mind, discriminated against homosexuals.  Surely, it would be 
difficult for either her or justice McLachlin to rule against such matters in light of their 
publicly stated convictions.   
Subsequently, F. L. Morton’s blasted Justice L’Heureux-Dube for her comments 
and asserted that her comments violated the ruling of the Canadian Judicial Council—that 
judges ought not “speak out against politically controversial issues of great public 
importance.”150  Chief Justice Lamer, in a speech delivered to an audience at the 
University of Toronto in 1992, alluded to the fact that democracy was not conducive to 
“human flourishing” and acted, at times, as an impediment to “progress.”151   
A few years later, after a candid interview with “Lawyers Weekly,” Justice 
Bastarache found himself in the media hot seat after he stated his long held preference to 
“persuade” the court to “revisit” Charter decisions in which criminal law was greatly 
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150 Morton, “Judicial Independence, Ethics and Discipline,” 179. 
151 As cited in Robert Ivan Martin, The Most Dangerous Branch: How the Supreme Court 
of Canada has Undermined our Law and our Democracy (Montreal, QC: McGill-
Queen’s University Press): 83.     
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expanded.  Bastarache even went as far to say that previous criminal matters that were 
settled by the Court were “result-oriented” and driven by “policy,” not “principle.”  In 
short, he disagreed with his colleagues’ self adopted “mandate to…define a whole social 
policy for Canada.”152  In that same interview, Bastarache inflamed those sympathetic to 
aboriginal land claims when he asserted that the legal system was “not the right forum” to 
settle such matters.  Referencing the Court’s Marshall [1999] decision, he reiterated his 
disagreement with the majority and further indicated “that the Court was very result-
oriented and was inventing rights that weren’t even in the treaties that were brought 
before the court in that case.”  While his initial comments called for judicial restraint, it is 
how he responded to another question that led to public outcry: “the court was maybe 
seen as being unduly favourable to the native position in all cases, and that it sort of has 
an agenda for extending these [aboriginal] rights and that it has no concerns for the rights 
of others.”153   
From this statement followed a myriad of criticisms, one such being a formal 
complaint lodged by the Atlantic Policy Congress of First Nations Chiefs (APCFNC) 
who, among other things, declared: “We strongly feel we could never have a fair hearing 
in front of a court in which he was a member.”154  Although Bastarache did not receive 
any formal discipline for his comments—the complaint by the APCFNC was rejected—
the Canadian Judicial Council warned that judges should “exercise restraint when 
                                                
152 “The Bastarache Interview: reasoning to results at SCC,” by Cristin Schmitz, The 
Lawyers Weekly, Jan. 26, 2001, p.19. 
153 As cited in F.L. Morton, “Judicial Independence, Ethics, and Discipline,” 179; “SCC 
wrong forum for native land claims: Bastarache,” by Cristin Schmitz, The Lawyers 
Weekly Jan. 19, 2001, p. 20. 
154 As cited in Morton, “Judicial Independence, Ethics and Discipline,” 179. 
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speaking publicly…particularly on issues that are likely to come before their court in the 
future.”155  
The examples listed above are just a few in a list of many.  Although they do not 
make speeches about their federalism preferences off the bench, the point to be made is 
that judges have opinions and policy preferences.  And the same preferences or 
convictions or legal principles that they speak about outside the bench follow them to 
their formal role inside the Court.  Despite such liberties, little can be done by non-judges 
to confront perceptions of bias.  Ian Greene touches on the issue in his discussion of 
“judicial discipline.”156  With the prevalence of judicial independence, and the 
professional expectation for judges that were outlined in the Berger case, it has proven to 
be a challenge to “strike the right balance between allowing judges to speak out publicly 
on important issues affecting justice, and encouraging them to refrain from comments 
that could cause us to question their impartiality.”157  It is clear that judges are political 
actors who behave strategically within the institutional rules of the game.  How they 
behave plays an important role in the decisions that are made and the manner in which 
they are implemented.   
It seems like eons ago that the use of academic literature in the courtroom was 
discouraged.  In 1950, for instance, Chief Justice Rinfret of the Supreme Court of Canada 
reprimanded a lawyer for citing a recent article in the Canadian Bar Review.158  In this 
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case, Maurice Wright, counsel for the Canadian Congress of Labor in Reference Re the 
Wartime Leasehold Regulations, cited Vincent C. MacDonald’s article, “Constitutional 
Interpretation and Extrinsic Evidence,” to which Rinfret snidely replied: “The Canadian 
Bar Review is not an authority in this Court.”159  Although this statement does not appear 
in the written reasons, subsequent reports “indicate that the Chief Justice said ‘he was not 
going to accept the opinion of the Canadian Bar Review—a lawyer’s magazine—as 
authority for the court.’”160   
D. Conclusion 
In this chapter, much was made about the evolution and impact of judicial power 
and discretion.  But the discussion did not go into length about how the Court utilizes the 
discretion it is given.  In the next chapter, I build on our discussion by providing an 
exhaustive account of the Supreme Court’s academic citation patterns in federalism 
cases.  This chapter is important because it discusses the role and significance that written 
reasons play in the case law of the Court and enables us to use citations as a tool to trace 
the academic disciplines upon which they confer, and the thinkers with whom they 
associate.  While written reasons justify the outcome of a decision, academic citations 
help to reinforce ideas, or distinguish them from, the views of others.  They also reveal to 
readers the political and theoretical assumptions of the judges who are writing.     
Indeed, if the “Authors Cited” list within a federalism decision revealed, for 
example, that a significant share of a judge’s references came from Alexis de 
Tocqueville, Canada’s founding debates, and political historians Paul Romney, Robert 
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160 Bale, 50. 
 76 
Vipond, and Janet Azenstat, one could infer that the issues of provincial autonomy, civil 
association, subsidiarity, and the philosophical underpinnings our Constitution weighed 
heavy in their reasoning.  On the other hand, if the Court relied on the cynical historians 
we discussed in Chapter 1—Edwin Black, Peter Waite, Ramsay Cook and Donald 
Creighton—one would expect that the Court operated on the assumption that 
Confederation unfolded in the absence of principle.      
Likewise, were the names of Donald Smiley, Alan Cairns, and Richard Simeon to 
surface frequently, one could expect to find more of a public policy flare—with a mind 
toward navigating through the implications and operations of intergovernmental 
relations—within the reasons for judgment.  Although a bibliography says nothing about 
the extent to which a source is utilized, or whether its authority is rejected or embraced, a 
list of authors provides an excellent starting point for further discovery—and that is basis 
upon which the research for Chapter 3 began.  If the ultimate goal of this thesis is to 
uncover the decision-making philosophy of the Court—and the subsequent impact this 
philosophy has on the “ends of federalism”—a systematic look at the thinkers upon 
which the Court relies is an important first step.  Upon looking to the academic citations 
for insight, we will be in a position to examine the caseload of the Court.   
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Chapter III 
Reasons, Citations and Authority 
 
The use of academic citations in judicial decision-making is a recent but significant 
phenomenon that has emerged in particular in the post-Charter era.  Those who study the 
Canadian (or the American or Australian) judiciary, for example, will have observed that 
“in the course of expressing reasons for the decisions they reach,” judges at both the 
appellate and Supreme Court level frequently cite “books and articles written by 
academics.”161  In 1985, the format of the Canadian Supreme Court Reports was 
amended to reflect these changes.162  This is significant.   
At first glance, this observation might seem inconsequential and trivial, the result 
of handy secretarial work—or perhaps an attempt by the Court to make decisions more 
readable and accessible to the general public.  However, this trend reveals much about the 
nature of our judiciary and its decision making process.  It shows that references to 
academic literature is consistent and frequent enough for the Court to amend the format 
of the Reports and to list them under a separate heading, “Authors Cited,” located 
                                                
161 Vaughan Black and Nicholas Richter, “Did She Mention My Name?: Citation of 
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beneath the summary notes and “Cases Cited” and “Statutes and Regulations” list.163  
Second, and perhaps more importantly, it reflects willingness on the part of judges to 
“branch out” and incorporate a broader range of ideas into the reasons they provide and 
the oral arguments they consider.  Like any essay, book or article, citations within a 
judicial decision help locate the origins of an outlook or idea.  It connects the written 
reasons of judges to a broader intellectual horizon, and reveals the sources on which they 
deliberate or rely.     
Studying the academic citation patterns of the Supreme Court is particularly 
relevant for the weighty public policy arguments that unfold in federalism cases.  Like 
any publication, the authors the Court cites as authority in their written reasons—and to a 
similar extent, the sources that they dismiss or ignore—reveals multitudes about the 
intellectual arena upon which they operate and decide.  As we discussed in Chapter 2, the 
decision-making climate of the post-Charter era is unlike that of any of the periods that 
preceded it.  It is characterized by heightened levels of academic participation, both in 
terms of what is done on the bench and off.  Not surprisingly, judges in the modern era 
share many of the traits that one would expect to find in a researcher or professor.  They 
cite academic literature in their reasons for judgment, publish articles, and deliver public 
speeches on major policy and social issues.  Their evolving decision-making style, 
coupled by the fact that there is a wealth of literature on Canadian federalism, raises the 
obvious question: which sources does the Supreme Court cite in the federalism decisions 
they deliver?   
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More precisely, in judgments involving the division of powers, which authors and 
publications do Supreme Court judges cite in particular, and from which discipline(s) do 
they prefer to draw?  Do they dabble in philosophy journals and converse with political 
scientists and historians, or do they stick to the “nitty gritty” and focus instead on legal 
sources published by law professors and judges?  It goes without saying that who the 
Supreme Court cites reveals a great deal about their decision-making philosophy.165   
We know from previous studies166 that Supreme Court judges cite scholarly 
publications at a much higher frequency now than they did 25 years ago, but the type of 
literature they cite and discuss—the authors and books titles, the academic disciplines 
and publishing medium, the age of an citation as well as the extent of its use—remains, 
up until this point, a mystery.  This chapter builds on the insights of Chapter 2 by 
examining the academic citation patterns of the Supreme Court in division of power 
cases.  While Chapter 2 looked at the decision-making conventions and liberties that 
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modern era judges enjoy, this chapter takes a systematic look at the collection of their 
choices—that is, their academic citations—in light of these decision-making liberties.  In 
the post-Charter era, there is no reason for a judge not to cite a particular author or 
source; indeed, there is no law or convention saying that a judge is prohibited from citing 
author X or author Y.  Judges have the freedom to cite whomever it is that they desire 
and believe to “fit” within a particular dispute.  That is why it is important to uncover the 
academic citations of the Court, because they are the result of conscious choices made by 
judges who possess the freedom to make such choices.  Like any publication, however, a 
citation must make some “sense,” otherwise it weakens the credibility of an attempt to 
convince an audience.  In sum, the academic citations that appear within a judgment are a 
persuasive tool intended to reinforce a judge’s argument.          
This analysis is divided into three component parts.  The first section will 
examine the phenomenology of judicial decision-making and will discuss in particular 
the functional significance that written reasons, citations and authority play in the 
formation, clarification and expansion of modern case law.  The second section provides 
an exhaustive and systematic quantitative account of the authors and scholarly literature 
employed by the Court in federalism cases.  I will also examine the age of citations and 
the frequency of federalism articles published in leading Canadian law journals.  The 
final section of this chapter will serve as the interpretive lens of the other two and will 
attempt to explain the absence of non-legal periodicals in Supreme Court bibliographies.   
A. Methodology 
 Understanding where the Supreme Court gets its ideas is a task that requires 
investigation from multiple angles.  Fortunately, there is a method to this chapter’s 
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madness.  What I have attempted to do in this short time is to employ the best of both the 
quantitative and qualitative worlds.  In the first part of this paper a series of frequencies 
and cross-tabulations will be generated from a database that provides an exhaustive 
account of the academic citations used by the Court in federalism cases since 1984 (with 
Tessier Ltée v. Quebec (C.S.S.T) [2012] being the most recent167).    
The academic citations recorded in the database were retrieved from the Supreme 
Court’s bibliography—the “Authors Cited” section—which is provided in the online 
version of the Supreme Court Reports.168  In almost every decision, the academics that 
are discussed or even casually mentioned appear in the citation list mentioned above.  
Indeed, the “Author’s Cited” list is an exhaustive attempt by the Court to list the authors 
and sources that it employs.  However, in going through the cases, I did manage to find 
one (rather recent) exception: in Consolidated Fastfrate Inc. v. Western Canada 
[2009]169, an article by W.R. Lederman was quoted and discussed but did not appear in 
the “Author’s Cited” list.170  
                                                
167 33935 SCC 23 [2012]. 
168 I accessed these reports through “Lexum,” an electronic resource which carries every 
judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada.  It is a service provided through a 
collaborative effort by the Supreme Court of Canada and the Lexum laboratory of the 
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169 3 S.C.R. 407 [2009]. 
170  The reference to Lederman appeared in Justice Binnie’s dissent, who states, in short: 
“W.R. Lederman in his illuminating article, ‘Telecommunications and the Federal 
Constitution of Canada’ in H.E. English, ed., Telecommunications for Canada (1973), 
339 at 360, puts much greater stress upon the effect of s. 91(29) in converting these 
exceptions to an exclusive head of federal power and thus supports a broader reading of 
federal authority.”  Of course, this omission is the exception to the Supreme Court’s 
tracking system, not the rule.  Fortunately, this was the only omission I was able to 
uncover.     
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During this period of study, academics have been cited 451 times in total; roughly 
six times per case, on average.171  However, what distinguishes this file from that of other 
studies on academic and judicial citation patterns is that it is “issue specific” and spans 
more than a quarter of a century.  That is to say, it focuses exclusively on federalism 
cases—and nothing more.  This approach is both beneficial and incomplete: beneficial 
because it resembles more of a “case-study” and longitudinal approach and is therefore 
more in-depth and historically representative; incomplete because it does not account for 
the citation trends and patterns of non-federalism issues which makes comparison to a 
broader body of jurisprudence difficult to determine.  Although secondary material was 
used to “fill the gap,” the types of thinkers, publications and academic journals the Court 
relies on for other issues—Charter cases, for example—was not factored into this 
analysis.  Before we get started, however, a few words on the theoretical and functional 
role that written reasons, precedence and citations play within our judiciary is needed.   
B. Reasons, Citations and Authority 
Reasons 
 The expression “to the victor go the spoils” is a misleading depiction of Canadian 
jurisprudence.  For both litigants and political and civil society, the written reasons 
surrounding judicial decisions are often more important than who “wins” and who 
“loses” because they represent a “discursive explanation intended to persuade the 
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that follow, I will define the criteria of the categories that I included.     
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relevant audience that the outcome is justified.”172  Reasons form an important link 
between general, established legal principles on the one hand, and particular factual 
circumstances on the other.  As Lord Denning of Britain observes, the giving of reasons 
is “the whole difference between a judicial decision and an arbitrary one.”173  Giving 
reasons forms an important check on judicial power and future decision-making.  Three 
points are pertinent here.        
 First, the reasons requirement prevents (or limits) arbitrary decision making 
because it forces judges to justify their conclusions and to make their line of reasoning 
transparent.  It causes them to show how they arrived at their decision and why, and from 
which sources in particular.  This in turn constrains judicial power because it limits, at 
least theoretically, the interpretational range from which judges may venture.  This is 
why for instance the lawyer of a client who cheers for the New York Yankees need not 
fear a judge that happens to love the Red Sox.  Although the statement “I find the 
appellant guilty because he cheers for the Yankees” is a reason—perhaps a noble one for 
some—it is a poor reason because it is unconnected to an established legal framework.  
Having to explain the connection between “sports preferences” and “guiltiness” would be 
a monumental task, to be sure.  However, as we will recall from our discussion in 
Chapter 2, judges select doctrines to substantiate the political outcomes they desire.  
Therefore, the Red Sox-loving judge may still convict the Yankees fan because he is a 
Yankees fan, but he will provide other (non sporting) reasons for doing so.  Of course, 
this is an extreme example, but the point is made.     
                                                
172 Peter McCormick, “What Supreme Court Cases does the Supreme Court Cite?: 
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An acceptable decision therefore is one that grounds itself in precedent.  In his 
landmark article “Toward a Theory of ‘Stare Decisis,’” Martin Shapiro notes the dual 
significance of our precedential legal tradition.  He argues that the redundancy of our 
legal system is its most readily definable feature because it establishes norms and 
principles by highlighting the citation patterns associated with well worn paths of legal 
doctrine.  Indeed, precedent makes it easy to identify deviation and error.174  Shapiro’s 
application of communications theory on the logic and structure of precedent is 
insightful:  
The more probable the transmission of a given sign, the less information its actual 
transmission conveys.  “Redundancy” is the opposite of information.  It is the 
introduction of repetition or pattern into the message.  If the telegrapher sends 
each message twice, his second sending is redundant and contains less 
information than the first.  If we establish the convention, rule or pattern that two 
dashes will always be followed by a dot, then the actual transmission of the dot 
after the two dashes will be redundant and contain no information because the dot 
placement in the sequence could always be predicted without actual 
transmission.175 
 
Similarly, when an established pattern of jurisprudence is broken or altered—the 
reintroduction of the death penalty, say, or the recognition that sexual orientation is a 
form of discrimination176 under Section 15 of the Charter—it is because there is an 
established standard (i.e the death penalty is illegal) from which to compare.  Anytime 
the Court hands down a new precedent, lawmakers and legal counsel will surely take 
note, for it is on the basis of this deviation that the dispositions of future similar factual 
circumstances will hinge.         
                                                
174 Martin Shapiro, “Toward a Theory of ‘Stare Decisis,’” Journal of Legal Studies 1 
(1972): 125-27. 
175 Shapiro, 125-26. 
176 Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 
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Second, while the act of giving reasons—legitimate or otherwise—creates both 
individual and institutional transparency, the expectation to provide good reasons 
necessitates accountability.  That is to say, written reasons provide opportunities for 
internal and external criticism, which can form the grounds for further review.177  The 
simple reason for this is that when reasons are provided, one can assess their soundness 
and legitimacy because the path of legal logic to which a conclusion was reached is 
spelled out by the judge responsible for delivering the judgment.  
Another reason why written justification is important is that it provides a 
“promise” to future litigants that the Court will rule similarly under parallel factual 
circumstances, for “precedent is forward looking as well as backward looking.”179  
Indeed, stare decisis is the guiding principle from which our judiciary is organized.  
Consequently, the reasons handed down for a decision in the present carry implications 
for similarly situated cases in the future.  Reasons strengthen law by repetitiously 
upholding it on the one hand and by gradually building upon it on the other.  Although 
exceptions sometimes occur, “adherence to precedent,” as one justice put it, “must be the 
rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the evenhanded 
                                                
177 This point is particularly important for judges sitting on lower levels, because in cases 
of “poor reasoning,” their decisions can be appealed, and as such, their reputation and 
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 86 
administration of justice.”180  Other experts, such as Frederick Shauer, for example, take 
it a step further and suggest that a decision in the present is really an “advisory opinion” 
for the future:  
If a court is constrained by the reasons it gives in addition to the result it reaches, 
and if reasons are results taken to a greater level of generality and so include a 
wider class of acts, then under a commitment model a court giving reasons is 
deciding a class of cases not now before the court, and class of cases for which 
the supposed crucible of experience is missing.  Thus every time a court gives a 
reason it is, in effect, giving an advisory opinion.181   
 
Thus, with the giving of judicial reasons comes the implicit, normative expectation of 
consistency.  At the Supreme Court level, this factor is particularly important because it 
sharpens the uniformity and clarity of the law by signaling to lower courts the appropriate 
doctrines and outcomes with which to adjudicate similar disputes in the future.  
Additionally, the provision of reasons within the lower courts facilitates the Supreme 
Court’s “advisory role” for the simple fact that with written judgments it is able to 
monitor and assess the basis upon which law is administrated throughout the country.    
 Written justifications carry importance because the judiciary is honest about 
binding itself to sound and transparent reasoning.  But this is not all.  Academic and 
judicial citations are a specific and important feature entrenched within the reasons 
judges provide.  Citations ground ideas in authority, and provide a frame of reference to 
those who read or review a decision.182  Not surprisingly, judges use citations in a manner 
similar to academics.  Citations draw “the attention of the reader to a broader background 
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against which to locate the immediate arguments” and, in turn, identify “specific passages 
in other such works for expansion or containment.”183  There is a distinction to be drawn 
between the authority that stems from judicial and academic citations, however.  While 
citations help to substantiate written reasons, it is judicial and not academic citations that 
are mandatory.  As discussed, academic citations are optional, are the result of carefully 
selected choices of individual judges, and have only become incorporated into Canadian 
judicial decisions over the past quarter century.  
On the other hand, more than few eyebrows would be raised if a judicial decision 
were composed without reference to previous decisions; it is an expectation—a necessity.  
Judicial citations are the bedrock or lifeblood of a judicial decision; academic materials 
are secondary and merely supplemental.  A disposition, in short, cannot hinge on what 
“so and so” said in “such a such” an article; the nucleus of a judicial decision must 
necessarily stem from judicial precedent.  Lastly, whereas there is almost unlimited 
freedom in terms of which academic materials a justice is permitted to ignore or 
employ—no set standard or preconceived expectation as to how a source be used or 
which one(s) in particular—the same operational liberality is not so with judicial 
citations.  There are cases that “must” be cited; cases that one expects to appear in certain 
topics, which would result in shock if it were absent.  As a comparative illustration, if a 
case involving a divorce settlement and spousal support failed to incorporate, in any 
fashion, the foundational precedent of modern family law—Moge v. Moge [1992]184—
serious questions would arise.  On the other hand, if a judgment neglected to include a 
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certain academic—let us use well-known legal scholar Peter Hogg, for example—critics 
would not flinch.  The difference, here, is that the jurisprudential range and expectations 
that govern legal citations is significantly more narrow than the role and expectations that 
accompany the use of academic authority.     
Citations 
When something is cited, it is intended to “convince the relevant audience of the 
appropriateness of the outcome.”185  To begin, citations demonstrate a basic 
understanding of a subject manner and its relation to the case at hand.  For instance, if 
one were to write an article on the history of political parties in Canada, one would 
expect to see in the bibliography household names like R.K. Carty, Alan Whitehorn and 
Escott Reid.  Similarly, if one were writing a paper on Canadian federalism, it would be 
expected that leading researchers in the discipline (Donald Smiley, Alan Cairns, Richard 
Simeon, and J.R. Mallory, to name a few) would be acknowledged and discussed, if not 
for the bulk of the analysis, then at least as its starting point.186  Likewise, if the Court 
were to rule on a division of powers dispute involving environmental legislation and the 
protection of natural resources, one would expect Crown Zellerbach187 and Friends of the 
Oldman River Society188 to figure prominently into a judge’s analysis.   
 Second, citations provide the intellectual coordinates—or starting point—from 
which to build an analysis.  A citation, therefore, locates the “immediate analysis in the 
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context of established principles and standards.”189  However, one cannot indicate 
agreement or disagreement if there is no recognizable standard from which to agree or 
disagree.  Indeed, agreement or disagreement presupposes a preexisting standard, and the 
degree of agreement or disagreement cannot be clear unless the standard from which it 
deviates is established and understood.  In his article on the Supreme Court’s use of 
American citations, McCormick summarizes the role and function of judges—what they 
do, and how they operate—by stating: “judges distinguish past decisions to show how far 
(but no further) a legal principle should be extended, or they clarify ambiguities or 
incompleteness from prior decisions, or they try to resolve apparent (or real) 
disagreements or divergences within the existing case law, or they try to pull a variety of 
sources together for an original and creative synthesis.”190  None of these functions are 
possible, however, without a preexisting standard.  In other words, deviation and 
clarification, affirmation and disagreement, stem from something that is previous.  And 
that which is previous is marked or referenced by citations.     
 Third, citations add credibility and legitimacy to the interpretations judges 
advance.  However, it is important to keep in mind that there are marked differences 
between academic disciplines and the judiciary.  Whereas judges strive for plausibility, 
the role of academics is less constrained and more open to theorizing, testing and 
experimentation.  Typically, judges uphold standards and conventions; they do not go out 
of their way to change or to challenge institutional norms as an end in itself.  Although 
deviation from precedent is sometimes necessary and happens from time to time, the 
                                                
189 McCormick, “The Supreme Court of Canada and American Citations, 1945-1994: A 
Statistical Overview,” 529. 
190 McCormick, 529. 
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judiciary, as a whole, does not seek to change things for “sport.”  Unlike academia, 
provocation is not the basis of judicial identity; getting it “right,” in light of factual 
circumstances and existing case law, is, at least theoretically, the ultimate goal.   
As we learned in Chapter 2, however, the factors that contribute to “rightness” 
have become the subject of intense debate.  In an age of unprecedented judicial power, 
some prominent schools of thought, such as the attitudinalists, posit that modern case law 
is the product of the ideological attitudes and values of the judges creating the decisions.  
In other words, even though objectivity and adherence to law are fundamental principles 
of our judiciary—the prima facie identity of the Court—judges are fallible and not 
always able to disassociate personal beliefs from their decisions.  
Academics, on the other hand, are convention-challenging professionals, often 
making contrarian arguments intended to provoke and challenge established patterns of 
thought.  Of course, the nature of academic discourse varies from discipline to discipline, 
but as a whole, academia fundamentally differs from our judiciary.  Political scientists, 
for example, construct paradigms to explain concepts and to categorize observable 
phenomena.  They develop models and hypotheses that identify emerging trends between 
citizen and state, and they follow certain methodologies, within different subfields, when 
doing so.  As one writer casually though perceptively observed: “It is probably fair to say 
that we all carry around in our heads ‘ways of looking at things’ which will help us to 
evaluate and interpret data and events.”191   
Another difference is that academics outwardly seek to contribute a deeper 
understanding of unchartered territory.  Unlike judges, they are not constrained by the 
                                                
191 Lewis A. Froman, “On Paradigms in Political Science and Economics,” Public Choice 
(1967): 91.  
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doctrine of precedent; academics, especially tenured ones, are free to explore and to write 
about what they want, when they want, how they want.  In many respects, the approaches 
of two “disciplines” represent each other’s inverse: while researchers pride themselves on 
nuance and originality, the Court emphasizes and encourages tradition; while 
“plagiarism” and “redundancy” serve as the methodological rudder for judges on the one 
hand, it leads to academic suicide on the other.  Therefore, the type of citations judges 
employ is significant.  Although citations demonstrate to the immediate litigants, and to 
the causal or serious observer the authority observed or the principles enunciated, the 
nature of the authority is quite different.  The fact that the Court in recent years has cared 
to incorporate both types of authority is revealing.        
 However, since the emergence of the Charter, judges use academic citations at a 
much higher rate than before.192  Whereas it was unusual (and even frowned upon) for 
them to be cited in the past, academic citations have become “business as usual.”  But 
this was not always the case.  As late as 1981, for example, Justice Berger of the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal received harsh criticism from the Canadian Judicial Council 
for criticizing the Constitutional Agreement on behalf of aboriginal peoples and 
women.193  McCormick points out that at that time, “the reigning tradition of judicial 
decision-making, emphasizing a mechanical process tightly bound to authoritative 
precedent… severely constrained the way judges could communicate even within the 
courtroom.”194  In the past, the role of judges was confined to addressing the legal issue at 
                                                
192 To be elaborated upon below.   
193 McCormick, “Judges, Journals and Exegesis,” 44. 
194 McCormick, 44. 
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hand—and little more.  If this were the case today, this chapter would serve little purpose 
in the overall analysis of this thesis.     
Authority 
The Canadian Judiciary reinvented itself in the post-Charter era, beginning with 
the appointment of Bora Laskin, a law professor, to the Supreme Court.  James G. Snell 
and Frederick Vaughan pick up on this trend and describe the Trudeau/Turner 
appointments of which Laskin was a part as “the most learned and scholarly group of 
justices ever to join the Supreme Court.”195  As we discussed in Chapter 2, there was a 
new brand of judges dominating the benches; they were academics and law professors 
prior to becoming judges, and not only had they “published, sometimes extensively, in 
the same journals that are now being cited,” but continued “to publish such articles even 
while sitting on the bench.”196  Indeed, over the past quarter century, a new relationship 
between judge and society had emerged.  Judges have adopted more of a social 
leadership role, allowing them to exercise their freedom by speaking out against 
controversial subjects or on behalf of disadvantages groups.  For better or worse, their 
                                                
195 James G. Snell and Frederick Vaughan, The Supreme Court of Canada: History of the 
Institution (University of Toronto Press, 1985): 236.  John Saywell adds: “Of the twenty-
two puisne judges who sat on the court between 1980 and 2000, eleven were or had been 
full time law professors at one stage of their careers and many others had lectured part 
time” (cf., The Lawmakers: Judicial Power and the Shaping of Canadian Federalism, 
(University of Toronto Press, 1985), 276.    
196 McCormick, “The Judges and the Journals,” 5.  It can be said that the changes in the 
role and decision-making process of our judiciary stem from the appointments of the 
judges who staff them.        
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role goes beyond, or even transcends, the legal technicalities and parameters of the 
courtroom.197  
C. Academic Citation Patterns in Federalism Cases 
The academic citation patterns of the Supreme Court in the “Laskin and beyond” 
years reflect these changes.  We know for example from Black and Richter’s work, that 
from 1985 to 1990, two out of every five judgments contain academic citations, and that 
the average number of academic cites per judgment containing citations is just over five 
(5.3).198  We also know that the Lamer Court has the highest academic citation frequency 
of the past three chief justiceships (166 citations per year on average), followed by the 
McLachlin (117/yr) and Dickson Courts (82/yr).199  More specifically, in federalism 
decisions alone, there are 423 academic citations that span 200 different publications and 
222 different authors.201  These figures, when translated into a per/case average (5.3 
citations per federalism decision)202, are right on par with the frequency of academic 
citations in non-federalism cases.  While the authority for the Supreme Court of Canada 
wears “a judicial robe far more often than an academic gown,” the numbers confirm that 
academic citations have become a “steady and persisting element of the Supreme Court’s 
explanatory practices.”203  It also reveals that there is ample room for analysis.    
                                                
197 McCormick, “Judges, Journals, and Exegesis,” 44: “The most recent and striking 
examples of this is perhaps Justice Cory publicly countering the suggestions of the 
Reform Party of Canada about possible changes to the Young Offenders Act” (cf., 44). 
198 Black and Richter, “Did She Mention My Name,” 382. 
199 McCormick, “The Judges and the Journals,” 6.  Only the first four years of the 
McLachlin Court were calculated in this analysis.   
201 The reason that there is a difference in the number of authors and the number of 
publications is that some publications were coauthored or involved multiple authors.   
202 This number includes government sources. 
203 McCormick, “The Judges and the Journals,” 6.  In 2003, for example, the judicial 
share of the Court’s total citations in 2003 was roughly 80 percent, suggesting that, while 
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Authors, Disciplines and Judges 
This section starts off by looking at the authors that are cited in federalism 
decisions, the subject matter of the sources that are utilized, and the academic citation 
patterns of individual judges.  Before we can examine how a source it utilized—that is, 
how prominently it figures into a judge’s analysis—it is important to first get an 
understanding of what the sources are as well the nature and background of the authors 
that produce them.   
As the data below indicates, the Supreme Court cites a diversity of authors, with 
more than 200 different thinkers incorporated, to some degree, within their decisions.  Of 
course, some authors are cited more often than others.  Peter Hogg, for example, is 
clearly the Supreme Court’s favorite author to cite, having appeared in more than half of 
the Supreme Court’s federalism judgments.204  From Hogg, there is a significant drop-off, 
although the next highest citation frequencies come from former Supreme Court justices 
Gerard La Forest (9) and Bora Laskin (9); while Dale Gibson (8), W.R. Lederman (7), 
and Joseph Magnet (5) round out the middle of the pack.  But what do these numbers tell 
us?  Are there any surprises or unfulfilled expectations?  Is there a common thread that 
emerges?   
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
judicial citations are clearly the norm, academic citations are frequent and consistent 
enough to worth noting.   
204 In forty six cases, one of Hogg’s publications is cited.  Because of his influence, his 
impact will be analyzed in a separate section below.   
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Table 1: Citation Frequency of Academics in Federalism Cases: 1984-2012   
 
Author 
 
 
Frequency 
 
Occupation 
Peter Hogg 46 Law professor 
Gerard V. La Forest 9 Law professor 
Bora Laskin 8 Law professor 
Dale Gibson 8 Law professor 
W.R. Lederman 6 Law professor 
Joseph Magnet 5 Law professor 
F.R. Scott 4 Lawyer/writer 
Jean Leclair 4 Law professor 
Pierre Carignan 4 Law professor 
Henri Brum  4 Law professor 
Guy Tremblay 4 Law professor 
Paul Emond 3 Law professor 
Colin McNairn 3 Lawyer 
Elizabeth Edinger 3 Law professor 
Pierre Issalys 3 Law professor 
David Beatty 3 Law professor 
Paul Weiler 3 Law professor 
Other authors205 155 - 
 
Total 
 
222 
 
- 
 
A few initial observations stick out.  First, it is significant to note that two of the 
top three authors cited are former Supreme Court judges, while the other, Peter Hogg, has 
appeared on the short list of potential Supreme Court nominees.  It is also telling that the 
occupation of the most frequently cited authors stems, exclusively, from the legal 
profession.  Indeed, every author that appears in the list above is either a law professor or 
lawyer.  That is not to say that other disciplines are deliberately excluded, or that they are 
absent from the 155 authors that remain, but it does give an early indication of the type of 
thinkers Supreme Court judges are most likely to gravitate toward.  Second, the brevity of 
                                                
205 This category includes every author, or string of authors, that were cited two times or 
less. 
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authors suggests that, although the Supreme Court cites some authors significantly more 
than others, it is not afraid to branch out and explore the publications of other academics.  
On average, the Court has incorporated an average of 2.5 publications for every 
federalism decision in the post-Charter era.  Although these figures do not come close to 
the average number of citations that one would expect to find in, say, a legal periodical or 
political science journal, over time they capture a diverse sample of the academic 
literature that is available.   
However, given that the “top five” represent 80 of the 200 publications that have 
been cited in total, it is worthwhile to conduct a more in-depth investigation of their 
contributions.  Specifically, are these authors cited for the same “landmark” publication, 
time and time again; or does the Court pick up on a variety of their publications?  Hogg, 
Laskin and Lederman, for example, have all produced well-known constitutional texts or, 
as they are sometimes called, “horn” books.  Hogg, however, like Laskin and the others 
in the list, has published multiple works and has written on a variety of Constitutional 
matters, including federalism.  It is reasonable to ask, then, for which publication(s) are 
they being cited?  Is Constitutional Law of Canada the only work of Hogg’s that the 
Supreme Court is citing or are some of his articles being cited as well?  How many of 
Dale Gibson’s many articles have they picked up on?  The table below breaks down the 
publications of the five most frequently cited authors.  Books and articles are indicated by 
italics and quotations, respectively.  
For all intents and purposes, the table shows that the sources involving the authors 
who were most frequently cited span multiple publications.  That is to say, it cannot be 
said that Hogg was only cited because of his textbook, although, at 40 citations, that is no 
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small feat; and it cannot be said that Laskin was only cited because of his textbook.  On 
the contrary, each author had multiple publications that were cited by the Court.  Gibson, 
for example, had six different articles that were cited; Hogg, four; and Lederman and 
Laskin, three.  That the Court picked up on these authors multiple times in multiple 
publications shows that these authors were referenced not simply because of the classic 
works that they had produced.  Although “classic” works are significant because their 
relevance stands the test of time, they are sometimes referenced for the sake of being a 
“classic,” that is, a title to which many can relate and/or expect to see in works involving 
constitutional matters.   
Table 2: Publication list of most frequency-cited authors in federalism cases: 1984-2012  
Author Publication No. 
 
 
Hogg 
Constitutional Law of Canada 40 
“Federalism and the Jurisdiction of Canadian Courts” 1 
“Constitutional aspects of Federal Securities Legislation” 1 
“The Constitutionality of the Competition Bill” 1 
Liability of the Crown (coauthored) 2 
“The Charter of Rights and American Theories of Interpretation” 1 
 
 
La Forest 
  
Water Law in Canada 4 
The Allocation of Taxing Power Under the Canadian Constitution 4 
Natural Resources and Public Property under the Canadian Constitution 1 
  
 
 
Laskin 
“An Inquiry into the Diefenbaker Bill of Rights” 2 
Canadian Constitutional Law: Cases, Text and Notes on… 3 
The British Tradition in Canadian Law 1 
“Tests for the Validity of Legislation:  What's the ‘Matter’?” 1 
“Provincial Marketing Levies: Indirect Taxation and Federal Power” 1 
 
 
 
Gibson 
  
“The ‘Federal Enclave’ Fallacy in Canadian Constitutional Law” 1 
“Interjurisdictional Immunity in Canadian Federalism” 2 
“Constitutional Jurisdiction over Environmental Management in Canada” 2 
“The Firearms Reference in the Alberta Court of Appeal” 1 
“Freedom of Commercial Expression under the Charter…” 1 
“Measuring ‘National Dimensions’” 1 
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Lederman 
“Unity and Diversity in Canadian Federalism: Ideals and Methods…” 2 
“Telecommunications and the Federal Constitution of Canada” 1 
“The Concurrent Operation of Federal and Provincial Laws in Canada” 1 
Continuing Canadian Constitutional Dilemma’s 2 
 
At this point, we can say that the Supreme Court cites a diversity of authors, and that the 
authors they most frequency cite are either law professors or lawyers.  But what about the 
remaining citations?  What subject matters or disciplines do they cover?  Do they branch 
out and explore publications that fall outside the legal arena?  Returning to our original 
question: does the Supreme Court cite political scientists or philosophers?  As the data 
below suggests, the short answer is “no.”   
While judges possess considerable freedom when it comes to the use of academic 
literature, it appears they are cautious to exercise that freedom as they tend to shy away 
from non-legal authority.  
Table 3: The Frequency of Academic Subject Matter in Federalism Cases: 1984-2009 
 
 
Subject/discipline 
 
Number 
 
Share of Total Number 
 
Law 291 68.8% 
Government/administrative 73 17.4% 
Environment/Science 17 4.0% 
Business/Economics 10 2.5% 
International 9 2.1% 
Dictionary/Encyclopedia 7 1.7% 
Philosophy 8 1.9% 
History 5 0.9% 
Health/medical 3 0.7% 
Total 423 100% 
 
Of the various disciplines the Court’s citations encompass, legal literature is by far the 
most frequent (68.8%); and when government publications are omitted (one in five 
citations), the proportion of legal material increases to 83.1%.  That the Supreme Court 
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cites legal authority far more than any other discipline is not surprising at first glance.  
Legal sources are most directly related to the pursuit of judging, and often serve to 
contextualize the doctrines that are applied to resolve a dispute.  But the Supreme Court 
still cites non-legal publications.  Although they are significantly less common, they are 
not absent, and make up about a third of the citation total (31.2%).  Of the remaining 
citations, reference to government documents—legislative debates, parliamentary 
proceedings, departmental reports or advisory studies—are the second most common 
source of authority, making up 17.4% of the citation total.   
However, reference to government-created material is fundamentally differs from 
reference to law journals.  While the former is more “matter of fact” or record-oriented in 
nature—assembled, at times, by researchers who are given a specific mandate established 
by another—the latter is more “free lance” in nature and is the product of whatever path 
the writer choses to embark.  In the case of Reference re: Firearms,206 for example, there 
are fundamental differences in the approach taken by the government-authored “The 
Government’s Action Plan on Firearms Control”207 and the article written by David 
Beatty, “Gun Control and Judicial Anarchy.”208  One is written by bureaucrats and is 
“matter of fact”—this is what our legislative policy will look like if it passes in the House 
of Commons—while the other is written by an outside observer and is more 
opinionated—in short, a forecast on the constitutionality, as well as the lower courts’ 
handling, of the government’s impending proposal.  The point to be made is that it takes 
                                                
206 Reference Re: Firearms (Can.) 1 S.C.R. 782 [2000]. 
207 “The Government’s Action Plan Firearms Control.” Canada.  Minister of Public 
Works and Government Services, 1994.   
208 David Beatty, “Gun Control and Judicial Anarchy,” Constitutional Forum 10, No 2 
(1999).    
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less creativity for a judge to cite government reference material than it does for a judge to 
sift through law journals and incorporate the insights of academics.   
It is worth noticing that judges cite government material at a far higher rate than 
other disciplines.  Together, law journals and government documents make up 86.2% of 
all non-judicial citations in federalism decisions.  Of the remaining disciplines, close to 
five percent are represented by environmental matters (4.3%), followed by 
business/economics (2.5%), international reports (2.1%), philosophy (1.9%), history 
(0.9%), and medical sources (0.7%).  These findings confirm the fact that 
overwhelmingly, the Court confines its secondary research to legal sources and 
government material.  They do not cite political scientists—a discipline that has produced 
a wealth of material on federalism—and only rarely do they make reference to literature 
produced by philosophers or historians.209   
However, the absence of political science literature is curious, for a number of 
reasons.  First, judges are the intellectual gatekeepers of the Court; they choose which 
authors to cite and how often, and whether or not to expand their explanatory net.  For 
now, and for whatever reason, they choose not to cite political scientists, even though 
there is nothing formally preventing them from doing so.  Therefore, the absence of 
political science material is a matter of choice.  Judges choose not to use it.  Second, 
federalism is a focal topic of discussion in the political science community.  From many 
angles, spanning a diversity of approaches and schools of thought, federal-provincial 
relations in Canada have been scrutinized by political scientists.  Some thinkers, like 
Robert Vipond and Paul Romney, take more of a theoretical or philosophical-historical 
                                                
209 In the section that follows we will examine the extent to which each resource factors 
into a judge’s analysis.   
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approach, while other well known scholars, like Richard Simeon, Donald Smiley, and 
David Cameron have taken more of a public policy / institutional approach.  Regardless 
of background, many scholars have produced books and articles containing leading 
research, insight, and opinion on the state of the Canadian federation.   
On the one hand, it should be expected that judges focus on legal literature when 
composing a legal decision; the two go hand in hand.  On the flip side, however, judges 
in the post-Charter era have incorporated a certain public policy “flair” into their 
federalism decision-making.  As will shall see in our analysis of doctrine in Chapter 7, 
they do not simply, as an end itself, apply the law and assess the legal standing of a 
legislative statute; they also factor into their decisions the end consequence their 
judgments will bring about.  Regardless of what one thinks about the appropriateness of 
their approach, Supreme Court judges think through the public policy implications of 
their decisions.  They examine the competing interests and legal arguments that come 
before them, and, when circumstances permit, prefer to render “softened” decisions or 
“compromises” that preserve the legislative capabilities of both levels of government.  In 
short, the nature of their decision-making philosophy has evolved to the point where it 
involves a fair level of law creation.   
In the expanded explanatory universe in which they now operate, it is reasonable 
to ask the obvious but important question: why is the Supreme Court ignoring the insights 
of political or policy experts when they are making policy decisions?  It is one thing if the 
Court, entrenched in legal formalism, confined itself to legal citations exclusively, but as 
we discussed in Chapter 2, they have expanded their roles and become more “contextual” 
in nature, which would make the incorporation of political science literature consistent 
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with, and perhaps complimentary to, their modern decision-making philosophy.  If the 
emerging focus for judges is to make sound policy decisions, it seems sensible to call on 
the expertise of political scientists and policy analysts to best understand the implications 
of an impending judgment. 
But not all judges embrace the use of academic material as widely as others.  
Although judges do not explicitly state their opinion on the institution’s usage of non-
judicial materials, almost all have done so at one point, indicating both broad and 
longstanding acceptance of the practice.  Although the frequency of academic citations 
varies from one justice to the next, the underscoring point is that the use of academic 
material is systemic, not the result of a select few judges.  In viewing the table below, one 
can see that while there is significant range in the frequency in which judges employ 
academic material, almost every judge who authored a reason in a federalism judgment 
made the list.      
Table 4: The Academic Citation Patterns on Federalism Issues According to Supreme 
Court Justice: 1984-2012 
 
 
Judge 
 
Total Cites 
Total Number 
of Reasons210 
Average # Cites per 
Reason Delivered 
La Forest 59 13 4.5 
Gonthier 33 4 8.25 
Iacobucci 31 10 3.1 
Lebel 36 7 5.14 
Dickson 21 11 1.9 
Bastarache 16 3 5.3 
Beetz 14 8 1.75 
Binnie 12 4 3.0 
Sopinka 10 3 3.3 
Lamer 11 4 2.8 
Wilson 8 11 0.7 
Rothstein 8 2 4 
                                                
210 This includes the total number of written reasons provided by a judge, be that a 
majority or unanimous decision, a dissent or a concurrence.   
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Deschamps 5 1 5 
L-Heureux Dube  4 1 4 
Estey 4 5 0.8 
Le Dain 2 2 1.0 
McLachlin 12 2 6.0 
Abella 1 1 1.0 
Cromwell 27 2 13.5 
 
 
As the numbers show, Justice La Forest cited academic material more times than 
any of his colleagues (59), but he also authored the greatest number of written reasons.  
This explains why his “average number of cites per reason” (4.5) is lower than that of 
Gonthier (8.25) and Cromwell (13.5).  However, some judges, like Wilson and Dickson, 
authored a number of written reasons but only rarely did they include academic citations.  
From these variations it can be said that the use of secondary literature in judicial 
decisions is a luxury and choice—widely accepted by judges and never criticized—but 
one that some expressed in their reasons more readily than others.        
Utilization and Dominance   
At this point, we have only discussed the authors and disciplines that are cited, 
and the judges who are citing.  But we have said nothing about what the sources look like 
or how they are utilized within a decision.  Indeed, does the Court actually quote and 
discuss the authors they list?  In other words, just because a source is cited does not mean 
that it is discussed at length or that its ideas helped inform the author of the reasons.  
Sometimes a source is listed in a string of citations at the end of a paragraph—“See 
Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada”—with no discussion of the content whatever.  But 
this type of reference says nothing about what Hogg said or what the Court thought of his 
work.  In other instances, the Court has been known to “name drop,” as was the case for 
example when Justice Gonthier cited John Stuart Mill in Reference re: Quebec Sales 
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Tax.211  Although Mill was neither quoted nor discussed, his book, Principles of Political 
Economy, appeared in a string of citations at the end of paragraph.  Of course, it would be 
erroneous to conclude that because Mill appeared under the “Authors Cited” header, that 
Gonthier’s decision hinged on his political philosophy.  These are but two examples, but 
they show that the mere existence of a citation does not guarantee that it was discussed. 
Therefore, looking at the frequency of citations in isolation is a limited exercise that only 
takes us so far.  If the goal is to uncover the origin of the Supreme Court’s ideas, and to 
see which types of authority they consider when assembling a judgment, we must 
measure the respective impact that each source has within a decision.    
The first attempt to accomplish this goal is to assess how a source is incorporated 
within a decision.  The table below lists the frequency of how a source is used by 
assessing whether it was quoted, mentioned in passing, or discussed at length.  Six 
categories were created to describe this phenomenon; they are described below and 
ordered according to their intensity.   
“Discuss” is the most significant or intense designation because it refers to 
sources that are discussed at length and appear throughout a judge’s analysis; this 
includes sources which are referenced repeatedly and/or quoted multiple times 
throughout a decision.  “Paragraph” represents the second most significant category, 
referring, as the name suggests, to authors who are quoted at paragraph length.  This 
category is more substantive than the third category—“quote”—because a paragraph is 
significantly longer than a quote which is usually only a few words or a single sentence.  
On the other hand, if a source was quoted multiple times it fell under the “discussion” 
                                                
211 [1994] S.C.R. 715 
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category.  This distinction was used when determining which category a citation most 
accurately belonged.  “List/mention,” the fourth category, includes citations which are 
neither quoted nor discussed, but simply a solo citation or a string of citations that are 
included at the end of a sentence or paragraph (usually in parentheses).  An “iconic” 
citation is one that is based not so much on necessity, but (presumably) for the 
significance of a name and what it represents (i.e. Shakespeare, Aristotle, David Hume, 
John Stuart Mill, and the like).  Lastly, the “secondary” category refers to an author that 
is mentioned, quoted or discussed by a judge only because they were discussed in a prior 
decision, and the judge in the present is attempting to understand or recapitulate the 
analysis of the judge who discussed an author in a previous decision.   
Table 5: The Use of Citations in Federalism Cases: 1984-2012 
 
Citation Type 
 
 
Frequency 
 
Proportion (%) 
Discuss 49 14.8 
Paragraph 47 14.2 
Quote 36 10.9 
List/mention 184 55.6 
Iconic 3 1.0 
Secondary 12 3.6 
Total 331 100% 
 
In essence, Table 5 can be divided into two main sections.  On the one hand, there 
are those citations that are either quoted or discussed (discuss, paragraph and quote) 
while the other citations are simply mentioned or referring to a citation made by a 
previous justice (list/mention, iconic, secondary).  As the data indicate, most academics 
that are cited in a decision are rarely quoted or discussed.  Most commonly, judges 
simply refer to a source at the end of a paragraph.  Indeed, more than half of all citations 
(55.6%) fall under the “list/mention” category, and this number increases when “iconic” 
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citations, a more specialized subset of the list/mention category, are included.  On the 
other side of the equation, 14.8% of citations are discussed and an additional 25.1% are 
quoted to some extent.  In commonsensical terms, there is nothing unusual about these 
findings, for these numbers are likely comparable to the citation patterns and tendencies 
contained within academic publications at large.  Not every name or resource that appears 
in the bibliography of a book or journal is used extensively.  In both academic 
publications and Supreme Court judgments, many references are included  “for more 
information,” and only a fraction of the works that are cited are debated or discussed at 
length.   
On the flipside, the fact that the Court either quotes or discusses two out of five of 
its citations reveals that the “Authors Cited” header is not simply a list of names, but a list 
that includes authors who factor prominently into a decision’s analysis.  It is the “two 
fifths”—the citations which are quoted and discussed—that will become the subject of 
further investigation.  Indeed, we need to focus upon the type of sources the Court quotes 
or discusses at length if we need want to uncover the thinkers that influence the outcomes 
of decisions.  Who are the authors, how “old” are the citations, and from what kind of 
publishing medium do they originate?  Further, how contemporary are the sources they 
discuss, and to what extent does the age of a citation correspond with the publishing 
medium of the source that is being cited?  
As we saw from the table above, there are various ways a source is incorporated 
into a decision.  While Table 5 contains categories that are explanatory in nature—
paragraph, discuss, quote, list/mention—Table 6 uses a numeric ranking to correspond to 
the extent to which a source factors into a decision’s analysis.  Table 6 uses a 1-5 scale, 
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with “1” representing the sources that are the least utilized and “5” representing the 
sources that are the most utilized.  In this table, government citations were omitted from 
analysis. 
Table 6: The Significance of Academic Resource Utilization: 1984-2012   
 
Significance 
 
Frequency 
 
 
Percentage 
1 158 
72 
48 
24 
12 
33.6 
17.6 
12.5 
6.1 
2.5 
2 
3 
4 
5 
    
As the table shows, a significant number of sources fall under the “1” category, that is, a 
third of citations are mentioned only in passing—be that string or spot citation at the end 
of a paragraph or sentence.  On the other hand, less than 10 percent of citations (8.6%) 
are discussed at great length.  To frame the findings in slightly different terms, only one 
out of every three citations factor prominently into the Court’s decisions.  The remaining 
citations (62.5%) were used only once, be that a single-sentence quote, a reference in 
passing, or simply one citation in a list of many.  From a broader perspective, only 1.9 
citations for every federalism case are prominent while the remaining sources (3.8 
citations per case) exist in “name only.”  However, these numbers in and of themselves 
do not take us very far.  Indeed, two additional factors will come into play here: first, we 
will examine the relationship between the medium of a publication and its age; and 
second, the age of a publication in relation to the extent to which it is used.  The intensity 
rankings will be used to facilitate a series of cross-tabulations.     
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D. Judges, Journals and Dialogue 
The information contained in academic journals is generally or at least potentially 
more recent than that of the information contained in books.  Although articles are 
usually less substantive and rigorous, their recency is perhaps their greatest asset.  Not 
surprisingly, because they are less in-depth but more cutting edge and nuanced than 
voluminous books, articles better lend themselves to quick and timely responses.  In the 
aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, for example, articles attempting to explain the 
motives of such an atrocity were published much sooner than books attempting to 
elucidate the same.  Another distinction between book and articles is that articles tend to 
be more “preemptive” than books; that is to say, because they are written and published 
sooner, they are able to forecast and provide commentary on a dispute, legal issue or 
lower court decision before the Supreme Court is able to hear it.  Books do not often get 
composed, and subsequently published, in time to influence an impending judicial 
outcome. 
On the other hand, while books are better for adding context and breadth, detailed 
forecasts that fit within a larger framework, rarely are they published in time to serve as a 
resource for a specific case.212  There are also fewer books published per year than 
academic journals, which means that there is a greater likelihood that topical information 
will be published in a journal than in a book.  Indeed, the likelihood that a book is written 
specifically to influence an impending decision is altogether rare and unlikely.  When it 
comes to journals, however, it is worth asking the question: to what extent does 
“dialogue” exist between judges and journals?  That is to say, how contemporary are the 
                                                
212 In most cases it is too laborious to write a book that predicts the outcome or 
implications of the Court’s decision.   
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Court’s citations, and to what extent do sources they cite make direct reference to the 
case(s) at hand?  Further, how many articles on federalism are there to choose from?   
As we learned from the Dale Gibson illustration in Reference re: Firearms (Can.), 
the Court makes reference to articles that address the precise dispute over which they are 
presiding.  In this particular instance, the Attorney General of Canada referenced 
Gibson’s work during oral argument.  The Court recorded this reference in its analysis: 
“The Attorney General of Canada argues that the 1995 gun control law meets these three 
requirements, and points to commentary on this legislation which supports its position: D. 
Gibson, “The Firearms Reference in the Alberta Court of Appeal” (1999), 37 Alta. L. 
Rev. 1071.”  While the Court did not discuss Gibson’s article directly—referring, instead, 
to source uncovered by the Attorney General—this illustration is nevertheless important.  
It shows the potential of contemporaneity and reminds us that non-legal sources are 
referenced during oral argument.  
As the data below indicate, the Court is just as likely to cite journal articles 
(29.1%) as it is books (25.1%), followed by government publications and international 
reports (24.2%), textbooks (19.4%), and dictionaries (2.1%).213  
Table 7: Format Frequency of Academic Material in Federalism Cases: 1984-2012 
 
 
Format 
 
 
Number 
 
Proportion 
Journal Article 123 29.1% 
Book 106 25.1% 
Government/International 102 24.2% 
Textbook 83 19.4% 
                                                
213 From hereinafter, however, government publications and dictionaries will be omitted 
from analysis.  The age and utilization of journal articles will become a source of 
emphasis.   
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Dictionary 9 2.1% 
Total 423 100% 
 
To translate these figures into broader terms, the Court cites 1.5 journal articles 
per federalism decision.  Articles make up the highest proportion of the Court’s citations, 
creating ample opportunities to assess the extent to which they interact with the authors 
that produce them.  In the paragraphs above, we discussed the differences between books 
and articles and determined that articles have a higher capacity to be “preemptive” as 
well as the type of publication dialogue is most likely to be found.  
The “Age Factor” 
However, if the goal is to assess whether there is a dialogue between judges and 
journals, we must examine the respective age of the Court’s publications.  To do this, I 
will measure the age of an academic citation by subtracting its publication date from the 
year it was cited in a Supreme Court decision.  From there, I will perform a series of 
crosstabs between the 1) age of a citation and its publication medium, and the 2) age of a 
citation and the extent to which it is utilized within a decision.  Together, these factors 
will help to uncover the respective impact publications have on Supreme Court decision-
making.      
The age of a source that is cited is important for a number of reasons.  To begin, it 
reveals the longevity and relevance of an author’s work as well as the publications stand 
the test of time and which ones do not.  The recency of a publication also allows us to 
pinpoint whether a source was published in time to address a specific dispute.  As the 
data in the table below suggests, more than a third (36.2%) of the Supreme Court’s total 
citations are five years of age or less, and more than two thirds are 10 years of age or less 
(68.6%).  Publications that fall in the 11-15 category make up one fifth of the Supreme 
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Court’s citations (20.6%).  In contrast, publications that are 16 years of age or older make 
up less than 10 percent of the Court’s academic citation total (6.9%).  There are only 17 
cited publications written more than fifty years ago.     
Table 8: The age frequency of non-legal publications in federalism cases: 1984-2012      
Age Number Percentage 
Very current (1-5 years) 153 36.2 
Current (6-10 years) 137 32.4 
Slightly Dated (11-15 years) 87 20.6 
Dated (16-50 years) 29 6.9 
Very dated (50+) 17 4.0 
Total 423 100 
 
While an exhaustive listing of citations is useful in its own right, it is also 
limiting.  It includes textbooks, which are updated every couple of years, as well as 
government and international publications, which, more times than not, include 
legislation or studies that are directly pertinent to the facts of the case at hand.  On the 
other hand, books and articles are sources which, almost exclusively, are “optional” 
materials that are found and selected by judges.  Indeed, books and articles are 
distinguishable from textbooks and government publications in a number of important 
ways.  Whereas books and articles are “nonessential”—works that are included for 
background purposes or opinion, analytical nuances or discoveries—textbooks and 
government resources tend to relate directly to a background or facts of a specific dispute 
or to the doctrine that is being used to resolve a dispute.  In addition, textbooks tend to 
serve as resources that articulate the history of precedents, the stages or steps involving 
the application of legal tests, and a summary of the Supreme Court’s handling of cases.  
But as content becomes outdated, new volumes, with minor changes under the same title, 
are released every couple of years.   
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Examining the citation of government publications are also limiting in terms of 
what they reveal about the Court, though for different reasons than textbooks.  Often, 
they are referenced under the “factual” section of a decision as a way to better understand 
the purpose or intent of a specific statute, including the legislative debates or 
parliamentary proceedings under which their gestation took place.  They are not, as is 
often the case with books and articles, cited because they offer a nuanced or progressive 
approach to adjudicating.  On the contrary, they are usually cited to bolster the factual 
background of a dispute and/or the history of a statute.  “Just the facts, ma’am” is an 
expression that most accurately describes the use of government material.  Books and 
articles on the other hand are a stronger indicator of judicial choice.  There are many 
articles and schools of thought from which to choose while there is only one federal 
legislature, and one version of government documents, that exists.  For these reasons it 
can be said that books and articles reveal more about where a judge gets his ideas—and 
the thinkers and schools of thought to which he subscribes—than government reports and 
textbooks.     
Because of these differences, I have created a table that looks at the age of books 
and articles exclusively—a table where all other publication mediums have been removed 
from analysis.  As the data indicates, the Court cites a significant number of books and 
articles that are “very current” (68).  They cite an additional 44 books and articles that 
fall between the age of six and 11.  These two categories combined one can say that 
Supreme Court judges incorporate “current” materials an average of 1.34 times per case. 
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Table 9: The age of books and articles that are cited in federalism cases: 1984-2012      
Age Book Article Total 
Very current (0-5 years) 26 40 66 
Current (6-10 years) 16 23 39 
Slightly Dated (11-15 years) 8 19 27 
Dated (16-30 years) 20 41 61 
Very dated (31+) 17 12 29 
Total 87 135 224 
 
The next factor to uncover, then, is the respective impact “current” materials have within 
federalism decisions.  If a book or journal is “hot off the press”—and its contents 
referenced in either oral argument or a written decision—it is prudent to ask about the 
extent to which said references factor into the Court’s decision-making.  That is, how 
intensely are they utilized?  Are these sources tucked away in a footnote and mentioned 
in passing, or are they discussed at length?  The paragraphs below attempt to shed light 
on these unknowns.   
A cross tabulation using the intensity of the book/article sub sample is reflected in 
Table 10, below.  As the numbers suggest, the more “intense” a citation the more likely it 
is to be an article as opposed to a book, and vice versa.   
Table 10: Publication utilization according to publication medium: 1984-2012 
 5 4 3 2 1 
Book 0 6 12 27 44 
Article 4 10 22 26 76 
Total 4 16 34 53 120 
 
Building on that point, a second modest discovery is that the more recent a citation is, the 
more likely it is to factor prominently into a decision.  In other words, recent material—
especially citations five years of age or younger—is more likely to be “discussed” than 
dated material.  Ostensibly, one of the reasons for this is that a recent publication may 
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have direct relevance to the case at hand.  It may, for example, contain pertinent 
information about the application of relevant doctrine, or commentary on how a dispute 
was settled in the courts below.  Recent material may contain nuanced ideas or newly 
published research data.  While reference to a longstanding doctrine or idea—a classic 
article or research study—may sufficiently satisfy its audience through a simple spot 
citation or quote, a new concept may require a more in-depth discussion so as to better 
link the relevance of its content to the disposition at hand.     
Table 11: Correlating the age of a citation with the intensity of its use: 1984-2012 
 5 4 3 2 1 
Very current 11 9 16 26 56 
Current 0 5 9 13 22 
Slightly dated 0 5 6 10 14 
Dated 1 4 17 14 50 
Very dated 0 1 0 6 4 
Total 12 24 48 69 146 
 
 Nor surprisingly, as the data in Table 11 indicate, almost every citation that was 
scored a ‘5’ on the intensity scale was “very recent.”  With the exception of one citation, 
the sources that factor most prominently into a decision are not more than five years of 
age.  On the other hand, a disproportion number of publications that are determined to be 
“dated” or “very dated” scored a “2” or a “1” on the intensity scale.  While there are 
various sources that fall between ratings “3” and “4,” a close examination of Table 11 
shows a strong correlation between the recency of an academic source and the intensity 
of its use.  
From previous tables we learned that in Supreme Court decisions, articles are the 
most frequently cited publication medium.  They surpass the proportion of textbooks, 
government documents and books.  They are also more likely to be discussed “at length” 
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than books.  With these factors combined, it can be said that some evidence exists to 
support the idea that the communication bond between judges and journals is a two-way 
street.  While articles offer a medium through which academics may influence the 
“reasoned elaboration”214 of judges, written judgments provide the Court with 
opportunities to respond to scholars through discussion.  Given that journals represent the 
intellectual pulse of the academic community, it appears that judges are undoubtedly 
influenced by the academic community of which they have become a part.215  That being 
said, however, which journals are they citing?  Do they confine their research to 
Canadian periodicals, or do they cite international journals as well?  Further, when it 
comes to issues that involve Canadian federalism—what does the intellectual “talent 
pool” look like?  How many articles on Canadian federalism are published each year, and 
what proportion of these publications do Supreme Court judges pick up on?  To use but 
one example, if a constitutionalist were to publish an article on Canadian federalism in 
the Canadian Bar Review, what are the chances it would end up in the written reasons of 
Canada’s National High Court?    
   The “Talent Pool” 
 
Between 1984 and 2012, the Supreme Court cited 121 journal articles in its 
federalism decisions, and of those articles, 64 had something to do with Canadian 
federalism.  The federalism articles that were cited spanned 41 academic journals—some 
Canadian, some international.  A breakdown of the citation frequency of articles 
                                                
214 Henry M. Hart and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the 
Making and Application of Law,” eds (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1994).   
215 See Peter McCormick, “Judges, Journals and Exegesis: Judicial Leadership and 
Academic Scholarship,” University of New Brunswick Law Journal 139 (1996), an article 
which discusses the “phenomenon of judicial participation in legal scholarship, primarily 
through contributions to the university and professional legal journals” (cf. p.44-45).    
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published in federalism decisions is contained in the table below.  For the purposes of this 
table, every article—regardless if it was cited multiple times—factored into analysis.     
Table 12: Ranking of Canadian Legal Periodicals Cited in Federalism Decisions 
 
Periodical name 
 
 
Number of times cited 
Canadian Bar Review 25 
University of Toronto Law Journal 12 
McGill Law Journal 6 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 6 
Alberta Law Review 5 
Dalhousie Law Review 4 
University of British Columbia Law Review 4 
Manitoba Law Journal 3 
Ottawa Law Review 3 
Queen’s Law Journal 3 
Canadian Business Law Journal 2 
Canadian Law Review 1 
Canadian Journal Criminal Law 1 
University of Western Ontario Law Review 1 
Saskatchewan Law Review 1 
Supreme Court Law Review 1 
University of New Brunswick Law Journal 1 
American Law Journals 20 
International Law Journals 4 
 
While it is clear that some journals are cited more frequently than others, the most 
revealing factor is the diversity of journals from which the Supreme Court engages.  
Granted, the frequency in which some journal appear is inflated somewhat by articles, 
within those journals, that were cited in multiple decisions.  But one cannot allow the 
qualification of such numbers to diminish its significance.  The Court cites multiple 
articles in multiple periodicals.  But what percentage of the articles in Table 12 are 
related to Canadian federalism? 
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Table 13: Number of federalism articles cited according to periodical: 1984-2012 
 
Periodical name 
 
Number of different 
federalism articles cited 
per journal 
Canadian Bar Review 23 
University of Toronto Law Journal 6 
McGill Law Journal 6 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 2 
Alberta Law Review 3 
Dalhousie Law Review 2 
University of British Columbia Law Review 2 
Manitoba Law Journal 2 
Ottawa Law Review 2 
Queen’s Law Journal 3 
Canadian Business Law Journal 1 
Canadian Law Review 1 
University of Western Ontario Law Review 1 
Supreme Court Law Review 1 
University of New Brunswick Law Journal 1 
American 2 
International 0 
Total 58 
 
Of the 121 article citations by the Court, 58 were related to Canadian federalism.  
In compiling the data for this table, articles that were cited multiple times were only 
counted once, for the purpose of the table is to see how many different publications there 
and what journals they come from in particular.  As Table 12 suggests, the Canadian Bar 
Review is by far the most frequently cited journal that is associated with the articles the 
Court references.  Although we are unable to determine whether it is the name and 
reputation of the journals that draws judges to its article—or whether it is the authors who 
publish in them—the fact remains that the Canadian Bar Review is the most frequently 
cited Canadian legal periodical when it comes to publications related to Canadian 
federalism.  The next two commonly cited periodicals include the University of Toronto 
Law Journal (6) and the McGill Law Journal (6).  From there, the frequencies of the 
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remaining drop off significantly.  However, it is peculiar that one of Canada’s leading 
law journals is nearly absent from the list above.  Indeed, while the Supreme Court Law 
Review has published a sizable number of federalism articles over the past quarter 
century (17), the Court has only cited it once in its federalism decisions over the past 
quarter century.  It is possible that the federalism articles being published had little to do 
with the federalism cases appearing before the Court, but such a scenario raises an 
interesting comparative question: how many Canadian federalism articles were published 
in relation to the number of Canadian federalism articles that were cited?   
 I have attempted to answer this question in the Table 14, below.  Because some 
journals have been around longer than others, it is not possible to compare apples to 
apples in every instance.  Some journals are longer standing than others, and some 
journals publish more frequently than others.  I confined the list to Canada’s “major” law 
journals as well as the journals the Court most frequently cites in its reasons for 
judgment.  Accordingly, many provincial journals—such as the Alberta Law Review—
were omitted from analysis. 
Table 14: Frequency of Federalism Articles in leading Canadian Legal Periodicals  
Journal Name 
 
Range 
 
Federalism 
Articles  
Total 
Articles 
Proportion 
(%) 
Canadian Bar 
Review216 
 
1984-2012 26 318 8.2 
Osgoode Hall Law 
Review217 
1993-2012 7 402 1.7 
                                                
216 Contains one very recent publication: Ian B. Lee’s case comment in the Canadian Bar 
Review, “The Assisted Human Reproduction Act Reference and The Federal Criminal 
Law Power” (July, 2012).  Of the journals we surveyed, only three federalism articles 
have been published over the past three years.  One from the Canadian Bar Review 
(above) and two from the Queen’s Law Review. 
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McGill Law Review 
 
1999-2012 5 260 1.9 
Queen’s Law Review218 
 
2000-2012 21 212 
 
9.9 
University of Toronto 
Law Journal 
1997-2012 4 306 1.3 
University of Toronto 
Faculty of Law Review 
1995-2012 4 112 3.6 
Supreme Court Law 
Review 
1999-2012 17 427 4.0 
Ottawa Law Review 1978-2012 6 
 
453 
 
1.3 
 
Total - 90 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
Of the nine journals we profiled, for example, less than five percent of the total 
number of articles were federalism related (3.6%).  This is significant, because when a 
federalism article is actually published, there is a high probability that it will not only be 
read by judges but potentially cited and incorporated into their reasons for judgment.  In 
some journals, such as the McGill Law Review, 50% of its federalism publications since 
1984 (3/6) have been cited by the Court.  In other instances, two out of six federalism 
articles that were published in the Ottawa Law Journal since 1984 have been cited, and 
three out of seven federalism articles published in the Osgoode Hall journal have been 
cited.   
                                                                                                                                            
217 The number of articles related to federal/provincial jurisdiction published in the 
Osgoode Hall Law Review can be counted on one hand: 5.  One of those articles is based 
on the Australian federation, and another on the work and impact of Brian Dickson, of 
which the issue of federalism is discussed at length.  Not once does the word 
“federalism” or the phrase “division of powers” appear in the title of an article published 
in Osgoode between 1993-2009.    
218 The spike in federalism articles can be explained by a federalism “special edition” 
published in 2009, where 12 federalism articles appeared.  If history is any indication, 
one would expect the Court to pick up on these recently published articles in the division 
of power cases it addresses in the next couple of years. 
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On the other hand, the article/citation ratio in other leading journals tends to move 
in the opposite direction.  Only one out of 17 federalism articles that were published in 
the Supreme Court Law Review were cited, and only three out of 21 federalism articles 
published in the Queen’s Law Review were published.  Despite the range of journal 
citation ratios, these numbers are surprising.  To begin, federalism articles are 
uncommon, and the disparity between federalism articles and non-federalism legal 
articles intensified in the post-Charter era.  The fact that federalism articles have been 
cited as much as they have suggests that they have a moderate influence on the 
federalism jurisprudence of the Court.  It also suggests that when the Supreme Court 
embarks on new federalism precedents, they make a real effort to stay current with the 
scholarship.  While it is unclear whether the articles influence their position—or whether 
they find articles to substantiate their opinion—judges participate in academia.  While 
they may not always “discuss” them, they cite them, and more times than not, read them 
or hear about them in oral argument.  
 At the end of the day, it appears there is a disparity between the number of articles 
on federalism that are published in comparison to the number of non-federalism articles 
that are published.  In the legal academic community, federalism has taken a back seat to 
other topics, including the Charter, aboriginal issues, the environment, and the legality of 
social-moral issues like doctor-assisted suicide, safe-injection sites and human 
reproductive technology.  Chapter 4 will examine the Supreme Court’s federalism docket 
and shed some light in this area.      
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Political Scientists and Indirect Infiltration? 
Over the past number of pages we explored the frequency and application of 
scholarly material in Supreme Court decision-making.  We learned that while the use of 
academic literature is common, it is largely confined to legal authority.  Indeed, both 
political scientists and public policy experts are absent, which is a matter of judicial 
choice.  That is, there is nothing formally preventing judges from expanding the 
boundaries of their intellectual arena.  They cite legal academics—and not political 
scientists—because they choose to cite legal academics and to ignore political scientists. 
  Yet, ironically, as we will see more fully in Chapter 7, the Court’s decision-
making philosophy blurs the legal function of judicial review with the political function 
of policy-making.  While the Supreme Court refrains, for whatever reason, from citing 
public policy experts, they sometimes behave like them and/or make decisions that are 
based on policy arguments that are presented by the litigants that come before them.  The 
question, “where does the Supreme Court get its ideas,” becomes a tenuous pursuit 
because one cannot rely on academic citations alone to trace the origins of their outlook 
or ideas.  While bibliographies are an excellent starting point, every author or judge is 
influenced by assumptions that were shaped by something.  And these assumptions are 
not often displayed in an “Authors Cited” list.  Assumptions are implicitly revealed 
through the work of a judge, through the application of doctrine and the creation of 
jurisprudence.  Supreme Court justices may not cite Donald Smiley, Alan Cairns or J.R. 
Mallory—to list but a few examples—but they may be indirectly influenced by their 
research, paradigms and views on Canadian government.  
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Interestingly, what is noteworthy about Hogg’s textbook—aside from the fact that 
it is cited so often—is that his chapter on federalism discusses the contributions of 
political scientists.  For example, in providing a definition of federalism, he uses K.C. 
Wheare’s classic text Federal Government as his starting point.  Moreover, in discussing 
the history of Canadian federalism, he discusses Saywell’s book, The Lawmakers: 
Judicial Power and the Shaping of Canadian Federalism.  And in discussing the 
relationship between federalism and judicial review, he cites Ted Morton and Ranier 
Knopff’s book, The Charter Revolution and the Court Party.  Additionally, his 
bibliography contains seven Donald Smiley publications, as well as numerous books and 
articles by Richard Simeon and J.R. Mallory.  It is difficult to imagine the Court using 
only the “legal” sections of Hogg’s textbook—skipping over the parts where he includes 
references to the “tainted” insights of political scientists.  This leaves open the possibility 
that political scientists have an indirect influence on the Court.  That is, while the 
Supreme cites Hogg and his work, Hogg cites political scientists and their work. 
Our review of the Supreme Court’s academic citation patterns revealed little 
about the decision-making philosophy of the Court.  The Court did not make reference to 
political scientists or historians; therefore, it is not possible for us to align them with a 
particular thought camp or framework.  They did not cite the revisionist historians we 
discussed in Chapter 1—Romney, Vipond, Moore and Ajzenstat—nor did they rely on 
the cynical outlooks of Waite, Cook, Black or Resnick.  The point to be made is that the 
Supreme Court’s bibliography left us with no identifiable thought camp from which to 
align them.  It is largely made up of legal sources, government publications and 
textbooks, and rarely did it include provocative arguments.  While they very well may 
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subscribe to the “pragmatist” school of Waite, Cook, Black and Resnick—or the 
revisionist school of Romeny, Vipod, Moore and Ajzenstat—we will have to look to 
other means than citations to find it.    
Moving forward, if we cannot identify (or glean insight into) the Supreme Court’s 
decision-making philosophy by analyzing their academic citations, we must look to the 
structure and content of the federalism cases for deeper insight.  In the chapter that 
follows, I provide an exhaustive account of the Supreme Court’s post-Charter federalism 
docket and use it as a springboard for the analytical chapters that follow.  If the docket of 
the Court is largely a collection of the judicial discretion, it is worthwhile to examine the 
cases that were important enough for consideration. 
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Chapter IV 
Docket 
 
In Canada, it is not uncommon for publications dealing with federal judicial review to 
point out the lack of interest in the topic.  Indeed, federalism cases in the modern era have 
been largely overshadowed by the emergence and predominance of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and the focus of political scientists and legal scholars 
has simply followed suit.  Given the impact that the Charter has had on our 
understanding of rights in particular—and the increased role and purview of the courts in 
in general—one could argue that such attention is warranted.   
However, the lack of attention paid to the Supreme Court’s handling of the 
division of powers is not reflective of a shortage of developments.  Since Brian Dickson 
took over as Chief Justice, the Supreme Court has handed down 81 decisions related to 
the distribution of powers.219  This figure not only represents a consistent and sizeable 
portion of the Supreme Court’s docket, but contained within these cases are landmark 
decisions with far-reaching precedential implications.  Yet, while one will almost always 
find federalism articles that deal with the doctrinal nuances of a landmark decision, 
surprisingly very little has been said about the Supreme Court’s division of power cases 
                                                
219 This figure includes every federalism reserve judgment over the past three chief 
justiceships (1984-2012).  There were nine oral judgments throughout this period; they 
were omitted from analysis due to their lack of substance.  For interest, they consist of: 
Goldway v. Montreal (City of) [1984], 2 S.C.R. 525; Ontario (Human Rights 
Commission) v. National Dental Examining Board of Canada [1991], 3 S.C.R. 121; 
Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada [1991], 3 
S.C.R. 689; Life Underwriters Assn. of Canada v. Provincial Assn. of Quebec Life 
Underwriters [1992], 1 S.C.R. 449; Téléphone Guèvremont Inc. v. Quebec (Régie des 
télécommunications) [1994], 1 S.C.R. 878; Ontario v. Canadian Pacific Ltd. [1995], 2 
S.C.R. 1028; Germain v. Montreal (City) [1997], 1 S.C.R. 1144; Nutribec Ltée v. Quebec 
(Commission d’appel en matière de lésions professionnelles) [2004] 1 S.C.R. 824; UL 
Canada Inc. v. Quebec (Attorney General) [2005], 1 S.C.R, 143.   
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as a whole.  How many federalism cases are there, one wonders?  What issues do they 
encompass, and from which courts of appeal do they originate?  
This chapter answers these questions by providing an exhaustive and contextual 
overview of the Supreme Court’s federalism caseload.  In the end, this chapter reveals 
that federalism cases in the modern era are constant and relevant, span a variety of issues, 
and come from a number of provinces.   
A. Caseload 
Understanding the nature and composition of the Supreme Court’s docket is an 
important prerequisite to understanding the role the Court plays in shaping the 
distribution of powers in Canada.  While various factors alter the federal-provincial 
landscape, the type of cases to which the Court grants leave to appeal—and the various 
actors and interests that are represented by the litigants and interveners who are 
opposed—speaks volumes to the sphere of influence the Court maintains in federalism 
matters.  Indeed, the Court cannot influence that which does not come before it; as an 
institution, it cannot pass laws, offer opinions or go out of its way to render legally 
binding decisions on matters that do not frequent its chambers.  All Supreme Court 
judges can do is maximize or minimize their opportunities to clarify jurisdictional issues 
that are presented by way of reference or appeal; they cannot pass laws with the same 
liberty, nor with the same directness, as elected officials.   
However, what the Supreme Court can do is determine the nature and scope of its 
docket.  As we discussed in Chapter 2, the majority of cases that are heard at the Supreme 
Court level are the result of carefully selected choices that come at the hands of judges 
who sit on docket selection committees.  On these panels, judges weigh the merits of 
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each application and look inter alia for opportunities to speak to an issue that requires 
direction—be that disagreement or inconsistency in the lower courts or confusion or 
uncertainty at the political level.  The paragraphs that follow are about identifying the 
federalism cases that made it through the Supreme Court’s screening process. 
Interestingly, the complexion of the Supreme Court’s post-Charter federalism 
docket is not far off the frequency of division of power cases observed by the Laskin, 
Taschereau, Cartwright, or Fauteux courts before it.  While the federalism case list in the 
modern era does not compare with the intensity of federalism matters under Laskin, this 
long range finding challenges the idea that federalism became irrelevant after the passing 
of the Charter.  Both the volume and the significance of the cases that follow reinforce 
this assertion.220  Using the per decade approach of Monahan, I have combined his 
findings with my own to paint a complete picture of the Supreme Court’s federalism 
caseload over the past half century.221  Notwithstanding a few noticeable spikes and dips, 
from a pure numbers perspective the frequency of federalism cases over the past five 
decades is similar, with the proportion of federalism cases in each decade being within 
five percent of the ones that it preceded.   
 
 
 
                                                
220 The frequency of federalism cases is not an accurate measure in and of itself.  That is 
to say, if 90% of the federalism decisions were comprised of two sentence dispositions, 
there would be little use studying the content and impact of the decisions.  The lack of 
time invested into these decisions would communicate the lack of significance in the eyes 
of the Court.  Significance and frequency create an accurate measure of relevance. 
221 Patrick Monahan, The Charter, Federalism, and the Supreme Court of Canada 
(Toronto, ON: Carswell, 1987). 
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Table 1: Proportion of federalism cases decided per decade: 1950-2012 
 
Decade 
 
 
Federalism cases 
 
Total cases222 
 
Proportion 
1950-59 30 651 4.6% 
1960-69 36 1161 3.1% 
1970-79 54 1464 3.7% 
1980-89 81 1017 8.0% 
1990-99 19 1119 1.7% 
2000-09 27 741 3.6% 
  2010-12* 9 173 5.2% 
   
Average/decade 
 
36 
 
1025 
 
3.51% 
 
As the data above indicates, from 1950 to 1990 the number of federalism cases 
appearing before the Court is gradual and steady, and moving in a linear fashion.  Thirty 
cases were heard in the 1950s, thirty-six in the 1960s, and fifty-four in the 1970s; 
notably, the number of cases handed down in the 1980s was twice the average number of 
cases handed down in the three decades before it.  In the 1980s, federalism was booming.  
However, looking at the numbers in slightly different terms, if one divides the caseload 
into two thirty-year chunks—1950 to 1980, 1981 to 2011—the frequency of federalism 
cases in each category is right on par: 132 to 120, respectively.  Aside from a dramatic 
spike in the 1980s, from a longitudinal perspective federalism cases are a caseload 
mainstay; their persistence has not decreased or increased, with any predictability, over 
time; and the Court is showing no indications of an impending docket extinction.223  
Viewed in a broad light, the constancy of the Supreme Court’s federalism docket stands 
the test of time.  But to what extent are there variations from one year to the next?  Has 
                                                
222 This number includes both oral and written judgments.  This is the approach Monahan 
adopted; and for this table, consistency was sought.  In the tables that follow, however, 
oral judgments are removed from further analysis. 
223 The notable caseload drop of the 1990s will be addressed in the paragraphs below.    
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the Charter augmented or diminished the frequency of federalism cases?  What do the 
latest trends suggest about the future of federalism?          
Despite the increased profile of the Charter, the Court continues to render a 
steady stream of division of power decisions.  Although the frequency of these cases 
represent less than five percent of the Supreme Court’s total annual caseload (4.03%), 
this proportion is significant because it underscores the fact that federalism cases make 
up a steady portion of the Supreme Court’s post-Charter docket.  Such a proportion is 
also consistent with the past half-century’s historical average.    
Table 2: Federalism case frequency per Chief Justiceship: 1984-2012224 
  
Federalism Cases 
 
 
Total Cases  
 
Proportion 
Dickson (1984-1990)       31                               550                            5.63% 
      17                               649                            2.62% 
      33                               811                            4.10%           
               81                             2010                            4.03% 
Lamer (1990-1999) 
McLachlin (2000 - ) 
Total 
 
General trends and averages aside, there are noticeable differences in the caseload 
frequency from one chief justiceship to the next.  Whereas a federalism dispute appears 
in roughly one out of every 20 cases in the Dickson Court, it surfaces only once out of 
every forty cases under Lamer.  This is true for both the total number of federalism 
decisions and the proportion of the caseload those decisions represent.  To put it in 
slightly different terms, under Dickson the Supreme Court handed down an average of six 
federalism cases per year while the decade under Lamer produced a yearly average of 
slightly less than two.   
                                                
224 It is important to note that both the “federalism cases” and “total cases” columns 
contain reserve judgments only.   
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Viewed in isolation, it appears there is some credence to the suggestion that the 
Charter contributed to the federalism caseload drop of the 1990s.  While this may be true 
to a certain extent, the permanency of this slump was short lived.  Under McLachlin, 
federalism experienced a moderate resurgence.  In this period, the Court has rendered 
more federalism judgments than either the Dickson or the Lamer eras (33 decisions 
compared to 31 and 17, respectively), although part of this resurgence can be explained 
by the extensive length of McLachlin’s term as chief justice.  Still, the proportion of 
federalism cases in this era (4.10%) is less than that of the Dickson Court (5.63%) but 
higher than the historical average (3.51%).  
  As the graph below indicates, there are significant variations in the number of 
division of power cases decided from one year to the next.  While Table 4 addresses the 
collective caseload average according to chief justice, the graphs below plot the number 
of federalism cases according to year.  Because the sample size is relatively small, some 
annual spikes should be expected.  However, there are a few trends in particular that 
require a deeper level of explanation.  
Figure 1: Frequency of Division of Power Cases Handled According to Year: 1984-2012
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First, 1989 stands out as the “big year” for federalism.  In that single year, ten cases were 
decided, which is more than half the total number of federalism cases handed down 
during the Lamer court.  As Chief Justice Dickson was slated to retire in 1990, it is 
reasonable to suggest that he sought to make as big a footprint on the subject as possible.  
Although there is not way to prove this conclusively, three factors contribute to the 
reasonability of this musing.  In 1989, Brian Dickson was 74 years of age; and with 
imminent mandatory retirement, he knew in advance that he would have had to leave the 
bench on May 28, 1991   
With almost complete docket control, it is not difficult for chief justices to steer 
the Court toward issues they find important.  Under Laskin, Dickson was a major 
contributor to federalism decisions, so much so that in Swinton’s book on the subject, he 
was among the “big three” who were most inclined to weigh in on the division of 
powers.225   In his final two years as Chief Justice, multiple landmark federalism 
decisions were handed down, and of these decisions, Dickson authored of five.  In total, 
Dickson rendered 10 federalism judgments and one separate concurrence as Chief 
Justice.226  The Charter had reached eight years of existence by the time Dickson had 
retired; but it does not appear that it had much of an impact on the federalism caseload of 
the eighties, for that came later.     
Second, one cannot ignore the federalism dearth of the 1990s.  Under Dickson, it 
was not uncommon for the Court to hand down five, sometimes six, federalism cases per 
                                                
225  The other two judges were Laskin and Beetz; see, Swinton, The Supreme Court and 
Canadian Federalism: The Laskin-Dickson Years, 1990. 
226 Although a introduction to the major cases will be touched on below, among some of 
the notable examples include: Crown Zellerbach [1988], General Motors v. City National 
Leasing [1989], Bell Canada [1988], Alberta Government Telephones [1989], and Sobeys 
Stores v. Yeomans [1989].   
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year.  Under Lamer, however, the proportion of federalism decisions dropped by half; 
and this disparity only increases when judgments from the bench are included in the total 
case list.227  As discussed, it is often acknowledged that the Charter displaced federalism 
as the major constitutional issue in Canada.  As the numbers below indicate, it is difficult 
to deny this assertion.  The Supreme Court, in every year since 1985, hands down more 
Charter decisions than federalism.  But whereas the number of Charter decisions 
increased steadily from 1984 to a historical high in 1991, they also decreased steadily 
between 1991 to 1997, where the annual frequency seems to have plateaued.     
Figure 2: Comparative graphing of Charter and federalism decisions per year: 1984-2012  
  
Also telling from Figure 2 is that Charter cases are most numerous under Lamer; 
and as Charter decisions were handed down at an unprecedented rate, federalism cases 
were at an all time low.  Because the Charter significantly altered the nature and function 
of judicial review, a surge in Charter cases should be expected.  However, the point of 
                                                
227 Under Lamer, the Supreme Court handed down a disproportionate number of oral 
decisions.  Of the 1119 total decisions that were rendered, only 649 were reserve 
(written) judgments.  
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this exercise is not to determine whether the Charter permanently suppressed the 
frequency of federalism cases.  While there is not enough information in the graph to 
declare a causal relationship, it is unclear what, exactly, precipitated a drop-off in 
federalism cases under Lamer.  One possibility is that the Court reprioritized its workload 
as a way to adapt to the more pressing rights-based landscape that the Charter inevitably 
created.  Or perhaps heightened levels of intergovernmental peace limited the need for 
litigation to play out before the Court.  Whichever the case, Figure 2 demonstrates the 
“resilience” of the federalism caseload.   
Under Lamer, the number of division of power cases dropped as the number of 
Charter cases rose, but the Charter did not create a permanent diminution on the 
federalism docket.  As the polynomial trend lines indicate, the gap between Charter and 
federalism decisions have stabilized.  Since 1991, the frequency of Charter cases has 
experienced a downward regression while the proportion of federalism decisions under 
McLachlin (4.1%) has exceeded the past half-century’s historical average (3.5%).  A 
long-term comparative historical mapping of federalism and charter decisions bolsters 
this finding.     
 In Figure 3, the total number of federalism and Charter decisions are grouped 
according to decade.  The graph reinforces what we learned from the previous table.  
While Figure 2 used 1984 as its starting point, this table starts with 1950 as a way to 
contextualize the modern federalism caseload with its historical average.   
 
 
 
 133 
Figure 3: Comparative graphing of Charter and federalism cases per decade: 1950-2010+ 
 
As the data reminds us, the 1980s was the decade of federalism, and the 1990s was the 
decade of the Charter.  However, after the dust of the Charter boom had settled, the 
number of federalism cases appears to be increasing.  Federalism cases have not dropped 
off the map, nor have they continually declined from each passing year.  In fact, the 
number of Charter decisions has never returned to its peak in the 1990s.  As the trend 
lines indicate, the average number of Charter decisions has steadily declined and stayed 
under 20 cases/year ever since 1994.  On the other hand, there have been some recent 
“spikes” in federalism matters.  In 2005, for example, the Supreme Court handed down 
seven federalism decisions; and in 2010, an additional five.  
At this point, we know that federalism decisions are constant, but we know very 
little about the content of these cases.  Do some division of power topics arise more 
frequently than others?  Do these cases represent landmark precedents or mundane 
technicalities?  In short, do federalism cases even matter?  If the vast majority of 
federalism decisions were simply composed of two line dispositions, there would be little 
point in studying the precedents of these decisions.  However, the majority of decisions 
are accompanied by lengthy and discursive reasons.  It turns out that Supreme Court 
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judges spend great lengths of time on federalism matters, and litigants continue to call on 
the Court to resolve disputes that stem from jurisdictional disagreements over how 
legislative powers are distributed.  The section below will provide a broad overview of 
some of the major developments in federal judicial review.  Its contents speak to the 
sustained relevance of our case list.   
 B. Issue Frequency  
The Supreme Court handles a diversity of federalism issues across the topical 
spectrum.  Such diversity is contained within the dockets of each of the past three chief 
justiceships, indicating both a broad and longstanding pattern of influence on the part of 
the Court.  After reviewing the case list, it is clear that judges do not confine themselves 
to dealing with “new” or trendy topics, such as clarification over environmental 
jurisdiction, the criminality of assisted reproduction,228 or the latest developments in safe 
injection sites.229  While the Supreme Court deals with nuanced and unprecedented issues 
on a regular basis, they also continue to (re)address classic issues related to “trade and 
commerce,” “property and civil rights,” “transportation and communication,” “natural 
resources,” and “taxation.”  Such issues are ongoing; they were never settled “once and 
for all”; and there is no reason to suggest that they will fall off the Supreme Court’s 
docket.  The Supreme Court’s ongoing engagement of the topic is also underscored by 
the fact that they have changed long-standing precedents on “age-old” issues.    
Nine categories were used to classify each of the 81 division of power cases in 
question.  In viewing the data below, one should note that some cases fit into more than 
                                                
228 Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, 3 S.C.R. 457 [2010] 
229 Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, 3 S.C.R. 134 [2011]. 
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one category, which explains why the total number of issues exceeds the total caseload 
number.230  
Table 3: Issue frequency per Chief Justiceship   
  
Dickson 
 
Lamer 
 
McLachlin 
 
Total (n) 
 
Total (%) 
 
Trade and Commerce / 
Property and Civil Rights 
13 4 13 30 37.0% 
Transportation and 
Communication 
8 4 4 16 20.0% 
Criminal / Regulation 6 2 9 17 20.3% 
Natural Resources 4 3 3 10 11.3% 
Taxation 2 4 3 9 11.3% 
Social Services - 3 1 4 5.0% 
Education 3 2 - 5 6.3% 
Section 95 - - 2 2 2.5% 
Indians - - 2 2 2.5% 
 
Total231 
 
36 
 
22 
 
36 
 
97 
 
- 
 
Trade and Commerce / Property and Civil Rights  
As the numbers above indicate, more than a third of federalism cases since 1984 
(37.0%) are related to “trade and commerce” and “property and civil rights.”  This 
category represents the most common federalism issue, with well-known landmark 
decisions handed down in the past three eras.  This is not unlike the historical frequency, 
which was predominated by attempts to distinguish the federal government’s trade and 
commerce power from the property and civil rights jurisdiction of the provinces.  In the 
Dickson Court, the defining trade and commerce decision, no doubt, is General Motors v. 
                                                
230 (Bell Canada v. Quebec [1988], for example, was coded as both a “transportation and 
communication” and “trade and commerce” issue.) 
231 In some cases, more than one issue would arise.  Therefore, the total number of issues 
exceeds the total number of division of power cases handed down by the Court. 
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City National Leasing [1989]232, a case that is referenced repeatedly in subsequent 
cases.233   
In this decision, a unanimous court refined and applied a five step criteria for 
establishing the validity of a statute falling under the “second branch” of the trade and 
commerce power.  Here, the Court held that an application of the Combines Investigation 
Act was intra vires the federal legislature because its effects on provincial legislation 
were incidental, invoking the “ancillary doctrine.”  While City National Leasing is 
perhaps the most influential federalism decision in the post-Charter era, it can be argued 
that the major trade and commerce decision of the Lamer Court is Ontario Hydro v. 
Ontario.234   
In a divided decision the Supreme Court applied the much avoided “declaratory 
power” under section 92(10)(c) of the Constitution Act, 1982.  They found that because 
Ontario Hydro, a nuclear power plant, was an undertaking for the “general advantage of 
Canada,” all necessary incidental operations, including labor relations, fell within the 
jurisdictional control of Parliament.  While the Attorney General of Ontario vehemently 
opposed this decision, labor relations for nuclear power plant workers continue to be 
governed by Parliament.  This illustration is important because it reminds observers of 
the Court’s authority and its subsequent impact on government.  In the McLachlin era, 
Canadian Western Bank235 is by the far the most important precedent in the trade and 
commerce / property and civil rights arena.  The Court held that Banks, which fell under 
                                                
232 General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. City National Leasing 1 S.C.R. 641 [1989]. 
233 See Chapter 3 on Judicial Citation Patterns for a listing of academic citation 
frequencies.   
234 Ontario Hydro v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board) 3 S.C.R. 327 [1993] 
235 Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta 2 S.C.R. 3 [2007] 
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the exclusive jurisdiction of Parliament, were subject to a provincial licensing scheme 
that served to regulate the promotion of insurance.  They based their unprecedented 
ruling on the principle that the promotion of insurance products—an area of exclusive 
provincial legislation—was not central to the activity of banking.   
Although it is outside the purpose of this section to provide an in-depth analysis 
of these decisions, it goes to show that the modern Court continues to render important 
precedents on a subject with a longstanding and checkered past.  In City National 
Leasing, the Court established weighty precedent, which colored the manner in which 
subsequent trade and commerce issues were handled.  In Ontario Hydro, the Court made 
a binding and contested decision that affected the governance of labor relations, and in 
Canadian Western Bank, the Court enunciated a new precedent that allowed the 
provincial government to subject banks to regulation of its insurance products. 
Criminal and Regulation   
Criminal matters represent a significant portion of the Supreme Court’s docket, 
and in some instances, they involve the division of powers.  Since 1984, the Supreme 
Court has handled 17 federalism cases (20.3%) that involve criminal or regulatory issues.  
A few notable trends in each of the chief justiceships emerge.  In the Dickson era, one 
would be hard pressed to find a “landmark” decision in this category, or even a “head to 
head” battle between the federal and provincial government.  Instead, there are a variety 
of issues involving disputes between non-government actors, including the disturbance of 
religious worship,236 arbitrary arrest and detention contrary to a provincial human rights 
                                                
236 Skoke-Graham v. The Queen, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 106  
 138 
code,237 the vires surrounding the provincial regulation of nude entertainment,238 and the 
validity of a provincial board of inquiry involving a criminal matter.239   
While six criminal and regulatory matters were addressed in the Dickson era, only 
two were handed down in the Lamer Court.  However, R. v. Mortgentaler [1993]—the 
federalism branch of the infamous “abortion case”—turned out to be a transformative 
decision.  Morality arguments notwithstanding, the division of powers issue in this 
decision hinged on the finding that the pith and substance of Nova Scotia’s Medical 
Services Act was legislation in relation to criminal law falling within the exclusive legislative 
jurisdiction of Parliament.  Justice Sopinka, writing for a unanimous Court, found that 
together, the Medical Services Act and Medical Services Designation Regulation “constitute 
an indivisible attempt by the province to legislate in the area of criminal law.”240  These two 
pieces of provincial legislation were struck down by the Court.   
The McLachlin Court on the other hand dealt with a significant number of criminal 
law cases that had far-reaching social and federalism implications.  Such developments have 
led some scholars to worry that the Federal Government’s “criminal law power has become a 
proxy for national concern.”241  In 2000, the Supreme Court made a bold statement in its 
reference decision regarding firearms.242  The unanimous panel ruled that the registration and 
licensing of all types of firearms was a federal criminal matter and not, as the Attorney 
General of Alberta and other provincial interveners had suggested, a matter falling under the 
                                                
237 Scowby v. Glendenning, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 226 
238 Rio Hotel Ltd. v. New Brunswick (Liquor Licensing Board), 1987 2 S.C.R. 59 
239 O’Hara v. British Columbia, [1987] 2 S.C.R 591 
240 [1993] 3 S.C.R. 463, para. 16. 
241 Gerald Baier, Courts and Federalism: Judicial Doctrine in the United States, 
Australia and Canada (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2006): 141. 
242 Reference re: Firearms Act Can. [2000] 1 S.C.R. 783 
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provincial header, property and civil and rights.  Some critics, like Justice Conrad of the 
Alberta Court of Appeal, argued that the Firearms Act “represents a sweeping intrusion on 
the right of law-abiding citizens to have decisions about their property informed by local 
values, without exposure to criminal sanction or loss of property.”243   
After a major decision on the recovery of health care costs incurred by provincial 
governments in treating individuals exposed to tobacco products,244 the Supreme Court 
handed down two leading decisions with important social implications: first, a reference 
on Assisted Human Reproduction245 in 2010; and second, a ruling on the regulation of 
safe injection sites.246  Both precedents sent shockwaves through the media, and both 
decisions, while attempting to provide jurisdictional clarification, confronted 
controversial ethical matters.  We will discuss the doctrines with which these cases were 
handled in the chapter that follows.         
 Transportation and Communication  
With 16 cases comprising twenty percent of the federalism docket, the third most 
common issue that comes before the Court is transportation and communication.  
Although the words “transportation” and “communication” are nowhere to be found in 
the Constitution Act, 1867, several examples are contained within the enumerated powers 
in Section 92(10), which confers upon the provincial legislatures the authority to makes 
laws in relation to:  
Local works and undertakings other than such as are of the following classes:  
                                                
243 Para 523, Reference Re Firearms Act, [1998] ABCA 305 (CanLII) 
244 British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473 
245 Reference re: Assisted Human Reproduction Act, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 457 
246 Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134 
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(a) Lines of steam or other ships, railways, canals, telegraphs, and other works 
and undertakings connecting the province with any other or others of the 
provinces, or extending beyond the limits of the province;  
(b) Lines of steam ships between the provinces and any British or foreign 
country; 
(c) Such works as, although wholly situate within the province, are before of after 
their execution declared by the Parliament of Canada to he for the general 
advantage of Canada or for the advantage of two of more of the provinces.247 
 
The Dickson era handled as many transportation and communication cases (8) as the 
Lamer and McLachlin Courts combined (8).  Indeed, a number of important precedents 
emerged from this era, beginning with the Bell Canada248 trilogy which also includes 
Alltrans Express249 and Courtois.250  The three appeals were heard consecutively.  In Bell 
Canada, Justice Beetz relied on the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine to declare that 
the impugned provincial law was constitutionally inapplicable to a federal undertaking, 
rejecting as an alternative the “double aspect theory”—the view that concurrent 
provincial jurisdiction could coexist.  The implications of this decision placed a 
significant blow to provincial legislative authority.   
In 1989, the Dickson Court released a string of decisions that dealt with aircraft251 
and taxation, and telecommunications.252  In Alberta Government Telephones v. CRTC, 
for example, the Supreme Court shocked the nation when it held that AGT was an 
interprovincial undertaking, despite the intraprovincial nature of its operations.  In 
                                                
247 Constitution Act, 1867. 
248 Bell Canada v. Quebec (Commission de la santé et de la sécurité du travail), [1998] 1 
S.C.R. 749 
249 Alltrans Express Ltd. v. British Columbia (Workers' Compensation Board), [1988] 1 
S.C.R. 897 
250 Canadian National Railway Co. v. Courtois, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 868 
251 Canadian Pacific Airlines Ltd v. British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1133; Air Canada 
v. British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1161. 
252 Alberta Government Telephones v. Canada (Canadian Radio-television and 
telecommunications commission, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 225; Ibew v. Alberta Government 
Telephones, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 318. 
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contrast to the Dickson era, transportation and communication cases were relatively quiet 
under Lamer, both in terms of numbers and case significance.  Recently, however, the 
McLachlin Court appears to be picking up the pace.  Having been silent on the issue for 
the first seven years of her tenure, Chief Justice McLachlin’s Court has rendered four 
transportation and communication decisions over the past five years.   
Natural Resources        
 Non-renewable natural resources fall within the operational authority of the 
provinces.  Section 92A(1) outlines some examples and applications of this provision.  
However, section 3 states: “Nothing in subsection (2) derogates from the authority of 
Parliament to enact laws in relation to the matters referred to in that subsection and, 
where such a law of Parliament and a law of a province conflict, the law of parliament 
prevails to the extent of the conflict.”253  From these two poles of jurisdiction flow 
disputes between different levels of government.  Under Chief Justice Dickson, two 
major cases stand out: Reference re Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act [1984] 
and R v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd [1987].  In Upper Churchill Falls, the Court 
addressed the issue of extraterritoriality, ruling that Newfoundland’s Water Rights 
Reversion Act was a colorable intrusion on the operations and contractual relationship 
between Churchill Falls Labrador Corporation and Hydro-Quebec.   
In Crown Zellerbach, the Court released a blockbuster decision.  With the 
pollution of inland ocean waters as its subject, Justice Le Dain advanced the “national 
concern” doctrine of the peace, order and good government power of Parliament as a 
means to mitigate the inability of provinces to address the pollution of cross-provincial 
                                                
253 Constitution Act, 1867. 
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waters.  The magnitude of this precedent spilled into the Lamer Court four years later in 
Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada.254  In this case, the Supreme Court 
upheld the validity of the federal government’s Environmental Assessment and Review 
Process Guidelines Order on the basis that provincial immunity would “undermine the 
integrity of the essential navigational networks in Canadian waters,” including such areas of 
federal jurisdiction as “navigable waters, fisheries, Indians and Indian lands.”255   
Five years later, in R v. Hydro-Quebec,256 the issue of environmental protection 
reared its head.  Unlike Crown Zellerbach, however, where the national concern doctrine was 
being advanced, the Supreme Court upheld dumping charges against Hydro-Quebec under 
the federal government’s criminal law power.  Acknowledging that environmental 
responsibility, and jurisdiction over the environment, falls under both the federal and 
provincial legislatures, La Forest, in his majority reasons, stated: “Determining that a 
particular subject matter is a matter of national concern involves the consequence that the 
matter falls within the exclusive and paramount power of parliament and has obvious impact 
on the balance of Canadian federalism.”257   
From these string of decisions, it is clear that the Supreme Court does not avoid 
weighty philosophical discussions.  They factor in public policy implications as well as 
public safety and the overall impact a decision has on the balance of the federation.  Natural 
resource issues have been largely quiet and inconsequential under McLachlin.   
 
 
                                                
254 Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 3 
255 Friends of the Oldman, para 13. 
256 R. v. Hydro-Quebec, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213 
257 Ibid, para 52. 
 143 
Taxation 
 There are separate constitutional provisions for both the federal and provincial 
governments to levy taxes from citizens and businesses.  In Section 91(3), the Federal 
government is authorized to raise “money by any mode or system of taxation.”  The 
provincial counterpart to this provision, in section 92(2), reads: “direct taxation within the 
provinces in order to the raising of a revenue for provincial purposes.”  With only nine 
taxation cases handed down over the past 25 years, two of the most prominent are reference 
questions regarding direct taxation referred to the Court by the Governor in Council during 
the chief justiceship of Lamer.258  The Dickson era handled two cases pertaining to the 
taxation of liquor and fuel on airlines, while the McLachlin Court handed down three 
decisions that carried little jurisprudential significance.      
Education 
 Five education decisions were handed down between Dickson and Lamer, with none 
coming through under McLachlin.  Four of these decisions involved a heated disputed 
between the provincial government and a school board.  In all but one instance the Supreme 
Court upheld the provincial government’s power to amend the Education Act and impose 
changes onto its subordinate school boards.  In only one instance was the provincial 
government told that it had operated outside of its legislative boundaries.  In A.G. (Que.) v. 
Greater Hull School Board,259 the Supreme Court reminded the Government of Quebec 
how difficult it is to pass universal funding changes to education without factoring in special 
administrative protections and rights enjoyed by nondenominational schools.  Because the 
                                                
258 Reference re Goods and Services Tax [1992], 2 S.C.R 445; Reference re Quebec Sales 
Tax [1994], 2 S.C.R. 715. 
259 A.G. (Que) v. Greater Hull School Board [1984], 2 S.C.R. 575 
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provincial government attempted to create a new system of school financing based on 
government grants, which would apply to all public schools—including nondenominational 
ones—the Supreme Court found the impugned provisions to be “ultra vires and void” for 
such changes carried the potential to “prejudicially affect a right or privilege” affecting 
nondenominational schools.  Interestingly, the Federal government did not become involved 
in any of the education cases that appeared before the Court.     
Social Services 
 The “social services” umbrella includes issues related to welfare benefits, funding for 
the disabled, retirement plans, employment insurance and the like.  Although only three cases 
fall under this category, each involves a major funding or jurisdictional dispute between the 
federal and provincial government.  The first major breakdown in cooperative federalism 
played out before the Court in Reference re Canada Assistance Plan.260  As means to reduce 
its budgetary deficit, the federal government enacted the Government Expenditures Restraint 
Act, which limited the growth of payments made to fiscally stronger provinces under the 
Canada Assistance Plan.  In response, the Lieutenant Governor in Council of British 
Columbia solicited advice from the British Columbia Court of Appeal to determine “whether 
the Government of Canada has any authority to limit its obligation under the Plan and its 
agreement with British Columbia,” and if it did, whether the consent of British Columbia was 
required.  The British Columbia Court of Appeal answered the first question in the negative 
and the second question in the affirmative.  The Attorney General of Canada appealed the 
ruling of the appellate court to the Supreme Court of Canada.  While justiciability was a 
central component of oral argument, the Court upheld the vires of the federal legislation, and, 
                                                
260 Reference re Canada Assistance Plan [1990], 2 S.C.R. 525 
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in response to whether the federal government possessed the authority to limit funds 
administered through this amended agreement, stated: “If a statute is neither ultra vires nor 
contrary to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the courts have no jurisdiction to 
supervise the exercise of legislative power.”261 
 Findlay v. Canada262 is a case involving a disabled person (the respondent) who 
brought action, as a public interest litigant, against the Government of Manitoba.   Here, the 
government made deductions to a disabled person’s monthly assistance payments as a means 
to recover overpayments it had made previous.  In response, the respondent sought a 
declaration that the “federal contribution payments to the Manitoba social assistance scheme 
under the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP) are illegal so long as the Manitoba Social 
Allowances Act (SAA) continues to authorize reducing an allowance below the level of basic 
requirements or so long as Manitoba permits its municipalities to establish their own rates of 
assistance.”   
At issue was the scope of provincial authority to administer an intergovernmental 
social-welfare scheme.  The Court ruled that given the nature of the spending statutes 
involved, “the federal government’s contributions are not designed to dictate the precise 
terms of the provincial legislation, but rather to promote legislation which achieves 
substantial compliance with the objectives of CAP.”  They found that the Manitoba 
government was within its authority to recover excess payments so long as the total payment 
remitted did not fall below the “basic requirements” established in the CAP.  In many ways, 
this decision softened the blow of the CAP reference while still upholding the federal 
government’s power to place conditions on the funds it contributes.    
                                                
261 Reference re Canada Assistance Plan [1990], 2 S.C.R. 525, para, 62. 
262 Findlay v. Canada (Minister of Finance), [1992], 1 S.C.R. 1080 
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 The third and final social services case is Reference Re Employment Insurance Act.263  
The Quebec government queried whether ss. 22 and 23 of the federally enacted Employment 
Insurance Act—which dealt with maternity leave—was constitutional.  They argued that 
maternity and parental benefits are distinguishable from unemployment insurance because 
the former is intended to support families, and to assist parents, as a social security measure 
while the latter establishes a plan to mitigate the effects of unemployment.  The Attorney 
General of Canada, on the other hand, argued that maternity benefits is a form of 
employment insurance because it “provides temporary income for pregnant women or 
parents who have paid premiums and held insurable employment for the required number 
of hours.”264  The Supreme Court, using the pith and substance doctrine, sided with 
Parliament and found that unemployment is unemployment regardless of how or why it 
originates, and therefore, the intent of employment insurance is to protect workers in the 
absence of employment.    
The last item I will cover in this section is a brief overview of cases of “great 
importance.”  I will assign a number value to each case according to its “importance” and 
level of impact on the federal jurisprudence in Canada.  Using a scale from 1 to 5, with 
one being the least significant and five being the most significant, I ranked each 
federalism case in terms of its impact on federal-provincial relations in Canada.  Various 
criterions were used: word count, precedent enunciated, judicial citation patterns, levels 
of disagreement, and whether or not a case is a “household” name that is frequently 
discussed in legal literature.  
                                                
263 [2005], 2 S.C.R. 669. 
264 Findlay v. Canada (Minister of Finance) [1992] 1 S.C.R. 1080, para 7. 
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The most important determinant of this scale is the total word count length of 
each decision.  One might expect that as cases become more complex and important the 
Supreme Court would expend more time and energy in explaining them.  Conversely, in 
matters of less importance, it follows that the Supreme Court would spend less time in 
their explanation.265  Of course, there is no particularly strong relationship between 
opinion length and case importance: longer or shorter opinions may simply reflect the 
writing styles of various judges or sharp divisions within the court.266  The second factor 
of analysis is whether a longstanding doctrine has changed or not.  If an old precedent is 
reversed—that is, if a level of government is told that they no longer have the authority to 
do something that they once did—that is significant.  Third, the judicial citation 
frequency of a particular case is also important because it reflects the level of impact a 
decision has had on subsequent cases.  A case that is cited repeatedly is more 
authoritative than a case that is decided but never referenced.  Cases that appear in “Horn 
Books” are also given consideration.  Together, these variables are used to determine the 
federalism cases of “great importance” that have been handed down over the past quarter 
century.    
 
 
 
 
                                                
265 One would expect for example that the reasons contained in General Motors Canada 
v. City National Leasing [1 S.C.R. 641, 1989] carry more weight and significance than 
the two sentence explanation in Chiasson v. The Queen [1 S.C.R. 266, 1984].  
266 L’Heureux-Dube, for example, was notorious for providing long-winded decisions; 
Major, in contrast, was known for being succinct.  
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Word Count Criteria 
1: Cases assigned a “1” had a word count of 1500 words or less (including, if applicable, 
dissents and concurrences).  These cases are almost always unanimous; indeed, 
disagreement is rare.  In addition, no new precedents in these cases are enunciated; the 
case typically centers on a factual or interpretational clarification.  Very little, in other 
words, is at stake.     
 
2: Cases assigned a “2” are similar in nature to those that are a “1,” although they are 
longer and have higher levels of disagreement.  These cases have less than 8000 words 
(including, if applicable, dissents and concurrences). 
 
3:  The biggest distinction between a “2” and “3” is length: A “3” is a case between 8000 
and 15,000 words (including, if applicable, dissents and concurrences).  Disagreement at 
this level is common.  Much is at stake, the subject matter is important, and interveners 
are typically present; it is usually clear who wins and who loses.   
  
4: A case that is awarded a “4” must be over 15,000 total words (including, if applicable, 
dissents and concurrences).  The stakes are high, there is a high number of interveners, 
and each side has much to gain and to lose.  There is usually a major dissent or 
concurrence.     
 
5: A case that is given a “5” is what one could call a “blockbuster.”  These cases are 
household names and are always mentioned in your standard constitutional textbook.  In 
these cases, there is usually a profound shift in doctrine, a new precedent enunciated, or a 
longstanding precedent overturned.  Indeed, they are the subject of much debate and 
analysis.  Like a number 4, they must be over 15,000 words.  However, it is the 
constitutional significance of these cases—the history of the issue and the doctrine 
enunciated—that separate the 4’s from the 5’s.  Word count alone is insufficient. 
 
The table below tracks the citation frequency of federalism decisions handed 
down in the post-Charter era.  A surprising omission from this table is Crown 
Zellerbach,267 a landmark case that is frequently referenced in academic discourse and 
constitutional textbooks.    Atop the list is General Motors v. City National Leasing, 
268which is no surprise, given that it is the single most cited federalism case since 1984.  
                                                
267 R v. Crown Zellerbach [1 S.C.R. 401, 1988].  
268 1 S.C.R. 641, [1989]. 
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Kitkatla269 is another noteworthy example, as it cited in subsequent federalism cases 
more than once per year on average.  
Table 2: Proceeding Citation Frequency per Federalism Case (1984-present)270 
 
 
Name 
 
 
Year 
 
 
Subsequent Citation 
Frequency 
 
Average (year) 
GM v. City National 
Leasing 
1989 13 0.62 
Bell Canada v. 
Quebec (csst) 
1988 11 0.50 
Kitkatla v. British 
Columbia 
2002 9 1.13 
Whitebread v. Walley   
     
1990 8 0.40 
Re: Upper Churchill 
Water Rights  
1984 7 0.27 
R v. Mortgentaler 
 
1993 7 0.41 
Global Securities 
Corp. v. British 
Columbia 
2000 7 0.70 
Reference Re: 
Firearms Act  
2000 7 0.70 
Ontario (A.G.) v. 
OPSEU 
1987 7 0.30 
Scowby v. 
Glendinning 
1986 6 0.25 
Canadian National 
Railway v. Courtois 
1988 6 0.27 
Alberta Gov’t 
Telephones v. CRTC 
1989 5 0.24 
Bank of Montreal v. 
Hall  
1990 5 0.25 
Friends of the 
Oldman River v. 
Canada 
1992 5 0.28 
  
                                                
269 Kitkatla Band v. British Columbia (Minister of Small Business, Tourism and Culture), 
[2002] 2 S.C.R. 146. 
270 Five citations was the minimum number of citations required for a case to make the 
table.   
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Together, using word count and judicial citation frequency as our measure, we have listed 
in order of importance the ten most significant federalism decisions handed down by the 
Court over the past twenty-five years.  
Table 3: The Ten most Prominent Federalism Cases in the Post-Charter era: 
Cases of Great Importance 
General Motors v. City National Leasing (1989) 
Bell Canada v. Quebec (1988) 
R. v. Crown Zellerbach (1988) 
Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta (2007)  
Friends of the Oldman v. Canada (1992) 
Ontario Hydro v. Ontario (1993) 
Husky Oil Operations Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue (1995) 
R. v. Hydro Quebec (1997) 
West coast Energy Inc. v. Canada (1998) 
AGT v. Canadian Radio-Television and Communication Commission (1989) 
 
C. Appeal Frequency  
The Supreme Court hands down important decisions on a variety of issues, which 
originate from both federal and provincial appellate courts across the country.  Indeed, 
the Court not only handles a broad range of important and relevant cases, but such cases 
come from a diversity of places.   The table below tracks the origins of each case.  As the 
numbers below indicate, population is the single largest determinant in the federalism 
case list appeal frequency.  
Table 5: Appeal Frequency According to Province or Appellate Court 
  
BC 
 
AB 
 
SK 
 
MB 
 
ON 
 
QB 
 
Mari- 
times 
 
Fed- 
eral 
 
Refer- 
ence271 
 
Total 
(n) 
Dickson 6 1 2 - 7 6 6 3 - 31 
Lamer 3 1 1 1 3 2 1 4 1 17 
McLachlin 7 5 1 1 2 10 1 4 2 33 
Total (n) 16 7 4 2 12 18 8 11 3 81 
Total (%) 19.8% 8.6% 4.9% 2.5% 14.8% 22.2% 9.9% 13.6% 3.7% - 
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 As the data indicate, the Supreme Court hears more federalism appeals from 
Quebec (18 cases, 22.2%) than from any other province in Canada.  Perhaps this comes 
as little surprise, given the history of aggressive constitutional battles to which the 
province of Quebec became so often engaged.  These numbers are followed closely by 
British Columbia (16 cases, 19.8%) and Ontario (12 cases, 14.8%), with appeals from the 
Prairie Provinces—Alberta (8.6%), Saskatchewan (4.9%) and Manitoba (2.5%)—being 
the least common region for appeals to originate.  The Maritime Provinces were coded 
into a single category; eight appeals (9.9%) came from that region over the past three 
chief justiceships.   
Lastly, 11 cases (13.8%) have come from the Federal Court of Canada, including 
cases from both the Federal Court of Appeal and Tax Court.  For the purposes of this 
table, “references” only include reference questions that were referred directly to the 
Supreme Court (usually by the Governor in Council).  On the other hand, reference 
questions that were submitted to an appellate court, which were later appealed to the 
Supreme Court, were included in the column of the province or region from which they 
originated.  The reason for this distinction is that reference decisions that are handled by 
an appellate court are subject to further appeal whereas references that are handled by the 
Supreme Court are not.    
D. Conclusion 
So far, we have looked at the historical caseload frequency of the Court, and 
established that federalism cases in the post-charter era are almost as common as they 
were in the pre-charter years.  If caseload size is an indication of importance, we can 
comfortably state that the significance of federalism cases has not diminished, with any 
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measure of significance, over time.  We also know that landmark decisions are found in a 
variety of topics over the past three chief justiceships.  The Court’s activity and 
involvement in federalism matters is well noted: past precedents have been reversed, 
legislation has been declared invalid, and hotly contested constitutional battles played out 
before them.  Were the Supreme Court simply an institution that maintained a “hands 
off” approach—allowing intergovernmental arrangements to function and repair 
themselves through the various internal mechanisms they have established to resolve 
disputes—there would be little need for government to present issues before them. 
However, the fact that multiple government interveners become actively involved in 
federalism cases underscores the point that something important is at stake—something 
that justifies the use of time and resources to attempt to influence the outcome of a 
decision.   
But how does a federalism dispute make its way to the Court?  Or to employ a 
phrase commonly used in childhood squabbles: “who started it”?  Indeed, which level of 
government is most litigious, and to what extent are non government actor’s responsible 
for initiating a dispute?  When a dispute is initiated, to what extent does government 
intervene and become involved?  We know that on at least 81 occasions some direction 
on federalism matters was sought.  But which litigants are most frequently seeking 
direction?  What type of litigants can one expect to find?  Is it the Attorney General of 
Canada taking on a multitude of provinces, or do non-government actors initiate most 
disputes?  Is there a “winner take all” mentality between the “feds” and the “provs,” or 
does a more cooperative spirit prevail?  The next chapter examines these issues by 
looking at the actors and interests at stake in federalism cases.  
 153 
Chapter V 
Dispute Initiation, Intergovernmental Conflict and Intervention 
 
Scholars often refer to the Supreme Court as a “judicial umpire.”  However, the 
connotations of this expression make it easy for readers to assume that if a division of 
powers case ends up in the Supreme Court, the federal and provincial government are at 
odds on a particular policy issue.  This is not necessarily so.  The Supreme Court’s 
federalism docket is diverse and reflects the complicated and collaborative nature of 
modern intergovernmental relations in Canada.     
In this chapter, I show the limitations of viewing federalism cases through the lens 
of a zero sum game.  Four points of consideration make this so.  First, I examine the 
‘dispute initiation’ process and find that non-government actors are responsible for 
instigating most disputes.  This dispels the notion that federalism cases are the product of 
head to head disagreements between the “feds” and the “provs.”  Second, after 
establishing the origins of disputes, I track the rate at which government intervenes or 
becomes involved in federalism cases.   Third, having established the rate in which 
government becomes involved, I analyze which side of the dispute they take.  Lastly, 
from these discoveries I am able to show that the outcomes of federalism decisions are 
not well served by a traditional “who won, who lost” analysis.    
A. Dispute Initiation  
It is important to provide a working definition of ‘dispute initiation’ before 
analyzing the data.  For the purposes of this chapter, the “initiator” can be defined as the 
party that first challenges an alleged wrongdoing, circumstance, statute, or legal opinion 
before a certified judicial board, tribunal or trial court.  This information can be found in 
the “judgments below” section of the written reasons.  In the case of a reference question 
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directed to a provincial superior court, the party who challenged the superior court’s 
response is said to have first initiated the dispute.  Indeed, “asking” the Court for a legal 
opinion is not the same as initiating a dispute, because a response is needed before 
disagreement—or disappointment in the answer—can take place.  It is how the federal or 
provincial government responds to a superior court’s handling of a question that 
determines whether or how a dispute is initiated in this circumstance.  If both the federal 
and provincial governments are satisfied with how an appellate court answered a 
reference question, there is no need for the Supreme Court to handle a dispute.  
 However, in viewing the case list there are instances when either the federal or 
provincial government appealed an inferior court’s response to a reference question.  In 
Reference Re Canada Assistance Plan (B.C.)272, for example, the Federal government 
appealed the British Columbia Court of Appeal’s belief that the federal government did 
not have any unilateral, statutory, prerogative or contractual authority to limit its obligation 
under the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP).  The Attorney General of Canada, who appealed 
this decision to the Supreme Court of Canada, is said to be the “initiator” of this dispute.  Had 
they accepted the inferior Court’s opinion, and maintained CAP payments to the Government 
of British Columbia, the “initiator” label would not apply, because there would be no dispute.  
In Reference re: Firearms Act (Can.)273, the Attorney General of Alberta queried whether it 
was within the legislative authority of Parliament to regulate the registration and licensing of 
firearms.  The Alberta Court of Appeal ruled that it was within the power of Parliament to 
regulate the sale, licensing and possession of firearms.  The Attorney General of Alberta 
                                                
272 [1991] 2 S.C.R. 525  
273 [2000] 1 S.C.R. 783 
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appealed this decision to the Supreme Court, which grants them the status of dispute 
“initiator.” 
Like the giving of a reference opinion, the act of creating a law or statute is not 
enough information in itself to assign the “initiator” label.  That is, one cannot simply say 
that the provincial government of such and such is the “initiator” because it passed the 
law in the first place.  Rather, it is the party—the organization, level of government, 
business, corporation or citizen—who responds to the law by challenging its validity in 
court.  The first party who challenges a provision is the one who is said to have 
“initiated.”  From there, applications for intervention typically follow; in all cases, 
initiation is primary, intervention is secondary.  In Ward v. Canada,274 for example, a 
fisherman was charged with selling seals contrary to section 27 of the federally enacted 
Marine Mammal Regulations Act.  Ward applied to the Trial Division of the Supreme 
Court of Newfoundland to challenge the validity of the legislation.  In this instance, 
Ward’s response to federal legislation constitutes “initiation,” the mere existence of the 
Marine Mammal Regulations Act, does not.  Additionally, the initiator is not always 
among the listed disputants.  For instance, in British Columbia (Attorney General) v. 
Lafarge Canada Inc., Lafarge Canada Inc. wished to erect a facility on waterfront lands 
owned by the Vancouver Port Authority (“VPA”), a federal undertaking pursuant to the 
Canada Marine Act.   
Together, the City of Vancouver and the VPA approved the project in principle, 
but a group of ratepayers opposed the development and filed an application of appeal to 
the British Columbia Supreme Court, “arguing that the City had declined to exercise 
                                                
274 Ward v. Canada (Attorney General), [2002], 1 S.C.R. 569 
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jurisdiction over the lands and ought to have insisted that Lafarge obtain a City 
development permit.  The VPA replied that no City permit was necessary because VPA 
lands enjoy interjurisdictional immunity as “public property” within the meaning of 
s. 91(1A) of the Constitution Act, 1867, or because the management of those lands is vital 
to the VPA’s “federal undertaking” pursuant to the federal s. 91(10) jurisdiction over 
“navigation and shipping.”   
In the alternative, the VPA contended that there was an operational conflict and 
that, according to the doctrine of federal paramountcy, the conflict must be resolved in 
favor of federal jurisdiction.  The chambers judge granted the ratepayers’ application and 
declared that the VPA lacked jurisdiction to approve the project.  The Court of Appeal set 
aside the decision, finding that VPA lands are “public property” within the meaning of 
s. 91(1A) of the Constitution Act, 1867 and declared the City’s zoning and development 
bylaw to be inapplicable to the proposed development.  In this rather complicated 
development, a NGA—the ratepayers in this case—initiated the dispute, even though the 
group of ratepayers is not found in the case name.  The VPA, who relied on federal 
jurisdiction, had to respond in court to the Attorney General of British Columbia.       
 As the table below indicates, non-government actors are the catalysts for the 
majority of disputes.  In most instances, they challenge the vires of a piece of government 
legislation, which in turn, ignited the federal or provincial government to respond.   
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Table 1: Dispute Initiation According to Chief Justiceship 
 NGA  Prov gov’t Fed gov’t Other275 
Dickson 23 8 0 - 
Lamer 14 2 1 1 
McLachlin 24 7 2 - 
Total 61 17 3 - 
 
Indeed, three quarters of all federalism disputes were initiated by a NGA (75.3%), with 
only three cases being initiated by the federal government.  On the other hand, provincial 
governments initiate one in five cases (17 decisions), which is far more often than the 
“feds.”  Although federalism disputes necessarily involve government because it is their 
legislation that is called into question by somebody, in most cases government is not 
responsible for initiating a dispute.  It turns out that NGA’s are the chief instigators in 
federalism disputes.  The fact that government responds to litigation three times more 
often than it initiates is significant.  I will elaborate on this point below.       
To begin, litigation jeopardizes their jurisdiction and places them in a position of 
uncertainty—a position they are only able to influence to some extent through 
intervention.  It also speaks to the effectiveness of intergovernmental arrangements that 
take place outside the Court through informal means.  If the vast majority of cases are 
initiated by the NGA’s, it means that head to head disputes between different levels of 
government—“Canada v. The Provs”—is rare.  But most importantly, it raises questions 
about the nature of federal/provincial disputes.  If government responds more than it 
initiates, in what ways and to what extent does it become involved in federalism matters?  
In matching up the disputants, “government versus non government” is the most 
common pairing for litigants in federalism cases.  The fact that government is involved in 
                                                
275 Reference submitted by the Governor in Council. 
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the majority of cases is expected and is not alarming at first glance.  In 39/81 cases, the 
provincial government became embroiled in a conflict with an NGA; however, in only 10 
instances did the Federal government became directly involved in a dispute that played 
out before the Courts.  The federal and provincial government squared off in only 13 
cases, of which the majority were reference questions.  In almost every one of these 
decisions, a heated battled between the respective legislatures emerged, with notable 
examples including: Reference re: Canada Assistance Plan, Reference Re: Firearms Act, 
Reference re: Same-Sex Marriage, Reference Re: Employment Insurance Act, Reference 
Re: Assisted Human Reproduction Act, Reference Re: Securities Reference Act.  
Table 2: Dispute Type According to Chief Justiceship 
 Prov v. NGA Fed v. NGA Fed v. Prov NGA v. NGA 
Dickson 18 2 3 8 
Lamer276 4 4 4 3 
McLachlin 17 4 6 5 
Total 39 10 13 16 
 
Despite these examples, however, the federal and provincial governments rarely 
square off.  In much more common occurrences, the federal and/or provincial 
governments will respond to a dispute that was initiated by a NGA who either disagreed 
with a particular piece of legislation or invoked a federalism argument as a way to build a 
defense against a potential fine or prohibition.  In either case, the Court is presented with 
an opportunity to apply a situation to existing case law.  In light of the uncertainty 
litigation represents, government representatives at both levels feel compelled to respond. 
 
  
                                                
276 There was one reference case in the Lamer era that was removed from analysis.   
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B. Intervention 
 While the vast majority of constitutional cases originate through private litigation, 
almost every case, with the exception of three, involves government to some extent.  As 
Table 8 indicates, “government litigiousness,”, a phrase I borrowed from Patrick 
Monahan, is widespread and rampant, with an average of more than three different 
legislatures intervening per case involving the division of powers.277 
Table 3: Intervention frequency per chief justiceship according to province: 
Government Dickson Lamer McLachlin Total 
Canada 15 4 18 37 
Ontario 9 6 22 37 
Quebec 15 9 19 43 
Maritimes 11 5 16 32 
Manitoba 7 4 12 23 
Saskatchewan 14 6 10 30 
Alberta 12 8 12 32 
British Columbia 10 6 14 30 
 
 
Total interventions 
 
 
93 
 
 
48 
 
 
123 
 
 
264 
Number cases 31 17 33 81 
Inventions per case 3.0 2.8 3.73 3.3 
 
Across the board, government is actively involved in federalism matters.  Quebec is the 
single biggest “litigator” at 43, while the Federal government and Ontario (at 37 cases a 
piece) lag not far behind.  With the exception of Manitoba, every province appears in at 
lease one third of all federalism disputes.  Although government does not typically “start 
fights,” they are not afraid to jump in and attempt to “finish them.”   
Not surprisingly, intervention is a sign that a case is important enough to warrant 
attention.  Another reason for increased government litigiousness in private litigation is 
                                                
277 Monahan, Politics and the Constitution: The Charter, Federalism and the Supreme 
Court of Canada, 155. 
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that the Court “appears most receptive to federalism arguments when government, rather 
than private interest, has instituted the litigation.”278  This statement was true in 1987 and 
continues to be true today.  Indeed, in every federalism case where government was 
altogether absent—where government was neither a plaintiff nor a defendant, nor 
involved by way of intervention—the Supreme upheld the vires of government 
legislation.  In other words, government only gets involved and expends resources if 
something important is at stake.  We will explores doctrines and dispositions in the next 
chapter, but the point, for now, is clear: had the validity of an impugned provision been in 
question—or if there was a serious chance that government was going to “lose”—it 
would have undoubtedly intervened and attempted to convince the Court of its 
position(s). 279  
C. Intergovernmental Conflict and Relations 
Tracking the frequency of intervention is limited, because one is unable to 
ascertain the legal position of the government interveners.  Nowhere in a case does it 
indicate in the case notes or docket summary list the legal position assumed by the parties 
who were granted intervention.  Is the Attorney General of Canada putting forth a 
“centralist” doctrinal position, invoking the paramountcy and interjurisdictional 
immunity doctrines in an attempt to expand “Team Canada’s” jurisdiction?  Or is the 
                                                
278 Patrick Monahan, Politics and the Constitution: The Charter, Federalism and the 
Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto, ON: Carswell, 1987): 155.   
279 The closest exception occurred in Unifund Assurance Co. v. Insurance Corp. of 
British Columbia [2003], a case involving the issue of extraterritoriality as it pertains to 
an insurance claim.  In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that “Section 275 of the 
Ontario Insurance Act is constitutionally inapplicable to the appellant because its 
application in the circumstances of this case would not respect territorial limits on 
provincial jurisdiction.”  The Court’s decision did not infringe upon the jurisdictional 
boundaries of the provinces; it simply applied the facts of the case to the most appropriate 
province.   
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federal government intervening as a precaution—intervening “just in case” something 
goes wrong in oral argument?  In the spirit of harmony, perhaps he is intervening on 
behalf of a province engaged in a dispute with a NGA.  I have translated these scenarios 
into categories and applied them to my case list in an attempt to measure the frequency 
and type of intergovernmental conflict that makes its way to the Court.  I have created 
four categories to measure this phenomenon: unified, indifferent, precaution, and turf.  
They are defined in the sections below.  I also touch on how the Supreme Court responds 
in relation to the different types of conflict that come before it.    
Unified 
Although direct disputes between government occur, some cases involve a unified 
government front, where a NGA is up against not only the federal government, but 
provincial governments as well.  The “unified” label is therefore ascribed to cases where 
both levels of government are unified in their response to an opposing litigant.  At its 
most basic level, unity can be said to exist when the federal government intervenes and 
speaks on behalf of a province or when a province speaks on behalf of Canada.  This is 
evident in the written reasons of a decision, most commonly under a factual header—
“The Facts”—but also, and sometimes to a much greater extent, the analysis.  There are 
numerous variations as to how the Court communicates an intergovernmental alliance 
within the reasons it provides.  Some cases reveal only a one-sentence comment in 
passing, with no evidence as to the doctrines or arguments upon which the respective 
levels of government were unified: “[T]he Attorney General of Canada intervened on 
behalf of the Attorney General of Quebec,”280 or “[T]he Federal government intervened 
                                                
280 Attorney General of Quebec v. Udeco Inc. et al [1984]. 
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in support and on behalf of the Attorney General of Nova Scotia.”281  In other cases, 
however, the analysis of a decision provides a much more in-depth account of an 
intervention, where the Court comments on the implications an intervention has on a 
potential disposition: “[L]astly, where, as here, one level of government supports the 
constitutionality of another level’s legislation, a court should be cautious before finding 
the impugned provision ultra vires.”282   
To be sure, the legal position taken by the respective government interveners is 
the most clear-cut way of determining an intergovernmental alliance within a case.  
Unfortunately, the reasons behind an allegiance—or intervention—are not always found 
in cases where unity is observed.  In Reference re Quebec Sales Tax [1994], for example, 
the Governor in Council queried the Supreme Court of Canada on whether it was within 
the legislative authority of the Legislature of Quebec to amend and transform its 
provincial sales tax into a tax similar “in all essential respects” to the Federal 
government’s goods and services tax.  The Attorney General of Canada intervened on 
behalf of the Attorney General of Quebec and argued that the proposed amendments were 
within the legislative power of Quebec because they exemplified a direct tax.   Further, in 
Gonthier’s unanimous decision can be found a dialogue between the Court and the 
“Attorneys General” and the arguments they put forth in support of their unified position.   
There are three snippets from this decision that can be used to further define the 
criteria and parameters of this category.  First, “[T]he Attorneys General of Quebec and 
Canada have agreed that the tax will be collected within the province…” is an example of pre 
judicial arranging by the respective legislative authorities.  That the federal and provincial 
                                                
281 Skoke-Graham v. the Queen [1990]. 
282 R. v. Demers [2004] S. C. R. 489 
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governments “agreed” on a workable solution before its constitutional validity was tested by 
the Court highlight the prevalence of intergovernmental collaboration.  Another dimension 
occurs when the Attorney General of Canada presents an argument on behalf of a provincial 
legislature: “The Attorney General of Canada argued that the category of exempt supplies 
does not create an indirect tax in practice.”  The third and final dimension is when the Court 
acknowledges an argument that was presented in unison: “I therefore agree with the 
Attorneys General that the general tendency of this exemption is to create a direct tax 
consistent with the constitutional imperatives recognized in earlier decisions.” 
Indifferent 
One can assume that there is a close correlation between a government’s 
willingness to intervene and the significance of what they perceive the political and legal 
implications of an impending outcome represents.  Likewise, the absence of intervention 
signifies the inverse: that a dispute is not important enough to warrant any type of 
involvement, that a case is low risk, and usually a dispute between a NGA and a 
provincial government.  Indeed, the “indifferent” label was assigned to cases involving 
only one level of government.  The presence or absence of Federal or Provincial 
government involvement can be found in the case name or interveners heading, located at 
the top of each decision.  A couple different factual scenarios fit this category.  The first 
instance is when a NGA (“the appellant”) is going head to head against the Attorney 
General of a Provincial Legislature (“the respondent”), with no intervention by the 
Federal government (in almost all cases, the Attorney General of Canada).  The best 
example of this description involves education cases—a sphere of jurisdiction falling 
within the exclusive legislative authority of the provinces.   
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In Greater Montreal Protestant School Board v. Quebec [1989], the Government 
of Quebec, under s. 16(7) of the Education Act, sought to universalize the non-
denominational components of its grade school curriculum.  The provincial government 
was met with resistance by a Protestant school board and various interveners and 
agencies who challenged the reforms on the grounds that they were “ultra vires the 
province.”283  Whether the Government of Quebec’s attempt to reform its curriculum is 
successful or not had little implication on the operation or jurisdictional power of the 
federal government.  It is no surprise, therefore, that the Attorney General of Canada was 
altogether absent from this dispute.  In cases that do not involve them, they do not 
typically become involved.  
Precaution  
There are a series of cases where the federal or provincial government will 
intervene but will say little or nothing in oral argument.  A case taking place under these 
circumstances can be referred to as a “precaution” dispute—a “just in case” scenario that 
is important enough to warrant intervention, but not important enough to be referenced or 
discussed at length in the written reasons of judgment.  A precautionary case can take one 
of three forms.  A government intervener may intervene but have nothing recorded in the 
written reasons, which is the most typical scenario under this heading.  It can be assumed 
that if the federal government intervened and was adamantly opposed to the jurisdictional 
claims of the provincial government that the Court would make reference to such 
opposition in its written reasons.   
                                                
283 Greater Montreal protestant school board v. Quebec (Attorney General) [1989], 1 
S.C.R. 377. 
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Secondly, a government intervener may also become involved for the purpose of 
stating a concern or requesting a clarification: “The Attorney General of Canada 
intervened in this appeal to argue that: [I]f the provision in question is held to be within 
provincial jurisdiction, this decision would not preclude overlapping federal jurisdiction 
over securities matters in respect of international and interprovincial transactions and co-
operation, or any other relevant head of federal jurisdiction.”284  The Federal government, 
in this case, was taking a “wait and see” approach, so that should the Court rule against 
them, they can regroup and make additional arguments to limit their losses.   
Third, one can identify a “precautionary” case by seeing the dispute initiation 
account of the Court, as was the case in Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta: “In the 
present appeal, we are not confronted with a dispute between the federal government and 
Alberta.  Rather, the appellant banks are independently making the claim to carry on their 
insurance activities in Alberta free of the insurance regulations imposed on all other 
promoters and vendors of insurance products in the province.”285  In blockbuster 
decisions with far-reaching precedential implications, it is not uncommon for many 
governments to become involved to some extent.    
In most cases, however, the factual section of a decision will identify the major 
interveners and indicate the litigant to whom they gave their support.  As discussed, if 
after reading the factual section one came up empty, I would look to a judge’s analysis, 
which would often contain direct references to the arguments that the major interveners 
have submitted on behalf of the litigant they were supporting.  The last step that was 
                                                
284 Global Securities Corp. v. British Columbia (Securities Commission) 1 S.C.R. 494 
[2000]. 
285 2 S.C.R. 3 [2007] 
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taken to assign cases to this category was to look through the written reasons provided in 
the lower court decisions, including an examination of the names of the litigants that 
were listed.  Some examples of “precautionary” cases include: Lamb v. Lamb286, 
Whitebread v. Walley287, Allard Contractors Ltd. v. Coquitlam (District)288, and Paul v. 
Forest Appeals Commission.289  The Attorney General of Canada intervened in each of 
these cases, but the reason for intervention was altogether absent from the written 
reasons.  None of the decisions were landmark, but ultra vires arguments against the 
Federal government were attempted by NGA’s.  Naturally, the Federal government 
intervened to respond.      
Turf     
The fourth and final category of cases that I have identified is the quintessential 
“turf” dispute.  Turf wars—or head to head disputes between federal and provincial levels 
of government—produce the type of cases that make news headlines.  They are 
nostalgically federal, because they represent what most people envision when they think 
of federalism—the constitutional battles between John A. MacDonald and Oliver Mowat 
before the JCPC, or the energy wars of the 1970s.  In these cases, the doctrinal and 
political positions of the respective levels of government are clear: the federal 
government wants to “win” and so do the provinces.  Both present competing 
conceptions of the public good, and make arguments for how a decision will either 
frustrate or enhance the service delivery of government.  In “turf” disputes, the written 
reasons make it clear that the federal and provincial governments are on opposing 
                                                
286 1 S.C.R. 851 [1985] 
287 3 S.C.R. 1273 [1990] 
288 3 S.C.R. 371 [1993] 
289 2 S.C.R. 585 [2003] 
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sidelines.  No arguments “on behalf of,” no pre-court “agreements,” and certainly no loss 
for words.   
At the heart of these matters is a battle over the control and delivery of public 
policy and the level of authority each believes is necessary to fulfill those objectives.  In 
Reference re Firearms Act, for example, the Attorney General of Canada went head to 
head with the Attorney General of Alberta.290  At hand was a disagreement over which 
level of government retained jurisdiction over the licensing and registration of firearms, 
setting up a battle between the provinces jurisdiction over “property and civil rights” on 
the one hand and the Federal government’s “criminal law” power with regard to public 
safety on the other.  However, a “turf” battle need not involve direct conflict between 
different levels of government in order for them to be directly opposed, for one level may 
intervene in opposition to the other.  Such has been the case for landmark cases like 
Crown Zellerbach291, Ontario Hydro292, and Lafarge Canada.293 
Because federalism involves government, it is easy to assume that federalism 
cases involve direct conflict between governments, that turf cases are standard, and all 
others are the exception.  However, different categories exist, and the breakdown below 
presents some surprising twists.  
Table 4: Conflict Type According to Chief Justiceship: 1984-2012 
 Unified Indifferent Precaution Turf 
Dickson 4 9 7 9 
Lamer 3 3 4 7 
McLachlin 6 9 8 9 
Total 13 21 19 25 
                                                
290 Reference re Firearms Act (Can.) 1 S.C.R. 784 [2000] 
291 [1988], 1 S.C.R. 401 
292 [1993], 3 S.C.R. 327 
293 [2007], 2 S.C.R. 86 
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In almost half the number of federalism disputes that appear before the Court—unified 
and indifferent cases combined—there is no intergovernmental conflict whatsoever.  In 
fact, out of 81 cases, only 25 involve direct conflict between the federal and provincial 
governments.  This number drops in half when “conflict through intervention” scenarios 
are omitted.294  An additional 19 cases involve cross legislative or “precaution” 
intervention, but of course, no recorded argument, or doctrinal position, is recorded in the 
reasons for judgment.  The remaining 34 decisions do not involve intergovernmental 
conflict at all; of these cases, 13 represent a federal-provincial alliance and 21 involve the 
interests of only one level of government.  There are a few different ways to interpret 
this.   
From one angle, one could say that the Supreme Court deals on average with only 
one head to head dispute each year and that intergovernmental conflict and litigation is 
rare.  Second, and more importantly, the fact that there are intergovernmental alliances in 
a federalism dispute demonstrates the limitations of viewing such cases through the lens 
of a zero-sum game.  Because government sticks together in some cases—or in the case 
of “indifferent” scenarios, remains neutral and lets the other fend for itself—one cannot 
presuppose at the onset that government is at odds on a particular policy issue when it 
ends up in Court.  
D. Winners and Losers 
Up until this point, we have avoided discussion on judicial outcomes, or more 
pointedly, the notion of “winners” and “losers.”  We know from the previous section that 
                                                
294 As we saw in Table 2, government went “head to head”—that is, “Canada v. the 
Province of…”—in only 13 cases.   
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whenever the Court has an opportunity to clarify or expand legislative jurisdiction, 
federal and provincial governments almost always become involved to some extent.  
However, we also learned that not every case presents an opportunity for the Court to 
declare a clear “winner” and “loser.”  In some cases, there is no intergovernmental 
conflict, and in other scenarios, both levels of government are unified against a common 
opponent. 
Yet, at the conclusion of almost every judicial decision, a judge will dismiss or 
allow an appeal.  In either instance, both the appellant and respondent have a vested 
interest to convince the Court to side in its favor.  Unfortunately, while both sides want to 
“win,” the Supreme Court is unable to dismiss and allow an appeal in the same decision; 
so one side will inevitably “lose.”  The fact that many disputes have questions framed in 
terms of whether an impugned piece of legislation is ultra vires, inoperative, inapplicable 
or outside the legislative competence of a respective legislature implies that the Court 
must choose between one of two outcomes: that a piece of legislation is either valid or 
invalid, and that one side will “win” and the other will inevitably “lose.”     
However, the reality of winning and losing in federalism cases is more 
complicated than what might first appear.  When I first looked at the Supreme Court’s 
handling of the division of powers, I thought I would be able to devise a system that 
would tally the win/loss record of the “feds” and the “provs,” which in turn would reveal 
the ideological preferences of the Court.  But the federalism docket does not allow for 
such an analysis.  It is not safe to assume that if the interests of an appellant are 
represented by the “provs,” the interests of the respondent are automatically backed by 
the “feds.”  As we will recall from our discussion above, federal and provincial 
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governments are not always at odds, and in some cases, are unified against a common 
opponent.  In cases involving intergovernmental “indifference,” the legislative authority 
of only one level is in question.  Not surprisingly, when I first attempted to measure the 
win/loss record of the “feds” and the “provs” I ran into significant problems.  Originally, 
I defined “wins” and “losses” strictly upon division of powers criteria (as opposed to 
declaring a winner or loser based on the final outcome).295   
In crafting these labels, I asked the question: “Was federal and/or provincial 
legislative authority challenged, and, if so, was it upheld or pushed back?”  If the 
Supreme Court upheld the vires of federal or provincial legislative jurisdiction, it was 
considered a “win.”  If one side “won” the other did not inevitably “lose,” and vice versa.  
In fact, in a third of cases (27 out of 81), both the federal and provincial governments 
“won” at the same time.  That is to say, the impugned provisions of each level were 
upheld in the same decision.  To use another illustration, in more than half of cases (44 
out of 81), the legislative outcome of one level (valid or invalid) had no barring or affect 
on the legislative territory of the other.  In other words, there are 44 cases where one side 
would win (or lose) but the other would neither win nor lose.  In light of these results, it 
is inaccurate to view federalism cases as a competition between different levels of 
government.  But that does not mean that there is no utility in analyzing wins and losses, 
either. 
How the Supreme Court responds to ‘government’ is a more fruitful 
consideration.  In the tables below I look how government fares in cases where it is up 
against a NGA.  To employ the categories we developed above, I will look at the win/loss 
                                                
295 Indeed, one level of government can “win” on division of power grounds but still lose 
lose on Charter grounds, as was the case, for example, in Irwin Toy [1989], supra.    
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record of government in “unified” and “indifferent” cases.  This simplifies matters 
because we do not have to contend with governments who are opposed.  There are 13 
cases where the “feds” and the “provs” are united against a NGA; and in these cases, 
team government “wins” every time.  It is striking that when government is unified, the 
Court has yet to rule against them.  Another astonishing discovery occurs when the 
win/loss record of “indifferent” cases are examined.  Out of 20 cases, where only one 
level of government (usually a province) appeared against a non-government actor, 
government won 19 times.  The only exception occurs in A.G. (Que) v. Greater Hull 
School Board [1984].296   
These findings give some credibility to the suggestion that the Supreme Court 
facilitates government action by upholding its ability to legislate or collaborate for mutual 
benefits.  There is not enough information to prove this conclusively on division of power 
grounds, so we will need to look to the legal doctrines they employ for additional insight.  
However, “we should not begin,” as Ryder notes, “with an a priori commitment to either 
centralization or decentralization,” as if to say “decentralization or centralization were 
abstractly valuable for their own sake.”297  We should avoid the interpretive pitfalls of 
“ideological determinism.”298  
F. Conclusion 
As we learned from this chapter, not every federalism case can be viewed through 
the lens of a zero-sum game.  In the modern era, federalism cases do not often originate 
                                                
296 2 S.C.R. 575 
297 Ryder, “Equal Autonomy in Canadian Federalism,” 572. 
298 Jean-Francois Gaundreault-DesBiens, “The ‘Principle of Federalism’ and the Legacy 
of the Patriation and Quebec Veto References,” in J. Cameron and Bruce Ryder, eds 
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from the legislatures whose authority is challenged. There are different categories of 
conflict that accompany division of power disputes.  Some cases express the cooperative 
nature of modern intergovernmental relations, while others resemble the landmark 
constitutional battles of the Laskin Court.  Indeed, it is no longer accurate to state that the 
Supreme Court simply chooses between competing claims of jurisdiction, for not every 
case that comes before Court involves a disagreement between the federal and provincial 
government.  Although Supreme Court judges behave like umpires in certain situations, 
the nature of federal-provincial relations have evolved to the point where such a label 
cannot be applied universally.  The federalism docket is diverse and reflects the 
collaborative nature of modern intergovernmental relations.   
The Supreme Court’s docket is ripe for analysis.  Federalism continues to be an 
important constitutional matter, and important precedents have been handed down on a 
diversity of matters.  But which judges are the federalism leaders of the Court?  Which 
judges are authoring the decisions, and subsequently, creating the jurisprudence that 
either frustrates or upholds the political ends that federalism was intended to serve?  To 
what extent is the Supreme Court unified or fragmented in federalism cases?  Is the Court 
divided on certain issues?  In short, what are the “hot button” issues of the Court?  In the 
chapter that follows, I will answer these questions and identify the major federalism 
players on the Court.  Upon identifying the federalism contributors of the Court, I will be 
in a position to assess the extent to which they agree or differ on major issues of law.  
Does the Supreme Court have a universal decision-making philosophy in federalism 
cases, or is it a collection of individual philosophies? 
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Chapter VI 
Judicial Participation and Disagreement 
 
In an ideal world, a unanimous decision is preferable to one that is fragmented.  
According to one Supreme Court justice, the provision of separate reasons is not the 
preferred means through which to influence the majority, because it “cancels the impact 
of monolithic solidarity on which the authority of a bench of judges so largely 
depends.”299  In many ways, it weakens the clarity of the law, “detracts from the authority 
of the court,”300 “creates uncertainty,”301 “casts doubt in the minds of litigants, signals 
dissention to the lower courts…and ultimately sends a muddled judgment to 
government.”302  Justice L’Heureux-Dube, in an article published in 2000, underscores 
the relationship between disagreement and restraint by stating: “[Supreme Court Justices] 
must exercise a degree of self-discipline in order to avoid having multiple, redundant 
opinions detract from the quality of the Court’s decisions and thereby diminish its 
legitimacy.”303  Disagreement is not a liberty whose use is intended to be flippant.   
On the other hand, disagreement or the threat of disagreement has an important 
role and function within the Court.  It places a check on unfounded reasoning by 
articulating the perceived deficiencies of a majority judgment, signals to future litigants 
an alternative line of reasoning, reassures the losing party that their side was recognized 
                                                
299 As cited in Antonin Scalia, “The Dissenting Opinion,” Journal of Supreme Court 
History 4 (1994): 35. 
300 Matthew Bergman, “Dissent in the Judicial Process: discord in Service of Harmony,” 
Denver University Law Review 68, No. 1 (1991): 86. 
301 John Alder, “Dissents in Courts of Last Resort: Tragic Choices?” Oxford Journal of 
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302 Bonnie Androkovich-Farries, Judicial Disagreement on the Supreme Court of 
Canada, M.A. Thesis (Lethbridge, AB: University of Lethbridge, 2003): 60. 
303 Claire L’Heureux-Dube, “The Dissenting Opinion: Voice of the Future” Osgoode Hall 
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and understood,304 and creates an avenue for future exploration and law development.305  
In some cases, albeit rarely, dissents create the basis for future judgments. 
Although much of the disagreements among judges in the modern era are 
delicately packaged and polite—expressions of “great respect” for “my brother” and 
“learned colleagues”—minority reasons speak volumes about the deliberations and 
debates that would otherwise take place only amongst judges in closed chambers.  
Written disagreements are significant for research purposes because it reveals alternative 
perspectives, identifies the jurisdictional territory and intellectual axis from which an 
alternative potential disposition could be reached; and thus elucidates the arguments and 
legal positions that receive at least traction and the ones that do not.   
However, not every federalism decision along the way has been unanimous.  
Some cases offer “scathing” dissents, and some do not even have a majority set of 
reasons.  While the data shows that the Court prefers unanimity whenever possible, 
judges are not afraid to branch off and deliver alternative paths of legal logic.  That being 
said, what is the range of disagreement?  Is there a clustering of opinions around the 
center of the federal-provincial jurisprudential axis—with minor nuances of 
disagreement—or is the territory of the debate vast and rugged, with written reasons 
scattered across the precedential map?  Are disagreements rooted in fundamental 
ideological differences—with desire for provincial autonomy colliding with centralizing 
doctrines and ideals—or do they stem from disagreement over the doctrines that are used 
to dispose of an appeal?       
                                                
304 Richard B. Stephens, “The Function of Concurring and Dissenting Opinions in Courts 
of Last Resort,” University of Florida Law Review 5 (1952): 395. 
305 Matthew Bergman, “Dissent in the Judicial Process: Discord in Service of Harmony,” 
Denver University Law Review 68, No. 1 (1991): 82.  
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A. Fragmentation and Unity 
Disagreement is a key part of our judiciary.  It signals to researchers the 
alternative routes that were taken on the pathway leading to the creation of an outcome.  
Whether disagreement in federalism matters is common or rare is the purpose of the 
tables that follow.      
Table 1: Decision type per Chief Justiceship: 
 
  Unanimous 
 
 
Majority 
 
Plurality 
 
Total  (n) 
Dickson 13 (41.9%) 15 (48.4%) 3 (9.7%) 31 
Lamer 8 (47.1%) 8 (47.1%) 1 (5.9%) 17 
McLachlin 21 (65.6%) 10 (31.3%) 1 (3.1%) 33 
Total 42 (52.5%) 33 (41.3%) 5 (6.3%) 81 
 
As the data in the table above indicate, the Supreme Court is “united” on more 
than half (52.5%) the federalism decisions it has delivered since 1984.  However, while 
the level of unanimity within the Dickson and Lamer courts is between forty and fifty 
percent (41.9% and 47.1%, respectively), the McLachlin Court represents a sharp spike in 
unity.  Indeed, of the 32 federalism cases that passed through the McLachlin Court since 
January of 2000, two thirds have been unanimous (65.6%).  Overall, unanimous 
outcomes (52.5%) are more common than majority judgments (41.3%), while plurality 
decisions, in any period, are rare (representing only 5 cases, or 6.3%, of all federalism 
cases).  In each era, the proportion of unanimous decisions has increased, which gives the 
prima facie impression the Court is trending toward higher levels of agreement.  
However, in almost half the decisions Supreme Court judges have failed to unanimously 
agree on the outcome, or corresponding reasons, of case.  This is worthy of deeper 
inquiry.  Are 8-1 decisions the “norm,” with repeat offenders dissenting in almost every 
decision?  Or is the Court deeply divided, narrowly escaping with 5-4 majorities?    
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Using the sum of squares equation, we developed a “fragmentation index” to 
measure the disagreement levels of the past three chief justiceships.306  Whereas Table 1 
(above) tracks the frequency of the type of judgments, the table below averages the 
voting breakdown of a panel’s signatories.  Indeed, if there is a string of 5-4 or 4-3 
decisions, the fragmentation level will be high; alternatively, if most outcomes are 8-1 or 
6-1 majorities, the fragmentation level will be low.  
Table 2: Average level of fragmentation on Supreme Court per Chief Justice Tenure: 
Chief Justice Fragmentation Index 
Dickson 0.672 
Lamer 0.785 
McLachlin 0.877 
 
As the data in the table above indicates, the Supreme Court has become less fragmented 
and more unity over time.  The Dickson Court is the most fragmented at an index score of 
0.672, followed by the Lamer (0.785) and McLachlin (0.877) Courts.  While these figures 
to point to growing levels of agreement, they say nothing about which issues the Court is 
unified and the issues to which they are prone to disagree.  Is the Court “settled” on some 
topics, while consistently divided on others?  Do the patterns of agreement and 
fragmentation change according to chief justiceship?  As the table below suggests, the 
answer to the aforementioned questions is “yes.”  Although there are important factual 
variations within any given topic—“trade and commerce,” for example, is a broad subject 
                                                
306 The sum of squares equation is calculated as follows: square the number of signatures 
on each set of reasons that are provided and add them up.  Next, square the number of 
judges on the panel.  Third, divide the sum of the reasons by the squared sum of the 
judges.  For example, if the voting breakdown was 6-2-1, it would be (36) + (4) + (1) = 
41.  9 judges on the panel = 81.  Therefore, 41/81 = a fragmentation index of 0.5.  The 
smaller the number, the greater the level of fragmentation.  1 = unanimity. 
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that also encompasses “property and civil rights”—the table below reveals that the Court 
is divided over some subject more than others.  
Table 3: Average level of fragmentation on Supreme Court per Issue:  
 
Indeed, the issues to which the Court is most likely to display disagreement are 
education (0.65), transportation and communication (.78), trade and commerce (.78) and 
natural resources (0.78).  On the flip side, they are most unified over matters related to 
social services (0.91), criminal and regulation, and intergovernmental disputes pertaining 
to agricultural and aboriginal questions raised by section 95 of the Constitution Act, 1867.  
But disagreement patterns change according to chief justiceship.  The Dickson Court, for 
example, could not agree on taxation (0.33) or educational matters (0.54), but they were 
almost completely unified over trade and commerce issues (0.91).  The Lamer and 
McLachlin Courts, in contrast, saw little unity in trade and commerce matters (0.68 and 
0.72, respectively), but were much more unified than the Dickson Court over issues 
related to taxation (0.79 and 1.00, respectively).  The McLachlin Court is united on issues 
related to “social services,” an issue category that was altogether absent in the Dickson 
era.  Although the average level of agreement on the Supreme Court has increased over 
time, each era had its “hot button” issue: for Dickson, it was taxation; for Lamer, it was 
 Fragmentation 
Index (Dickson) 
Fragmentation 
Index (Lamer) 
Fragmentation 
Index (McLachlin) 
Fragmentation 
Index (total ave) 
Trade / Commer 0.91 0.68 0.72 0.77 
Transport / Com 0.76 0.89 0.68 0.78 
Natural Res 0.77 0.57 1.00 0.78 
Taxation 0.33 0.79 1.00 0.71 
Education 0.54 0.76 - 0.65 
Social Services - 0.81 1.00 0.91 
Crim / Reg 0.72 1.00 0.81 0.84 
Section 95 - - 1.00 1.00 
Total (average) 0.672 0.785 0.877 - 
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natural resources; and for McLachlin, it is transportation and communication, a divide 
that was renewed in two recent decisions stemming from Quebec.307        
B. Judicial Participation  
As we have seen, there are patterns of disagreement on the Court, but which 
justices are producing judgments and which ones are communicating their disagreement 
through separate reasons?  By locating the “major players” in federalism decisions, one is 
better equipped to identify whether philosophical debates take place within the Court.  If 
such debates exist, it is important to determine what, exactly, the debate is about.    
Table 4: Authorship per Supreme Court Justice: The Dickson, Lamer, and McLachlin 
Years:308 
 
 Unanimous309 Majority310 Plurality Total Percentage of Total 
Federalism Cases 
Dickson 2 8 0 10 12.5% 
La Forest 2 2 3 7 8.8% 
Iacobucci 4 3 0 7 8.8% 
Le Bel 4 2 1 7 8.8% 
Binnie 2 6 0 6 7.5% 
Beetz 3 2 0 5 6.3% 
Gonthier 3 1 0 4 5.0% 
McLachlin 2 2 0 4 5.0% 
Sopinka 2 1 0 3 3.8% 
Chouinard 1 1 1 3 3.8% 
Major 3 0 0 3 3.8% 
                                                
307 Quebec (Attorney General) v. Lacombe, [2010] and Quebec (Attorney General) v. 
Canadian Owners and Pilots Association [2010]. 
308 In this table, justices are ranked according to frequency; however, those justices who 
wrote two reasons for judgment or less were omitted from this table.  Chief Justice 
Lamer, surprisingly, only authored two decisions.  Also, Table 7 calculates the number of 
written reasons that lead to “judgments” in particular—that is, majority, unanimous or 
plurality decisions—which is distinguishable from the number of written reasons in 
general, which includes dissents and separate concurrences.    
309 Percoram cases (which are seven in total) were excluded from this table, as it is 
impossible to identify an individual judge.   
310 The total number of majority judgments exceeds the total number of majority 
decisions; the reason for this is co-authorship, where each judge who participates in a 
combined judgment is given full credit for a authoring a majority decision.   
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Abella 1 2 0 3 3.8% 
 
As Table 4 indicates, some judges produce significantly more written judgments 
than others.  Chief Justice Dickson, for example, provided a written judgment in more 
federalism cases (10 cases, 12.5%) than any other Supreme Court justice in the post-
Charter era.  La Forest, Iacobucci and Le Bel authored the second highest number of 
federalism cases at seven, although it is important to note that La Forest delivered more 
plurality judgments than everyone else combined.311  At first glance, it may seem 
reasonable to believe that La Forest’s “majority struggles” were symptomatic of the 
“fragmented” decade in which he was writing.  However, that is a difficult assertion to 
maintain: of all the plurality decisions involving federalism disputes since 1984, three out 
of five belong to La Forest, with Justices Chouinard (in 1999) and Le Bel (in 2010) being 
the only exceptions.   
There are also longstanding justices, such L’Heureux Dubé, who failed to deliver 
a single judgment.  The implication of this point is that a judge was either never 
appointed to author the reasons for judgment or that the reasons they drafted were never 
persuasive enough to convince a majority of judges.  On the other hand, there are other 
judges who have delivered a disproportionate number of judgments in relation to their 
years of service.  For example, Justice Le Bel, who was appointed to the bench in 2000, 
delivered six federalism judgments in the first eight years of his tenure.   
The frequency of written judgments only tells part of the story, however.  If the 
point of this exercise is to uncover the major “players” or “debaters” in federalism cases, 
                                                
311 Justice La Forest’s “plurality” judgments include: Canadian Pacific Airlines Ltd. v. 
British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1133; Air Canada v. British Columbia [1989] 1 S.C.R. 
1161; and, most notably, Ontario-Hydro v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), [1993] 3 
S.C.R. 327.  
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it is important to look to the number of dissents and separate concurrences that are 
authored as well.  Indeed, if it turns out that a few justices stand out for their lengthy and 
frequent dissents, it would be logical to ask what, exactly, they are dissenting about.  Is it 
a Supreme Court justice from Quebec taking a philosophical stance against the erosion of 
provincial autonomy, which threatens the way of life for Quebecers?  Or perhaps a judge 
crafted a separate concurrence because it softened the doctrine with which a matter was 
disposed.  Whichever the case, by studying judicial participation in particular, and the 
unity and fragmentation levels of the Court in general, we can determine the extent to 
which debates take place among judges.  If it turns out that the Court is completely 
unanimous in its decision-making, there would be little point attempting to discover, in a 
later chapter, the nature of their disagreements.   
Table 5, below, ranks judges according to the total number of written 
contributions made to federalism cases since 1984.312  It includes every justice that sat on 
the Supreme Court since Dickson took over as Chief Justice.  The below listed judges are 
ranked according to frequency.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
312 Because Table 5 below examines the contribution frequency of individual judges, 
percoram decisions were excluded from analysis.  This represents seven omissions from 
the Supreme Court’s federalism caseload. 
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Table 5: Total Number of Federalism Contributions per Supreme Court Justice (n): 
 
 Unani
mous 
Majority
313 
Plurality Dissent Concur Total % of Total 
Federalism Cases 
La Forest 3 2 3 3 3 14 17.5% 
Dickson 2 8 - - 1 11 13.8% 
Wilson - 2 - 4 5 11 13.8% 
Iacobucci 4 3 - 3 - 10 12.5% 
Le Bel 4 2 1 2 1 10 12.5% 
McLachlin 2 2 - 3 2 9 11.3% 
Beetz 3 2 - - 3 8 10.0% 
Binnie 2 3 - 1 - 6 7.5% 
Estey - 1 - 2 2 5 6.3% 
Gonthier 3 1 - - - 4 5.0% 
Lamer - 2 - 1 1 4 5.0% 
McIntyre 1 - - 1 2 4 5.0% 
Deschamps 2 - - 2 - 4 5.0% 
Major 3 - - - - 3 3.8% 
Sopinka 2 1 - - - 3 3.8% 
Chouniard 1 1 1 - - 3 3.8% 
Bastarache 1 - - - 2 3 3.8% 
Abella 1 2 - - - 3 3.8% 
Fish - - - - 2 2 2.5% 
LeDain - 1 - - 1 2 2.5% 
Stevenson - - - 1 - 1 1.3% 
Charron - 1 - - - 1 1.3% 
L’Heureux - - - 1 - 1 1.3% 
Rothstein - 1 - - - 1 1.3% 
Cromwell - 1 - - - 1 1.3% 
Dubé - - - 1 - - 1.3% 
 
Total (n) 
 
34 
 
36 
 
5 
 
24 
 
25 
 
124 
- 
Total (%) 27.4% 29.0% 4.0% 19.4% 20.2% - - 
 
 The top seven federalism contributors come as little surprise: La Forest, Wilson, 
and Iacobucci are long standing justices who produced a proliferation of reasons 
throughout their careers, while Dickson and McLachlin are chief justices.  It is also 
                                                
313 The total number of majority judgments exceeds the total number of majority 
decisions; the reason for this is co-authorship, where each judge who participates in a 
combined judgment is given full credit for a authoring a majority decision.  See, for 
example, the co-authored reasons of Binnie and Le Bel in Canadian Western Bank and 
Lafarge Canada.  
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unsurprising to see Justice Beetz, who was known for his contested constitutional battles 
with Laskin, atop the table as well.  Nothing from the top of the list is out of the ordinary.  
However, the most striking feature of this table is the number of prominent judges that 
have been virtually silent on federalism matters.  Chief Justice Lamer, for instance, who 
was known for pushing social and political boundaries—as evident by the Remuneration 
of Judges314 and Secession315 references, to name but two examples—provided reasons in 
only four federalism decisions in a career that spanned two decades.  L'Heureux-Dubé, 
“the great dissenter,” did not channel her lack of judgment opportunities into a flurry of 
dissents or concurrences; indeed, her only contribution to the jurisprudence is the dissent 
she provided in Starr v. Houlden.316   
It appears that interest in federalism plays a significant role in whether a judge 
decides to contribute or not.   There appears to be some evidence to suggest that blocks of 
federalism “experts” or “debaters” exist, at certain times, on the Court.  For five years— 
between 1985 and 1990—Dickson, La Forest, Wilson and Beetz sat on the bench 
together, and combined to produce 34 sets of reasons over a 27 case period: 22 
judgments, 8 separate concurrences and 4 dissents.  In almost every federalism decision 
during this period, one of these four judges either provided the reasons for judgment or 
minority reasons.  In the Lamer years, it is difficult to locate a similar block of 
participators, because the small sample size (17 federalism cases) makes it difficult to 
unearth any notable patterns.  However, there were two very active and antagonistic 
members during this era: Justices Iacobucci and La Forest.  Together, they combined to 
                                                
314 Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court (PEI), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 3 
315 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 
316 Starr v. Houlden, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1366 
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produce 13 sets of reasons (8 judgments, 3 dissents, and 2 separate concurrences).   Most 
notably, on three instances neither judge would sign onto the reasons for judgment 
provided by the other, and in 6 cases, they signed onto conflicting sets of reasons.   
In Ontario Home Builders’ Association v. York Region Board of Education, a rather 
heated exchange between Iacobucci and La Forest unfolded.  Writing for the majority, 
Iacobucci makes reference to La Forest’s dissent throughout his reasons and, in particular, his 
addendum: “First, I note that underlying my colleague’s approach is an insistence upon 
categorizing the EDCs as “land taxes”, while ignoring their true nature….In 
characterizing EDCs as land taxes, my colleague has oversimplified the nature of the 
scheme, and overlooks the ways in which EDCs are novel and unlike any known form of 
taxation….With respect, however, I find his characterization of the EDC scheme is so 
narrow that he ultimately seems to deny the complexity that necessarily and appropriately 
exists within the realm of land use planning.”318  Three other judges signed off on Justice 
La Forest’s reasoning, creating a 5-4 split within the Court.   
The last example I wish to highlight with regard to this rivalry is R v. Hydro-
Quebec,319 a “rematch” of Ontario Hydro v. Ontario.  In this decision, La Forest reversed 
his losing fortunes in Ontario-Hydro by persuading a majority of judges to sign onto his 
reasons for judgment.  Iacobucci, who had disagreed with him in Ontario Hydro, co-
authored a dissent with Lamer. 
  Finding active judges or blocs of judges in the McLachlin Court is a bit more 
tenuous, given the extended length of the period and the high rate at which written 
reasons are dispersed.  Prior to 2009, Binnie, Bastarache and Le Bel were the most 
                                                
318 Justice Iacobucci, para 80-86. 
319 R v. Hydro-Quebec, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213 
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prolific writers in the McLachlin Court, accounting for 18 sets of reasons.  Although the 
sample size is too small to draw any significant conclusions, of the 18 panels Le Bel and 
Bastarche sat on together, they signed onto, or authored competing reasons, in 6 cases.  
This number is more profound when percoram and unanimous decisions are subtracted 
from the equation: in federalism cases where minority reasons were present, not once did 
Le Bel or Bastarache sign onto the same reasons.  Since then, McLachlin has authored 6 
of the past 8 judgments, and one of those 8 judgments was a percoram decision.  
Interestingly, Chief Justice McLachlin went from being virtually silent on federalism 
before 2009 to authoring almost every decision since. 
C. Swing Judgments     
 This section deals with the concept of “swing” judgments.320  A swing occurs 
when a judge who is designated to provide the written judgment not only fails to secure 
the necessary signatures of a panel to form a majority, but also loses them to another 
author.  Swings are an important but overlooked dimension of judicial disagreement that 
helps uncover possible voting patterns and divisions within the court.  Indeed, if 
judgments are “stolen,” it is important to identify the judges who are involved and the 
issues they represent.  The swing cases, as well as the judges and issues involved, are 
listed in the table below.  
 
 
 
                                                
320 For a more detailed account of the concept, see Peter McCormick, “Structures of 
Judgments: How the Modern Supreme Court of Canada Organizes its Reasons,” 
Dalhousie Law Journal 32, Vol 1 (2009): 35-67. 
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Table 6: Federalism Swing Judgments from 1984-2012 
 
Case New 
Judgment 
Original 
“Judgment” 
Decision 
Type 
 
Issue 
Re Ownership of the Bed 
of the Strait of Georgia 
(1984) 
Dickson Wilson Majority Natural 
Resources 
Deloitte Haskins and Sells 
v. Worker’s Comp. Board 
(1985) 
Chouinard Wilson Plurality Trade / 
Commerce 
Rio Hotel Ltd. v. New 
Bruns. (Liquor Board) 
(1987) 
Dickson Estey Majority Criminal / 
Regulation 
Finlay v. Canada (Minister 
of Finance) (1993) 
Sopinka McLachlin Plurality Social 
Services 
Ontario Hydro v. Ontario 
(1993) 
La Forest Iacobucci Plurality Trade / 
Commerce 
Husky Oil Operation v. 
Minister of National 
Revenue (1995) 
Gonthier Iacobucci Majority Trade / 
Commerce 
 
 One of the first things that stick out from this table is that both Wilson and 
Iacobucci were twice the “victims” of swing judgments.  While Iacobucci lost both 
judgments on “trade and commerce” issues—one to La Forest and one to Gonthier—
Wilson lost one judgment to Dickson (a natural resource case) and one to Chouinard (a 
trade and commerce case).  These observations help explain why Wilson and Iacobucci 
authored so many dissents.  Indeed, half of Wilson’s “dissents” came at the hands of a 
“swing judgment,” although five concurrences and two non-swing dissents are still far 
above the mean.321  In Iacobucci’s case, two out of three dissents resulted from a 
“swing.”  In other words, he was not a great “federalism dissenter,” as a cursory viewing 
                                                
321 Wilson concurred on a variety of constitutional issues and cases.  They are listed as 
follows:  Skoke-Graham v. The Queen [1985] (criminal and regulation); Deloitte Haskins 
& Sells v. Worker's Comp. Board [1985] (trade and commerce); Great Montreal 
Protestant School Board v. Quebec (Attorney General) [1989] (Education); Canadian 
Pacific Airlines ltd v. British Columbia [1989] (transportation and communication); Ibew 
v. Alberta Government Telephones [1989] (trade and commerce, transportation and 
communication).  
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of the data may suggest; rather, he tried on multiple occasions to form a majority 
judgment, but because he could not procure enough signatures, it became a dissent.           
Assessing the rate at which judges participate in federalism matters is important 
for locating patterns of disagreement and interest levels in a topic.  As the tables above 
suggest, more than half of our case list (62%) contains a minority reason of some type.  
At the individual level, we can see that debates—indeed, rivalries—exist on the Court.  
But what, exactly, are the rivalries about?  Is it a matter of pitting “centralists” against 
“provincialists,” or is the nature of the disagreements more technical in nature?  
Iacobucci and La Forest certainly traded barbs in the two leading decisions of the Court; 
and Le Bel and Bastarache, in later years, were also prone to disagreement. 
D. Of “Provincialists” and “Centralists”  
When I first considered the disagreement patterns on the Court, I thought a central 
component of this chapter would be about uncovering the centralist/provincialist leanings 
of judges.  I hypothesized that there would be strong federalism  “dispositions” on the 
Court (similar to the Laskin, Dickson, and Beetz years in the late 1970s and early 1980s) 
and that blocs of “centralizers” and “balkanizers” would be found.  Unfortunately, no 
such demarcation exists.  There are two reasons for this; I will touch on them briefly.       
First, judicial disagreements in federalism cases often take place over issues that 
have little to do with jurisdictional “preferences.”  The Court is united in the general 
philosophical approach it takes in division of power cases.  It is not the case that some 
judges embrace the overarching decision-making philosophy and some consistently reject 
it (as if there are “centralist” or “provincialist” outliers on the Court).  Rather, the 
Supreme Court’s federalism philosophy serves as an organizing principle that transcends 
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the technicalities over which they disagree.  As we learned from above, disagreements 
are not absent, but they do not take place along overarching philosophical lines. 
Provincial autonomy versus centralization is not a language or continuum that the Court 
recognizes.  Nor does it accurately describe the outlook of its judges.  Notwithstanding a 
few divided judgments in 2011, the Supreme Court has been increasingly unified in its 
disposition of federalism cases.          
Second, as we will recall from our discussion in Chapter 5, the Supreme Court’s 
federalism docket does not lend itself to an either/or, zero sum analysis.  
Intergovernmental relations in the modern era are complex, and so are the disputes that 
appear before them.  In some cases, there is no dispute between government at all.  In 
other cases, the “feds” and “provs” are united against a common opponent or altogether 
absent from a dispute.    For these reasons, it is difficult to use individual voting patterns 
as a way to unearth the federal/provincial leanings of judges.  The Supreme Court is not a 
collection of individual judges whose centralist/provincialist tendencies offset each other 
in a series of back and forth deliberations.  Rather, they collectively pursue an 
overarching approach to federalism, and it is within the confines of this approach that 
disagreements from time to emerge.    
 But what is the nature of the philosophy upon which they are unified?  To what 
extent does the Court give deference to intergovernmental unity?  How does the Supreme 
Court respond to government when they are unified against a common opponent?  Are 
the Supreme Court’s doctrinal preferences in division of powers cases consistent with the 
intergovernmental collaboration that is so characteristic of our era, or do they deliver 
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judgments that carve out specific lines of jurisdiction?  We know they are unified in their 
approach, but that begs the question: what is their approach? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 189 
Chapter VII 
Doctrine 
 
The decision-making approach the Court employs in federalism disputes is the purpose of 
the chapter that follows.  As we shall see, a distinct decision-making philosophy of 
facilitation—informed by overlapping and liberal interpretations of federal and provincial 
heads of power—emanates from the federalism case law of the Court.  This philosophy 
informs the legal doctrines judges select and, in many ways, serves to reinforce and 
facilitate the collaborative nature of modern intergovernmental relations.  Upon 
completion of this chapter, we will be in a position to “judge” the implications of the 
Supreme Court’s post-Charter federalism jurisprudence and determine the extent to 
which it frustrates, or reflects, the political ideals the founding fathers intended 
federalism to serve.         
Organizationally, this chapter is divided into three main sections.  The first 
section provides a brief literature review of the different schools of thought that attempt 
to classify the motives that underlie the Supreme Court’s federalism jurisprudence.  The 
second section discusses the doctrinal frequencies of the Court as well as the principles 
they espouse in their reasons for judgment.  The third and final section examines the 
decision-making philosophy that informs the doctrines that are chosen.    
A. Literature review  
The neutrality of the Supreme Court of Canada in federalism cases has been the 
subject of widespread disagreement and debate.  In viewing the literature, doctrinal 
analyses of the Supreme Court’s handling of division of power disputes typically leads to 
one of two conclusions: crudely, that the Supreme is biased, however radically, in favor 
of the federal government; or that the Supreme Court is an impartial, neutral arbiter 
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without clear preference for one level over another.  Although various nuances, overlaps 
and insights are contained within each respective thought “camp,” the fundamental 
turning point of the debate is clear: the Supreme Court is either “neutral” and “balanced” 
in its approach to federal judicial review, or it is decidedly biased.  In the paragraphs that 
follow, I summarize the most common theories that attempt to understand the nature and 
impact of federal judicial review in Canada.  Surprisingly, there has yet to be a researcher 
that has conducted an exhaustive review of the Supreme Court’s handling of the division 
of powers.   
Pendulum Theory 
In Canada, “balance” and “federal judicial review” typically go hand in hand in 
scholarly publications.322  Not surprisingly, for much of the past few decades scholars 
have attempted to point out the Supreme Court’s track record of neutrality.323  Those who 
subscribe to this notion suggest that, “for every swing to the benefit of the central 
government that a court takes, it appears to take an equivalent swing to the favour of the 
provinces.”324  Over time, this “balances” out.  As the name suggests, the “pendulum 
theory” of federal judicial review suggests that legislative power undergoes a series of 
jurisdictional ebbs and flows which results in alternating periods of centralization and 
                                                
322 Bruce Ryder, “Equal Autonomy in Canadian Federalism: The Continuing Search for 
Balance in the Interpretation of the Division of Powers,” Supreme Court Law Review 54 
(2011); Baier, The Courts and Federalism, 2006. 
323 This approach is found in numerous studies that look at federal judicial review in 
Canada.  See, for example: Swinton, The Supreme Court and Canadian Federalism, 
1990; Garth Stevenson, Federalism in Canada (Toronto, ON: McClelland and Stewart, 
1989); Peter H. Russell, The Judiciary in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 
1987); Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2007; Stephen Brooks, Public Policy 
in Canada (Toronto, ON: McClelland and Stewart, 1989).  
324 Baier, Courts and Federalism, 23. 
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decentralization.  Such a theory posits that, over the long run, federal and provincial 
swings in power cancel each other out, thus creating “balance” within a federation.   
In his classic, albeit dated, article “Is the Supreme Court of Canada Biased in 
Constitutional Cases?” Peter Hogg concluded that the:  
Supreme Court of Canada has generally adhered to the doctrine laid down by the 
Privy Council precedents; and that where the court has departed from those 
precedents, or has been without close precedents, the choices between competing 
lines of reasoning have favoured the provincial interest at least as often as they 
have favoured the federal interest.  There is no basis for the claim that the court 
has been biased in favour of the federal interest in constitutional litigation.325   
 
Hogg takes the approach that both levels of government “win” and “lose” at an 
equivalent rate.  In his eyes, balance is not derived from the principled desire and intent 
to create balance for the sake of creating balance—as if balance is inherently good—but 
is rather the end result of offsetting swings in jurisdiction.  For evidence, he lists 
favorable outcomes for each level of government, positioning his article on the 
assumption that the Court’s give and take approach is consciously driven by an offsetting 
centralist/decentralist logic.  Hogg says nothing, however, about the decision-making 
philosophy that governs the choices of Supreme Court judges.  More recently, the 
Supreme Court’s handling of the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine in Canadian 
Western Bank326 and Lafarge327 led John G. Furey to remark that the “pendulum truly has 
swung” back in favor of the provinces, signaling a retreat from the more “centralist” 
reasoning in Bell Canada.328   
                                                
325Peter Hogg, “Is the Supreme Court of Canada Biased in Constitutional Cases?” in The 
Canadian Bar Review 57 (1979), p. 739. 
326 2 S.C.R. 3 [2007] 
327 2 S.C.R. 86 [2007] 
328 John G. Furey, “Interjurisdictional Immunity: The Pendulum Has Swung,” Supreme 
Court Law Review 42 (2008): 620.  
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Gerald Baier, on the other hand, while similar to Furey and Hogg in some aspects, 
summarizes the Supreme Court’s stance on federalism through a pure doctrinal lens.  He 
states that the Canadian Supreme Court has not “approached the division of powers with 
nearly as much gusto as its American counterpart…and has shied away from grand 
theorizing…in favor of more discretely based judgments that make detailed distinctions 
about constitutional jurisdiction.”329  The Canadian Court, one could say, sees itself not 
so much as a “neutral arbiter,” but as a balancing agent that intervenes on an as-needed 
basis.  Both Hogg and Baier agree that the Supreme Court is not a conscious, 
ideologically driven centralizing agent, but an institution that attempts to judge division 
of power disputes according to the level of government that is best suited to handle a 
particular sphere of authority.330   
However, Baier warns of the centralizing implications of the Supreme Court’s 
federalism jurisprudence in recent years.  In particular, he cites their liberal application of 
the federal criminal law power, and to a lesser extent, the national dimensions branch of 
POGG, which, he argues, systematically erodes provincial jurisdiction.  From these lines 
of reasoning the doctrine of “provincial incapacity” is created.   Baier implies that the 
Supreme Court is systematically, albeit subtly and unintentionally, eroding provincial 
autonomy and shifting a disproportionate level of decision-making responsibility to the 
feds. 
 
                                                
329 Gerald Baier, “New Judicial Thinking on Sovereignty and Federalism: American and 
Canadian Comparisons,” in The Justice System Journal 23 (2002), p. 12.  See also Baier, 
Courts and Federalism: Judicial Doctrine in the United States, Australia and Canada 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006), pp.129-155. 
330 Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 721-23; Baier, Courts and Federalism, 157-
165.  
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Centralization Thesis  
Unlike adherents to the more optimistic “pendulum” theory of judicial review, 
there are some thinkers who believe national high courts are centralizing institutions that 
place provincial levels of government at a decided disadvantage.  Andre Bzdera, for 
example, is highly critical of federal judicial review because, he contends, national high 
courts are inherently centralizing agents.  Bzdera disagrees with both Hogg and Baier by 
rejecting the “pendulum” theory of judicial review and the end consequence of “balance.”  
In the alternative, he states rather pointedly that the Supreme Court “has demonstrated a 
consistent centralist stance over the past 25 years,” and that through “generous 
interpretation of federal constitutional competences (with such concepts as national 
dimensions, commerce power, external relations and national sovereignty) and 
particularly by refusing to review federal spending in areas of member-state jurisdiction, 
federal high courts are able to validate virtually all federal legislative ends.”331  
Additionally, Bzdera notes that during the period from 1949 to 1990, “few 
substantive federal legislative acts were deemed to be unconstitutional by the Supreme 
Court on federalism grounds.”332  It is important to keep in mind that Bzdera was writing 
in 1993, and that since then, several subsequent jurisprudential developments have taken 
place.  Nonetheless, his stance is important because it rejects the balance-through-
offsetting-outcomes-approach that is held by the majority of constitutional observers.  In 
contrast, he believes the Supreme Court erodes provincial power because of the centralist 
motives that inevitably flow from national institutions and the nation-building objectives 
                                                
331 Andre Bzdera, “Comparative Analysis of Federal High Courts: A Political Theory of 
Judicial Review,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 26, No. 1 (March, 1993): 17-20. 
332 Bzdera, “Comparative Analysis of Federal High Courts,” 13. 
 194 
inherent in their design.  Jurisdictional centralization, therefore, is not an accidental 
byproduct of the sum of judicial decisions, but a political goal that is achieved by the 
conscious political attitudes of the judges presiding.   
 Jean Leclair concurs with Bzdera’s centralist conclusion, but instead of using 
comparative research to ground his perspective, he looks to the end result of the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence instead.  He believes that since constitutional repatriation in 1982, 
the “lure of centralist efficiency is overpowering a fundamentally important part of 
Canada’s federal character: regionalism.”333  With “functionalism” leading the charge, 
there is little being done to “counterbalance” the needs of “regional polities.”334  
However, his outlook is not as bleak or cynical as Bzdera’s.  While he believes the 
Supreme Court has been decidedly central over the past few decades, he leaves open the 
possibility that Supreme Court judges can create balance by “developing a structured and 
normative understanding of the role of provinces.”335  He does not contend that national 
high courts are inherently central or that the political inclinations of judges lead them to 
side in favor of the “hand that feeds them.”  But he agrees that the Supreme Court is more 
comfortable assigning jurisdiction to the legislative bodies that possess the most 
appropriate means of administering it.    
Of the perspectives we considered, not one derives a conclusion from an 
exhaustive account of the Supreme Court’s handling of federalism cases.  Bzdera uses 
international comparative research to assert that are inherently centralizing agencies; 
Baier draws a more measured conclusion, but only uses a sampling of cases to support it; 
                                                
333 Jean Leclair, “The Supreme Court’s Understanding of Federalism: Efficiency at the 
Expense of Diversity,” Queen’s Law Journal 28 (2003): 411-453. 
334 Leclair, “The Supreme Court’s Understanding of Federalism,” 415. 
335 Leclair, 453. 
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and neither Leclair nor Hogg provide more than eight case studies to substantiate their 
positions.  My contribution to the discussion is an analysis that draws insight from a 
comprehensive look at the federalism cases of the Court.          
B. Doctrines and Justifications  
Notwithstanding the perspectives summarized above, the best approach to draw 
out the decision-making philosophy of the Court is to study the doctrines, and 
corresponding rationales they provide, to settle disputes.  As we will recall from our 
discussion in Chapter 2, the doctrines judges apply are informed by political preferences.  
Therefore, by examining the Supreme Court’s doctrines, and the subsequent impact of 
those doctrines, one is better positioned to ascertain the decision-making outlook from 
which they precipitated.   
To achieve this goal, I went through every federalism case handed down over the 
past three justiceships and tracked the doctrinal frequency of the Court.  In particular, I 
looked at the Court’s determination of an impugned statute’s validity, applicability and 
operability, determinations that are made through the pith and substance, 
interjurisdictional immunity and paramountcy doctrines, respectively.  These analyses 
take place in almost all division of power cases.  They are, to be sure, the hallmark 
features of a traditional federalism analysis.  
 “A law that purports to apply to a matter outside the jurisdiction of the enacting 
legislative body may be attacked in three different ways.”336  Peter Oliver reminds us of 
the sequence of federal judicial review.  First, in the opening lines of the reasons for 
judgment, one will almost always find reference to the well-established “pith and 
                                                
336 Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 382. 
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substance” analysis, which involves the ‘characterization’ of legislation for the purpose 
of determining its ‘validity.’  After determining the dominant feature of the law in 
question—its purpose and effect—the Court then assigns that law to an appropriate head 
of power.  From here, the Court is able to determine whether such a law is valid by virtue 
of the enacting legislature.   
If, after the pith and substance test, the Court finds that an impugned provision is 
intra vires, or within the authority of the enacting legislature, they then determine 
whether or not a validly-enacted law is “applicable” to matters that fall outside the 
jurisdiction of the enacting legislature.  This second stage of analysis invokes what the 
courts refer to as the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine, the notion “that legislation 
enacted by one order of government cannot interfere with the core of any subject matter 
that is under the jurisdiction of the other order of government.337  The third step involves 
the application of the ‘paramountcy doctrine,’ which assesses whether a valid and 
applicable provincial law is operational in light of potential conflicting federal legislation.  
Operationally, when there are inconsistent or conflicting federal and provincial laws, the 
federal law prevails and the provincial law is declared “inoperative to the extent of the 
inconsistency.”338 
The three steps, or progressions, that I identified above are fundamental to an 
analysis of the division of powers.  Over the past three chief justiceships, however, the 
Court has been reluctant to apply them.  The validity of most statutes is upheld, and only 
rarely are laws declared inoperative and inapplicable.  Does this mean that the Court 
                                                
337 Peter Hogg and Rahat Godil, “Narrowing Interjurisdictional Immunity,” Supreme 
Court Law Review 42 (2008): 623. 
338 Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 382. 
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refrains from making decisions?  The short answer is no.  But the point of emphasis in 
this section is that the Court is reluctant to embrace its traditional role as umpire.  While 
litigants often attempt to persuade the Court to invoke the doctrines of paramountcy and 
interjurisdictional immunity, seldom do they do it.     
Determinations of Validity  
As the data in the table below indicate, it is rare for the Court to declare an 
impugned provision invalid on division of power grounds.  Over the past three chief 
justiceships, only three federally enacted pieces of legislation were declared ultra vires 
and only seven provincial laws were declared to be “beyond the powers” their legislative 
capabilities.  For a Court whose mandate, for so long, was to act as a “judicial umpire,” 
this finding is astonishing.  While recent scholarship has identified a string of cases that 
points to the relatively “hands-off” approach of the Mclachlin era, an exhaustive 
comparative analysis of this nature is the first of its kind.339   
Table 4: Success rate of litigants invoking ultra vires arguments in Federalism cases 
 Number t Ultra vires attempted Number t Ultra vires successful 
 - Fed Prov 
Dickson 24/31cases 1/31 5/31 
Lamer 10/17cases 0/17 1/17 
McLachlin 23/33/cases 2/33 1/33 
 
Total 
 
57/81 (70.4%) 
 
3/81 (2.5%) 
 
7/81 (7.4%) 
 
Before I address the cases where the Courts declared an impugned provision 
invalid, I will elucidate a few additional findings from this table.  First, in more than two 
thirds of all federalism cases (70.4%), litigants from one side or another attempt to 
convince the Court of the merits of an ultra vires ruling.  In contrast to these crafty 
                                                
339 See, for example, Bruce Ryder’s article, “Equal Autonomy in Canadian Federalism,” 
Supreme Court Law Review 54 (2011). 
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attempts, the Court makes such rulings in less than 10 percent (9.9%) of its decisions.  
While they hear numerous arguments in favor of ultra vires rulings, the Court choses to 
dispose of matters through other avenues.  Second, despite the unsuccessful track record 
of the “beyond the powers” argument, litigants continue to attempt it. 
 At face value, a disposition that states “the impugned provision is ultra vires the 
enacting legislature” is the most crushing defeat one can experience in a federalism 
dispute.  It is not simply a matter of exempting a particular someone from otherwise valid 
and applicable legislation; it is the Court saying that a legislature is prohibited from doing 
something.  This is why it is important to look at the context of each of the ultra vires 
rulings over the past three chief justiceships, as will be done in the section that follows.   
 On the flip side, in how many instances and at what proportion are laws upheld?  
What is the spirit of the reasoning underpinning the vires status of an impugned 
provision?  Is the Court simply rubberstamping the validity of every federal statute that 
comes its way?  That is, is the Court allowing the federal government to intrude upon 
provincial legislative jurisdiction?  To what extent are provinces resisting the feds and to 
what extent does a cooperative spirit prevail? 
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Table 5: Federal-provincial statutes held to be valid or intra vires on federalism 
grounds341 
 
Chief 
Justiceship 
Federal 
Statutes 
Provincial 
Statutes 
Total (n)342 
Dickson 
Lamer 
McLachlin 
- 
16/17 
13/13 
20/22 
49/52 (94.2%) 
24/28 
7/8 
24/25 
55/61 (90.2%) 
40/45 
20/21 
44/47 
104/113 (92.0%) 
 
Given the numbers above, is comes as little surprise that Bruce Ryder, writing in 
2010, found it “hard to remember” the last time the Court declared a law invalid.  As the 
data suggests, the constitutionality of more than 9 out of 10 statutes has been upheld over 
the past few decades.  While federal statutes do slightly better than that of provincial 
statutes, provincial statutes are more often challenged, which might help explain that 
provincial laws are declared invalid more often than federal laws.  Even so, the Court is 
not disproportionately striking down the validity of laws enacted by either level of 
government.  Rather, he Court upholds the vast majority of statutes at both the federal 
and provincial level.  Until three very recent decisions,343 save for a minor jurisdictional 
issue in Unifund Insurance,344 the last time a law was declared invalid on division of 
power grounds was in 1993, in the Mortgentaler case.345  The Court almost went two 
decades before declaring a law invalid on federalism grounds.  
                                                
341 The total number of cases are defined as the total number of cases where the validity 
of a statute was called into question; indeed, if the validity of statute was not discussed in 
a decision or dispute, there is no basis to include that case, for the purposes of this table, 
into the “total.”   
342 The total number is over 81 because in some cases, both federal and provincial pieces 
of legislation were declared valid and both sides therefore “won.” 
343 Reference re: Securities, supra, Reference re: Human Reproduction Act, supra, and 
Quebec (Attorney General) v. Lacombe [2010], 32608. 
344 Unifund Insurance Co v. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia [2003] 2 S.C.R. 63 
345 R v. Mortgentaler [1993] 3 S.C.R. 463 
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 There are two additional factors that reveal multitudes about the Court and its 
disposition of division of power disputes in particular.  In Chapter V, we learned that 
there are four different categories of federalism cases—turf, precaution, indifferent and 
unified—and that non-government actors initiate most disputes.  From these two findings 
we were able to demonstrate the limitations of viewing division of power cases through 
the lens of a zero sum game.   
The rate at which the Court upholds legislative provisions adds credence to this 
suggestion.  In the modern era there are 27 occasions where the validity of both federal 
and provincial legislation is upheld in the same decision, and in 11 of these 27 cases, the 
feds and provs were locked in a head to head “turf” war.  In this subsection of cases, the 
litigants representing the interests, and/or making arguments on behalf of, one level of 
government attempt to convince the Court of the invalidity of an opposing legislature.  
As the numbers show, the Court is not often swayed by such arguments.  In one third of 
all cases, they uphold the validity of the statutes enacted by both levels of government; in 
49 decisions, the vires of only one level of government is under review; and in only six 
cases is the validity of one level of government upheld while the other level is denied.346   
To think that whenever the jurisdictional line for one level of government 
expands, the other automatically retracts, is erroneous.  The Supreme Court has made its 
preference quite clear in this regard.  In fact, justices Binnie and Lebel, writing for a 
united Court in Canadian Western Bank, had this to say: “A court should favour, where 
possible, the ordinary operation of statutes enacted by both levels of government.”347  
                                                
346 Clark v. Canadian National Railway [1988], Starr v. Houlden [1990], Mortgentaler 
[1993], Ontario Hydro [1993], Lacombe [2010], and Reference Re: Securities [2011]. 
347 At para 31, 2 S.C.R. 3 [2007]. 
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And in his reasons for judgment in Chatterjee, Binnie recognized that an age of “[C]o-
operative federalism recognizes that overlaps between provincial and federal laws are 
inevitable.”348  In both instances, the Court had the opportunity to declare that such 
overlap was unconstitutional.  But they did not.   
In other cases, the Court has not shied away from concurrent authority, and in 
some instances, has gone to great lengths to embrace it: a “flexible approach to federal-
provincial cooperation [is] appropriate to modern federalism, where matters will 
frequently attract concurrent legislative authority.”349  Writing for the majority in 
OPSEU, Dickson, in a pioneer-like statement, summarized the Court’s position as 
follows: “The history of Canadian constitutional law has been to allow for a fair amount of 
interplay and indeed overlap between federal and provincial powers.”350 
The third element that helps explain Tables 4 and 5, above, is a familiar one.  As 
the Court explicitly reminds us in Rothmans, Benson & Hedges, they are sympathetic to 
intergovernmental unity in federalism cases:  
The conclusion that s. 6 of The [provincially-enacted] Tobacco Control Act does 
not frustrate the purpose of s. 30 of the [federally-enacted] Tobacco Act is 
consistent with the position of the Attorney General of Canada, who intervened in 
this appeal to submit that the Tobacco Act and The Tobacco Control Act were 
enacted for the same health-related purposes and that there is no inconsistency 
between the two provisions at issue.  While the submissions of the federal 
government are obviously not determinative of the legal question of 
inconsistency, there is precedent from this Court for bearing in mind the other 
level of government’s position in resolving federalism issues: see Kitkatkla Band 
v. British Columbia (Minister of Small Business, Tourism and Culture), [2002] 2 
S.C.R. 146.351 
 
                                                
348 At para 32, Chatterjee v. Attorney General of Ontario [2009] 1 S.C.R. 624  
349 Para 152, Assisted Human Reproduction [2010] 32750 
350 Para 27, Ontario (Attorney General) v. OPSEU [1987] 2 S.C.R. 2 
351 Para 26, [2005], 1 S.C.R. 188 
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Prior to this, the Court made a similar statement in OPSEU when it noted the “federal 
government’s intervention in support of the Ontario law” and intimated that, because of 
this, the Court “should be particularly cautious about invalidating a provincial law.”352  
Interjurisdictional Immunity  
Determining the dominant characteristic of a challenged law, and in turn, 
assigning it to the appropriate head of legislative power, may be the first step in federal 
judicial review, but it is not the last.  If the vires of an impugned provision is upheld, and 
the pith and substance of a matter is established, the Court proceeds to the next question: 
“Is the impugned legislation applicable?”  In theory, the doctrine of immunity is 
reciprocal, that is to say, “it applies both to protect provincial heads of power and 
provincially regulated undertakings from federal encroachment, and to protect federal 
heads of power and federally regulated undertakings from provincial encroachment.”353  
However, such a theory has produced “asymmetrical” results.  It has, in the words of 
Bruce Ryder, “served only to place limits on the application of valid provincial laws, and 
it has done so in a wide range of significant contexts.”354  To be sure, the Court has yet to 
employ the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine as a basis to waive the applicability of 
an otherwise valid federal law to an exclusive provincial undertaking.  Unlike the first 
stage of a traditional division of powers analysis, there is not an equal chance that it will 
be used for either level of government.   
                                                
352 Para 1, Ontario (Attorney General) v. OPSEU [1987] 2 S.C.R. 2  
353 Canadian Western Bank , id., at para. 35. 
354 Ryder, “Equal Autonomy in Canadian Federalism,” 586. 
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 Were it not for a trio of cases that involved interprovincial undertakings in 
1988,355 one could say that the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine has all but vanished.  
As the numbers below indicate, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to declare 
legislative provisions inapplicable to extra jurisdictional matters.  As Peter Hogg notes, 
the “idea of interjurisdictional immunity finds its genesis in cases concerning federally-
incorporated companies,” but also applies to federally regulated undertakings and some 
fields of transportation and communication.356  It does not extend much further, 
however.357  While the opportunity for the Court to consider application of this doctrine 
is relatively uncommon—about one case in four—the Court has spent considerable time 
articulating its concerns about how it disrupts the federalism balance in Canada.    
Table 6: Success rate of litigants invoking immunity arguments in Federalism cases 
 N Interjurisdictional Immunity 
arguments attempted 
N Interjurisdictional Immunity 
arguments successful 
Dickson 7/31 3/31 
Lamer 2/17 0/17 
McLachlin 10/33 1/33 
Total 19/81 (23.5%) 4/81 (4.9%) 
  
Consider, for example, former Chief Justice Brian Dickson’s critical comments in 
OPSEU: “[The] interjurisdictional immunity is not a particularly compelling doctrine.”358  
                                                
355 Bell Canada, supra, note 68; Canadian National Railway Co. v. Courtois [1988] 1 
S.C.R. 868; Alltrans Express Ltd. v. British Columbia (Worker’s Compensation Board) 
356 Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 383-388. 
357 In Canadian Western Bank, the Court in its introductory paragraph made as much 
clear: “This means, in practice, that it will be largely reserved for those heads of power 
that deal with federal things, persons or undertakings, or where in the past its application 
has been considered absolutely indispensable or necessary to enable Parliament or a 
provincial legislature to achieve the purpose for which exclusive legislative jurisdiction 
was conferred, as discerned from the constitutional division of powers as a whole, or 
what is absolutely indispensable or necessary to enable an undertaking to carry out its 
mandate in what makes it specifically of federal (or provincial) jurisdiction.”  
358 Para 3, OPSEU [1987] 
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Consider also the perceptive and comprehensive discussion of justices Binnie and Lebel 
in Canadian Western Bank [2007].  Writing for the majority, and citing a plethora of case 
law, they referred to the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine as one of “limited 
application which should be restricted to its proper limit.  A broad use of the doctrine 
would be inconsistent with the flexible federalism that the constitutional doctrines of pith 
and substance, double aspect and federal paramountcy are designed to promote.”359  A 
few paragraphs later they drove in the final dagger: “While in theory a consideration of 
interjurisdictional immunity is apt for consideration after the pith and substance analysis, 
in practice the absence of prior case law favouring its application to the subject matter at 
hand will generally justify a court proceeding directly to the consideration of federal 
paramountcy.”360   
Essentially, the Court signaled that it has little appetite to consider expanding the 
scope and application of this doctrine and that “paramountcy” is the likely “fallback” 
option for litigants.  That interjurisdictional immunity is least preferred was also clarified 
in Lafarge: “the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity should generally not be applied 
where the legislative subject matter presents a double aspect and both federal and 
provincial authorities have a compelling interest….[F]ederalism does not require (nor, in 
the circumstances, should it tolerate) a regulatory vacuum, which would be the 
consequence of interjurisdictional immunity.”361  In yet another example, in Alberta 
Government Telephones v. CRTC Dickson reminded us of where immunity fits within the 
doctrinal “totem pole:” “Canadian federalism has evolved in a way which tolerates 
                                                
359 Para 42, Canadian Western Bank [2007] 
360 Canadian Western Bank [2007], para 77. 
361 Para 4, British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Lafarge Canada [2007], 2 S.C.R. 86  
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overlapping federal and provincial legislation in many respects, and in my view a 
constitutional immunity doctrine is neither desirable nor necessary to accommodate valid 
provincial objectives.”362  
 Despite its disfavor, the Supreme Court surprised analysts of the Court by invoking 
the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine in Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canadian Owners 
and Pilots Association [2010].363  Although the Court took a measured approach with a few 
dissenters along the way, McLachlin’s majority judgment did not recapture the doctrinal flair 
of Canadian Western Bank.   In the end, the Court believes that an “‘asymmetrical 
application of interjurisdictional immunity is incompatible with the flexibility and 
co‑ordination required by contemporary Canadian federalism.”364  
Paramountcy         
 The third and final stage of a traditional division of powers analysis involves the task 
of determining whether a validly enacted law is inoperative to the extent that a legislative 
inconsistency arises or “where it is impossible to comply with both legislative 
enactments.”365  Or to borrow Dickson’s classic formulation in Multiple Access Ltd. v. 
McCutcheon: “In principle, there would seem to be no good reasons to speak of paramountcy 
and preclusion except where there is actual conflict in operation as where one enactment says 
“yes” and the other says “no”; “the same citizens are being told to do inconsistent things”; 
compliance with one is defiance of the other.”366   
                                                
362 Para 72, Alberta Government Telephones v. Canada (CRTC) [1989] 2 S.C.R. 225 
363 2 S.C.R. 536.   
364 Canadian Western Bank, supra, para. 45.  
365 Bank of Montreal v. Hall [1990] 1 S.C.R. 121 
366 Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon [1982] 2 S.C.R. 161 
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We know from previous discussion that immunity doctrines are avoided by the Court 
whenever possible.  While the paramountcy doctrine is viewed more favorably than that of 
interjurisdictional immunity, the Court has developed a high threshold for its exercise as well.  
In the words of Wilson J. in Deloitte Haskins, for example, if “faced with the choice of 
construing the provincial legislation in a way which would cause it to invade the federal 
sphere, thereby attracting the doctrine of paramountcy, or construing it in accordance with the 
presumption of constitutionality, I prefer the latter course. I believe also that it accords better 
with the more recent authorities on the scope of the paramountcy doctrine.”367   
A few years later, in Husky Oil, Iacobucci, along with three others in dissent, set the 
tone for subsequent cases and warned that “some” is not a strong enough basis to justify 
inoperability in the future:  
In closing, although I find there to be no conflict between s. 133 (1) and the 
Bankruptcy Act, I posit that, even if there were to be some element of conflict, 
this must be evaluated in light of the fact that the provincial legislation is intra 
vires.  Legislation that is intra vires is permitted to have an incidental and 
ancillary effect on a federal sphere.  I would emphasize again that this Court has 
traditionally declined to invoke the paramountcy doctrine in the absence of actual 
operational conflict.  I am uncomfortable with the watertight approach to federal 
bankruptcy legislation propounded by the respondents.  To interpret the quartet as 
requiring the invalidation of provincial laws which have any effect on the 
bankruptcy process is to undermine the theory of co-operative federalism upon 
which (particular post-war) Canada has been built.368    
 
In Iacobucci’s eyes, the Court ought not be quick to declare operational conflicts.  Legislation 
is permitted to have incidental and ancillary effects on each other.  To illustrate, the 
paramountcy doctrine was bypassed in Siemens v. Manitoba, where it was determined that 
“The Criminal Code specifically creates an exception to the gaming offences where 
                                                
367 Deloitte Haskins Sells v. Worker’s Comp. Board [1985] 1 S.C.R. 785, para 37 
368 Husky Oil Operations Ltd v. Minister of National Revenue [1995] 3 S.C.R. 453, para 
162.  It is interesting to note that cooperative federalism is a manifestation of 
government—and one that is deferred to by the Court.   
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provincial lottery schemes are established, affirming the double aspect of gaming, 
promoting federal‑provincial cooperation and removing operational conflict and any 
question of paramountcy.”369  Indeed, before the paramountcy doctrine applies, the Court 
looks to both the ancillary and double aspect doctrines, which I touch on below.    
Table 7: Success rate of litigants invoking paramountcy arguments in federalism cases 
 N Paramountcy arguments 
attempted  
N Paramountcy arguments 
successful  
Dickson 13/31 2/31 
Lamer 2/17 2/17 
McLachlin 11/33 2/33 
Total 26/81 (32.1%) 6/81 (7.4%) 
 
It should come as little surprise that rulings of inoperability are rare. 
Although litigants attempt to make the case for paramountcy in about a third of all cases, only 
six successful arguments have been made since 1984.  In Law Society of B.C. v. Mangat, for 
example, the Court found that the federal immigration act must prevail over the province of 
British Columbia’s Legal Professional Act because “dual compliance to both statutes is 
impossible without frustrating Parliament’s purpose.”370  In other words, the threshold for 
this application is high.  The Court is hesitant to resort to paramountcy if other doctrinal 
avenues are available.  When all other avenues are exhausted, a “restrained approach to 
doctrines like federal paramountcy is warranted.”371  By “restrained,” the Court means 
that its use should be applied conservatively and only when preferred doctrinal 
alternatives have first been considered.   
I will conclude our discussion of this doctrine with a few highlights of the criteria 
the Court uses to determine its doctrinal choices.  When the doctrines of paramountcy 
                                                
369 Siemens v. Manitoba (Attorney-General) [2003] 1 S.C.R. 6, para  
370 [2001] 3 S.C.R. 113, para 23. 
371 Reference re: Securities Act [2011], 3 S.C.R. 837, para 60 
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and interjurisdictional immunity are invoked, they are done after much hesitation and 
careful consideration.  That being said, if a traditional division of powers analysis rarely 
produces determinations of invalidity, inoperability, and inapplicability, which doctrines 
is the Court relying on instead?  They prefer the application of legal doctrines that allow 
for greater jurisdictional overlap.  They give the “double aspect, ancillary powers and 
living tree doctrines liberal rein, thus promoting a great deal of overlap and interplay 
between federal and provincial laws in growing areas of de facto concurrent 
jurisdiction.”372  Although it is not my intent to provide a series of tables that captures the 
frequency of each of the various doctrines used by the Court in federalism cases, I will 
say a few words about the double aspect and ancillary powers doctrines, and then turn our 
discussion to the philosophy that informs the selection of these doctrines.   
Alternative Doctrinal Avenues 
In the modern era, a traditional analysis of the division of powers usually ends 
with the Court applying doctrines that uphold legislative concurrency.  I will mention two 
brief examples and will begin with the ancillary powers doctrine.  After the dominant or 
most important characteristic of a law is determined to fall within a class of subjects 
allocated to the jurisdiction of the enacting legislature, the law will be held to be intra 
vires, even if it has spillover, or incidental effects, in areas outside of its jurisdiction.  
This concept has become known as the ancillary powers doctrine, even though no such 
reference can be found in the Constitution.  This doctrine is used to facilitate incidental 
overlap, and as such, a great portion of modern jurisprudence rests on its application.  As 
                                                
372 Ryder, “Equal Autonomy in Canadian Federalism,” 567. 
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Peter Hogg reminds us, “With respect to those incidental or ancillary effects, legislative 
power is, of course, concurrent rather than exclusive.”373   
Second, the idea that “subjects which in one aspect and for one purpose fall 
within s.92, may in another aspect and for another purpose fall within s.91,” is known as 
the double aspect doctrine.374  It is a doctrine that, when invoked, preserves legislative 
concurrency by ensuring that the laws of both levels of government are upheld and 
respected.  In the spirit of upholding federal/provincial balance, the Court explores the 
viability of this doctrine before the doctrine of federal paramountcy is applied.  Although 
the Court has not created a step-by-step criterion that determines whether federal and 
provincial features of a proposed law can coexist, W.R. Lederman suggested that the 
double aspect doctrine comes into play when “the contrast between the relative 
importance of the two features is not so sharp.”375  And when, as Peter Hogg reminds us, 
tolerance of legislative concurrency does not result in the “frustration of federal 
purpose.”376  In Rio Hotel v. N.B, for example, Chief Justice Dickson (as he then was) 
found that the prohibitions of nude dancing in adult taverns contained a liquor-licensing 
(and, hence, a provincial) aspect as well as a criminal law (and, hence, a federal) aspect.   
The Court’s doctrinal choices reveal multitudes about their approach to the 
division of powers.  As we saw from the tables above, the Supreme Court is committed to 
a modern, flexible vision of federalism that generously interprets both federal and 
provincial heads of legislative power.  This tendency is precipitated by an overarching 
political philosophy that aims not simply to maintain but to foster jurisdictional balance 
                                                
373 Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 393. 
374 Hodge v. The Queen [1883] 9 App. Cas. 117 
375 W.R. Lederman, Continuing Canadian Constitutional Dilemmas (1981): 244.     
376 Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 411. 
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and intergovernmental collaboration in Canada.  The doctrinal choices we looked at are 
but examples—or manifestations—of this overarching philosophy.  I will now turn our 
discussion to the explicit remarks judges make about their decision-making approach.  
C. Supreme Court as ‘Facilitator’  
  The Supreme Court’s trifold role as that of “enabler,” “accommodator” and 
“advisor” is symptomatic or indicative of a broader decision-making philosophy of 
facilitation.  There are three main ways in which this philosophy works in practice. 
Facilitation takes place when the Court 1) advises government on how they should 
proceed in the future, should an aspect of legislation be declared invalid; 2) enables 
legislative concurrency to sustain through toleration; and accommodates cooperative 
arrangements established by government.   In the paragraphs that follow, I identify what 
these roles mean and how they are exemplified in post-Charter federalism case law.           
The political philosophy of the Court in federalism cases is evidenced by various 
factors.  First, the positive manner in which the Court responds to intergovernmental 
collaboration within the courtroom suggests there is merit to preserving such relations 
even if such relations go outside the formal strictures of the Constitution.  In almost all 
cases where intergovernmental unity is present, the Court is tolerant provided both levels 
of government agree to its terms.377  Another component of this broader approach is that 
the Supreme Court consciously avoids legislative interference because it believes that 
governments, working in collaboration, are the ideal sculptors of federalism.  The 
tendency toward determinations of intra vires flows from this principle.   
                                                
377 An excellent example of a breakdown of an intergovernmental arrangement is Finlay 
v. Canada (Minister of Finance) [1993] 1 S.C.R. 1080, supra, Chapter 5.  
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A third component is that the Supreme Court seeks to provide guidance to 
government.  This can take the form of trimming back ever so slightly the boundaries of 
legislation as needed, and then signaling to litigants how the Court would decide should a 
case, with similar factual circumstances, appear before them in the future.  These are 
value statements which indirectly impact how federalism is operationalized in Canada.   
Supreme Court as Accommodator 
I will begin with a relatively recent case that underscores the reality of judicial 
accommodation.  In the Securities Reference, a unanimous Court reflected upon its role, 
and jurisprudential tendency, by stating: “The Supreme Court of Canada, as final arbiter 
of constitutional disputes since 1949, moved toward a more flexible view of federalism 
that accommodates overlapping jurisdiction and encourages intergovernmental 
cooperation — an approach that can be described as the ‘dominant tide’ of modern 
federalism.  If there was any doubt that this Court had rejected rigid formalism in favour 
of accommodating cooperative intergovernmental efforts, it has been dispelled by several 
decisions of this Court over the past decade.”378  The key word in this excerpt is 
“accommodates.”  The predominant decision-making pattern of the Court is to take steps 
to help make intergovernmental relations run more smoothly.  To make this guiding 
principle work in practice, a flexible doctrinal approach must necessarily follow.  In 
contrast, a willingness to declare laws invalid is the antithesis of accommodation and 
resembles the judicial approach supreme court judges have come to reject: formalism.   
Interestingly, the words “balance” or “flexibility” are nowhere to be found in the 
Constitution Act, 1867.  They are value statements invoked by Supreme Court judges and 
                                                
378 Reference re Securities Reference [2011] 3 S.C.R. 837, paras 57 and 58. 
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serve as the rudder upon which legal doctrines are selected and applied.  In the end, it is 
the Supreme Court’s federalism philosophy that determines the manner in which disputes 
are disposed.  The doctrines that Supreme Court judges select facilitate this underlying 
philosophy and form part of a larger policy objective of the Court.  
Supreme Court as Enabler 
As the perceived “highest good,” the Supreme Court seeks to facilitate 
intergovernmental relations by maintaining a “hands off” approach that allows 
governments to make collaborative arrangements in the absence of judicial interference.  
Wade Wright states that the Court justifies this stance as a “posture of restraint.”379  Take, 
for example, the words of Binnie and Lebel in Canadian Western Bank: “the task of 
maintaining the balance of powers in practice falls primarily to governments, and 
constitutional doctrine must facilitate, not undermine what this Court has called ‘co-
operative federalism.”380  They continue: “The Constitution, though a legal document, 
serves as a framework for life and for political action within a federal state, in which the 
courts have rightly observed the importance of co‑operation among government actors to 
ensure that federalism operates flexibly.”381  Justice Deschamps, echoing their statements 
in her judgment in Reference re Employment Insurance states: “The task of maintaining 
the balance between federal and provincial powers falls primarily to governments.”382  
Here, the Supreme Court acknowledges the reality of federal/provincial 
collaboration by expressing the restrained approach with which they are inclined to 
                                                
379 Wade Wright, “Facilitating Intergovernmental Dialogue: Judicial Review of the 
Division of Powers in the Supreme Court of Canada,” in Jamie Cameron and Bruce 
Ryder, eds (2010) Supreme Court Law Review 51.  
380 2 S.C.R. 3 [2007], Para. 24.   
381 Canadian Western Bank, supra, para 42. 
382 2 S.C.R. 669 [2005], para 10. 
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respond it.  In the modern era, the general rule has been to permit different levels of 
government to negotiate behind the scenes in a cooperative matter so long as the result of 
such negotiations does not disrupt the federalism balance in Canada.  The Supreme 
Court’s federalism case law suggests that the threshold with which they are willing to 
tolerate intergovernmental arrangements is high.  This point is reinforced in Lafarge: “A 
successful harbour in the 21st century requires federal-provincial cooperation.  The courts 
should not be astute to find ways to frustrate rather than facilitate such cooperation where 
it exists if this can be done within the rules laid down by the Constitution.”383  
Of course, the “rules laid down” are more difficult to “break” when there is 
generous tolerance of, and a flexible approach to, overlapping powers.  Writing for the 
Court, Justice Abella upheld the provincial legislative component of a federal-provincial 
scheme: “In my view, the 1978 Federal-Provincial Agreement, like the scheme in the Egg 
Reference…both reflects and reifies Canadian federalism’s constitutional creativity and 
cooperative flexibility….The Grant of Authority falls squarely within a well-established 
body of precedent upholding the validity of administrative delegation in aid of 
cooperative federalism.”384  In Pelland, the Supreme Court enabled cooperative 
federalism to exist.  They did not look to the spirit or underlying principles of the 
Constitution to determine whether “constitutional creativity” or “cooperative flexibility” 
                                                
383 British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Lafarge Canada Inc [2007] 2 S.C.R. 86, para 
86.  In addition, as we will recall from our discussion in Chapter 5, the Supreme Court 
responds favorably to governmental litigants who are unified against a common 
opponent.  In every case where this has occurred, the Court has sided in favor of “Team 
Government.”  And one of the reasons for this can be found in what the Court had to say 
in R. v. Demers: “[L]astly, where, as here, one level of government supports the 
constitutionality of another level’s legislation, a court should be cautious before finding 
the impugned provision ultra vires” (para 18). 
384 Fédération des producteurs de volailles du Québec v. Pelland 1 S.C.R. 92 [2005] 
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were consistent with framers’ intent.  Nor did they discuss the implications of such 
enablement on political society.   
One of the reasons for this is that the Supreme Court believes that part of its 
mandate is to enable the federation to adapt to the political and social realities of the 
times.  As constitutional amendments are both time consuming and difficult, the Court 
tailors its jurisprudence to better align with the needs of the present.  Consider what they 
had to say in Ontario Home Builders’ Association v. York Region Board of Education: 
“[A]n inflexible interpretation, rooted in the past, would only serve to withhold necessary 
powers from the Parliament or Legislatures.  It must be remembered too that the 
Constitution Act, 1867, like other federal constitutions, differs from an ordinary statute in 
that it cannot easily be amended when it becomes out of date, so that its adaptation to 
changing conditions must fall to a large extent upon the courts.”385  It is clear that the 
Court does not wish to obstruct.  Indeed, if they maintained an “inflexible interpretation, 
rooted in the past” they would prevent Parliament and the Legislatures from being able to 
collaborate—and by implication, blur formal legislative boundaries—for the purpose of 
fulfilling “shared” goals.  Instead of insisting that Government pave the way for this 
possibility by way of formal amendment, the Supreme Court does it for them. 
The third and final suggestion that the Court serves as an enabler is the longevity 
with which they recognize this role.  In Husky Oil Operations Ltd. v. Minister of National 
Revenue, the Supreme Court embraces “co-operative federalism” as the “theory upon 
which (particularly post-war) Canada has been built.”386   Here, the Court recognizes that 
government, not the courts, brought about a historical shift in the nation’s constitutional 
                                                
385  [1996], 2 S.C.R. 929, para 145. 
386  [1995] 3 S.C.R. 453, para 162. 
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balance.  This government-led convention is not something the Court resists, but rather, 
embraces it as an early cornerstone upon which their post-Charter federalism 
jurisprudence is based.        
Supreme Court as Advisor  
Another way the Court facilitates or maintains federalism balance is through its  
“advisory” role.  That is to say, when Court believes that a law stretches beyond the 
acceptable legislative boundaries of the constitution, they not only declare it invalid but 
in some cases foreshadow to the losing party what a law should look like if they desire 
for it to be upheld the “next time.” 
In what is perhaps the best example of this “advisory” role in modern 
jurisprudence, in Reference re Securities Act387 the Supreme Court declared the federal 
government’s proposed securities regulator ultra vires.  In their response, the Court 
advised that a more cooperative approach would be more consistent with established case 
law: “The experience of other federations in the field of securities regulation, while a 
function of their own constitutional requirements, suggests that a cooperative approach 
might usefully be explored, should our legislators so choose, to ensure that each level of 
government properly discharges its responsibility to the public in a coordinated fashion.”  
And further: “A cooperative approach that permits a scheme recognizing the essentially 
provincial nature of securities regulation while allowing Parliament to deal with 
genuinely national concerns remains available and is supported by Canadian 
                                                
387  [2011] 33715 
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constitutional principles and by the practice adopted by the federal and provincial 
governments in other fields of activities.”388  
In this reference, the Court viewed the federal government’s proposed securities 
regulation scheme unfavorably, not because the “incidental effects” were 
“constitutionally suspect” but because it was “the main thrust of the legislation.”  In order 
for the ancillary powers doctrine to take effect, a proposed statute must be valid as a 
whole: “[W]hile the proposed Act must be found ultra vires Parliament’s general trade 
and commerce power, a cooperative approach that permits a scheme that recognizes the 
essentially provincial nature of securities regulation while allowing Parliament to deal 
with genuinely national concerns remains available…. The common ground that emerges 
is that each level of government has jurisdiction over some aspects of the regulation of 
securities and each can work in collaboration with the other to carry out its 
responsibilities.”389  And further:  
It is not for the Court to suggest to the governments of Canada and the provinces 
the way forward by, in effect, conferring in advance an opinion on the 
constitutionality on this or that alternative scheme.  Yet we may appropriately 
note the growing practice of resolving the complex governance problems that 
arise in federations, not by the bare logic of either/or, but by seeking cooperative 
solutions that meet the needs of the country as a whole as well as its constituent 
parts.  Such an approach is supported by the Canadian constitutional principles 
and by the practice adopted by the federal and provincial governments in other 
fields of activities.  The backbone of these schemes is the respect that each level 
of government has for each other’s own sphere of jurisdiction. Cooperation is the 
animating force. The federalism principle upon which Canada’s constitutional 
framework rests demands nothing less.390 
 
The Supreme Court stopped short of providing an in-depth prescription for next 
time, but they established the parameters and approach for what a future framework 
                                                
388 Reference Re: Securities Act [2011] 3 S.C.R. 837, paras 9 and 12. 
389 Reference Re: Securities Act [2011] 3 S.C.R. 837, paras. 129-131. 
390 Reference Re: Securities Act [2011] 3 S.C.R. 837, paras. 132-133. 
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should look like.  In this illustration, the Supreme Court facilitated intergovernmental 
relations by, first, protecting the provinces from federal encroachment, and second, by 
giving advice on what a future securities regulator might look like.  Although 
determinations of ultra vires are often symptomatic of legal “formalism,” the Supreme in 
this reference did not waiver on its decision-making philosophy of balance, for it was on 
the basis of balance and the philosophy of cooperative federalism that the proposed 
regulator was opposed.  Instead of telling the federal government that it lacks the 
authority to create a national securities regulator, the Court simply advised that a more 
cooperative approach was necessary.  
D. Conclusion   
 The Supreme Court’s reluctance to declare laws invalid, inoperative or 
inapplicable stems from a federalism decision-making philosophy that seeks to facilitate 
modern intergovernmental relations in Canada.  Where possible, the Court allows elected 
representatives, in the spirit of cooperation, to steer the course of federalism with limited 
judicial supervision.  In order to allow government to fulfill their political mandates—
which necessarily involves the fulfillment of social welfare programs—the Supreme 
Court has adopted a flexible interpretive approach that allows for generous interpretation 
of both heads of legislative power.  The Court believes that facilitation of jurisdictional 
overlap is necessary for adapting to the political and social realities of modern Canada.  
And it is within these generous interpretive boundaries that the Court seeks to maintain 
federal/provincial “balance.”   
 Interestingly, while the Supreme Court speaks of the pragmatic benefits of 
“cooperation” and “flexibility,” they underemphasize and underexplore the moral 
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implications of the jurisprudence that is ushered in by their philosophy of facilitation.  To 
put it another way, that the federal and provincial governments agree to the terms of a 
collaborative framework does not make it “constitutional.”  I contend that the adaptation 
of jurisprudence to meet changing social and political conditions undermines the eternal 
principles that underlie our constitution.  The Supreme Court’s “hands off” approach, 
while “restrained” in one sense, is not value-free and has profound implications on the 
federal-provincial balance in Canada.  I will explain why this is so in the concluding 
chapter.   
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Chapter VIII 
Judging Federalism 
 
Throughout this project, we conducted a multifaceted inquisition of Supreme Court 
decision-making.  In previous chapters, we learned that the modern Court holds more 
power over more matters; enjoys unprecedented and internationally unrivalled levels of 
independence; and wields significant discretionary control over their docket.  We also 
learned that Supreme Court judgments are the byproduct of the political attitudes and 
policy objectives of the judges that create them.  Philosophically, it is clear that they 
avoid drawing clear jurisdictional lines in the sand and leave up to government, wherever 
possible, the determination and scope of intergovernmental relations.  That the Court not 
only tolerates but welcomes intergovernmental collaboration, cooperative arrangements 
and legislative concurrency is no longer a surprise; it is a reality. 
Up until this point, much has been said about who the Court is and what they 
produce.  The project has been explanatory and observational in nature.  However, I have 
said very little about the implications of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on 
government and society.  And it is at this point that the overarching theme of the project 
comes “full circle.”  Indeed, what are the political and moral consequences of blurred 
jurisdictional lines?  Does it matter?  What happens when behind-the-scenes negotiations 
and interactions between different levels of government erodes the constitutional 
boundaries that define their separation?  Does our post-Charter federalism jurisprudence 
lead to greater levels of administrative centralization?  To what extent, and in what ways, 
does the Supreme Court’s handling of the division of powers influence our way of life?    
In this chapter, I evaluate and “judge” the consequences of the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence in relation to the political ideals the Fathers of Confederation intended the 
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federal principle to serve.  Despite the “restraint” with which the Supreme Court’s 
approach is lauded, it is value system that threatens provincial autonomy, leads to greater 
bureaucratic centralization, clouds the relationship between political choice and 
consequence, and convolutes the mandate and priorities of Parliament.  I contend that 
their “hands-off” approach to the division of powers is form of abdication that allows 
government to facilitate its policy objectives by going outside the formal strictures of the 
constitution.  This is quite unlike their approach to Charter matters.    
I have divided this chapter into three component parts.  First, I explain how the 
Supreme Court’s approach to federalism matters is carried out with little regard for, and 
in the absence of, history and our founding principles.  Second, I underscore the 
consequences of judicial inaction and elucidate the formal and informal interplay of 
Supreme Court decision-making.  Third, I contrast the ends of federalism that I identified 
in Chapter I—“the criteria”—with the contemporary case law of the Court.   
A. Background, Context and Approach 
In this section, I bring to light important and distinctive aspects of Supreme Court 
decision-making that are neither discussed by litigants, scholars nor judges.  There are 
two points in particular I wish to emphasize.  First, the Supreme Court’s approach to 
federalism issues is at odds with Canada’s constitutional heritage.  To begin, the 
jurisprudence fails to account for or discuss Canada’s founding debates.  This we learned 
from our Chapter II analysis of Supreme Court’s academic citation patterns.  More 
importantly, however, the outcomes of impending decisions hinge not on whether a law 
is harmonious with the framers’ intent or the spirit of the constitution, but on whether a 
law frustrates or upholds their conception of “balance.”  In other words, the task of 
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applying the original meaning of the constitution has been displaced by a newly created 
litmus test that factors in the political/institutional impact of an impending precedent.  
The end result of a decision, therefore, is intractably linked to public policy processes and 
outcomes that are desired by the Court.         
Second, how the Court operationalizes federal ‘principles’ differs markedly from 
the philosophical debates that unfolded during the ratification debates.  There are few 
examples in which the Court relies on the “principles” of Confederation as a means to 
resolve a dispute.  The closest instance can be found in the Quebec Secession 
reference.391  Here, federalism was recognized as one of four “foundational constitutional 
principles.”392  Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Lamer stated that sections 91 and 92 
of the Constitution Act, 1867 represent the “textual expression of the principle of 
federalism in our Constitution, agreed upon at Confederation.”  He went onto say: 
“principles assist in the interpretation of the text and the delineation of spheres of 
jurisdiction, the scope of rights and obligations, and the role of our political 
institutions.”393   
According to this decision, principles serve as the interpretive aid for the explicit 
written text of the Constitution.  They are “unwritten norms” that form the basis of 
“constitutional argument that culminates in the filling of gaps in the express terms of the 
constitutional text.  In the process of Constitutional adjudication, the Court may have 
regard to unwritten postulates which form the very foundation of the Constitution of 
                                                
391 Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 
392 Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, para 47 
393 Reference re Secession of Quebec, para 52. 
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Canada.”394  A few years later, the Court reaffirmed these statements in Ward v. Canada: 
“The principle of federalism must be respected.”395  
However, what the Court says about the principle of federalism on the surface is 
at odds with how they strive to make it work in practice.  The political principles that 
they choose to apply hardly resemble the political ideals underpinning the Constitution 
Act, 1867.  Instead, as was demonstrated in Chapter VII, Supreme Court judges have 
adumbrated a decision-making philosophy that places bureaucratic efficiency—informed 
by legislative concurrency, intergovernmental collaboration and balance—above the first 
principles of Confederation.  This fact is demonstrated by the textual crumb trail of the 
Court as well as the policy implications brought about by their decisions.  And this brings 
us to our next point.           
B. Formal and Informal Interplay   
The Supreme Court’s prima facie posture of restraint in federalism cases is not 
value-free and is informed by political rather than legal notions.  Traditionally, to study 
the Supreme Court is to study the formal elements of politics: judicial decisions and their 
reasons.  However, the end goal or object of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is the 
informalities of politics.  That is to say, judicial decisions—in the formal realm—are 
simply a vehicle to allow intergovernmental relations to function desirously in the 
informal realm, which is where the most significant political reforms have taken place 
over the past quarter century.  The Supreme Court’s decision to not interfere with 
intergovernmental relations is a political choice informed by an awareness of 
consequence.  The Court’s jurisprudence is, self-consciously, then, an attempt to set the 
                                                
394 Reference re Secession of Quebec, para. 53-55. 
395 Ward v. Canada (Attorney General) [2002] 1 S.C.R. 569. 
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ground rules for a highly informal and personalist form of politics that unfolds between 
governments.  The Court thus uses the formal realm to influence and steer what 
happens—or what is allowed to happen—in the informal realm (for example, First 
Ministers’ conferences, liberal use of the federal spending power for intergovernmental 
cost-sharing arrangements, and the like).  Supreme Court judges are fully aware of the 
consequences of their doctrinal choices; indeed, it is because of these consequences that 
they select the doctrines that they do.     
Second, it is the compilation of the direct and indirect, formal and informal that 
leads to “under the table” centralization in Canada.  Because the Supreme Court has 
established a framework that allows numerous intergovernmental arrangements to take 
place, they are therefore, at arm’s-length, responsible for them.  By “turning a blind eye,” 
and allowing such arrangements to unfold, they are in turn enabling them: “Constitutional 
doctrine must facilitate, not undermine what this Court has called ‘co-operative 
federalism.”396  Centralization thus takes place in various proxy issues whereby the 
centralization that goes on, goes on under the radar of the Court’s jurisprudence.  Federal 
spending, for example, flies below the radar when the arrangement is such that the 
provinces consent to receive money from the “feds” so long as the provinces carry out 
health care under the auspices of the Canada Health Act—a federal piece of legislation.   
The federal government is the more powerful body; they have the means to raise 
revenue, and to fund initiatives, at rates provinces could only dream.  However, with this 
power follows influence.  If provinces desire federal money, they must play by federal 
rules and meet the conditions of their grant dollars.  Provincial budgets now depend on it; 
                                                
396 2 S.C.R. 3 [2007], Para. 24.   
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bureaucracy has adapted to facilitate it.  While intergovernmental arrangements are not 
wrong in and of themselves, it raises questions as to how these arrangements were able to 
take place and evolve in the first place.  They could not have done it without some direct 
(i.e. doctrinal selections) and indirect (i.e. turning a blind eye) judicial facilitation.  By 
allowing the practice of collaborative federalism to operate and evolve, the Supreme 
Court is allowing the more powerful body—the federal government—to incrementally 
influence the constitutionally exclusive mandate of the provinces.      
C. The Ends of Federalism  
As we learned in the previous chapter, the Court expresses a strong commitment 
to facilitating federal/provincial relations by endorsing the contemporary 
intergovernmental practices of “cooperation,” “collaboration,” “concurrency” and 
“flexibility.”  However, this approach is inconsistent with the political and moral virtues 
the founders were attempting to engender.  There are four ends that the founders believed 
federalism would serve: the i) protection and control of local interests, ii) heightened 
government responsiveness, iii) increased clarity and focus in the national legislature, and 
a iv) greater connection between individual choice and consequence.  As we shall see, the 
Supreme Court’s federalism jurisprudence undermines the principle of each desired end.     
Provincial Autonomy  
First, the tolerance and embrace of blurred jurisdictional lines undermines 
provincial autonomy.  Although some may argue that such developments are forward 
looking and positive, such a scenario allows the “feds” to incrementally influence and 
control the mandate and priorities of the provinces.  To be sure, cooperative federalism 
allows the federal government to become involved, however arm’s-length and well 
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intended, in exclusive areas of provincial jurisdiction.  Through liberal use of the federal 
spending power, by way of conditional grants and project subsidies, the federal 
government is able to influence the manner in which provincial priorities are shaped.  By 
placing conditions on how funds are utilized, they indirectly undermine the autonomy of 
the provinces.  Ultimately, provinces have the liberty to turn away federal money, but to 
do so would place them at a national disadvantage.   
Consider, for example, the spending “conditions” attached to the “cooperative” 
agreement the Court embraced in Findlay v. Canada: “The scheme, like most shared-cost 
arrangements between the federal government and the provinces, is essentially 
cooperative.  The provinces may participate; they are not obliged to do so.  The provinces 
have responsibility and exclusive jurisdiction over social assistance within their 
boundaries.  The federal government agrees to share the cost of their programs, provided 
certain conditions are met.  One of the conditions is that the province enter into an agreement 
with the federal government.  The language of the agreements tracks the language of the 
CAP Act and incorporates conditions imposed by that Act.”397  In this illustration, the Court 
recognizes the nature and scope of provincial authority, but in the same paragraph, raises no 
issue with the fact that the central government is placing conditions or standards on provinces 
that have an opportunity to benefit from federal dollars.  The Supreme Court’s silence 
therefore acquiesces the appropriateness of the arrangement.   
Additionally, such arrangements erode provincial autonomy, because there is little 
choice about whether they can accept the funds or not.  Technically, the provinces can reject 
the conditions and turn the money away.  However, if a province does not join in on attractive 
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funding initiatives, other provinces will benefit from the influx of revenue, and the 
competitiveness of the opting out province will suffer.  As Barry Cooper reminds us, “The 
chief consequence of exercising the federal spending power, and especially the use of 
conditional grants, is to enable Ottawa to flex its fiscal muscle and influence (or distort) 
provincial decision-making.398  By accepting fiscal gifts from the federal government, 
provinces become dependent, conform to national standards, and are left with no long-term 
guarantees that Parliament will sustain its level of funding.  The constituents of provinces will 
then come to expect the programs that federal funding provides, and, in the chance that they 
vanish, will lobby the federal government for programs that were under provincial 
jurisdiction to begin with.   
This is problematic because a universal social welfare standard is imposed upon the 
provinces, and the federal government, upon creating this standard, devises new ways to fund 
it, thus reinforcing and cementing their involvement in jurisdiction that does not belong to 
them.  While the upfront pragmatic benefits of federal grants-in-aid are enticing for 
provincial legislatures, they erode the principle and spirit of federalism that underpins our 
constitution.  
Government Responsiveness  
 A jurisprudence that fosters legislative concurrency is additionally problematic 
because it indirectly contributes to legislative backlog, political unresponsiveness and 
regional discord and strife.  While none of these consequences are discussed or 
considered in the written reasons of recent jurisprudence, it is difficult to deny the reality.  
If the federal government enters into various interprovincial cost-sharing arrangements 
                                                
398 Cooper, It’s the Regime, Stupid, 189. 
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that have budgetary and policy implications—like Canada Health Transfers, for 
example—parliamentarians must expend time and energy to discuss, review, draft and 
vote on the parameters of each agreement.  Federal bureaucracy must also adapt to meet 
the workload needs created by additional responsibilities.  There are three reasons why 
this has the potential to make parliamentary proceedings more inefficient.   
First, the size of the federal government expands, because new ministerial 
portfolios are created to manage the funding allocations and spending priorities of new 
departments, which initiate bills, and propose policy frameworks, that require subsequent 
review and ratification.  With a much wider issues net with which to legislate, members 
are parliament are faced with the difficult task of reviewing both local and national 
matters under a single legislature.  It follows that more bills will be initiated, which slows 
the review process and consumes time of members.  Second, an increased purview will 
undoubtedly lead to debates about funding and allocations.  Unfortunately, such a 
scenario invites regional discord and strife.  Members will be preoccupied will lobbying 
for regional interests that they will have difficulties focusing on the primary task at hand.  
This has the unintended consequence of distracting Parliament from matters of “great 
importance,” which brings us to our next point.       
National Unity, Focus and Reflection 
 
The Supreme Court’s philosophy of facilitation has the unintended consequence 
of cluttering the decision-making table of Parliament.  Indeed, can one remember the last 
federal election where health care did not factor prominently into a political party’s 
campaign platform?  When the federal government creeps into provincial territory, it 
increases the workload and mandate of its representatives.  Instead of being confined to 
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national issues, which have a potential unifying effect, members of Parliament, acting on 
behalf of their constituents or province, lobby for funding to carry out local initiatives.  
The disparity of resources, coupled by the inequitable distribution of provincial transfers, 
opens the door for regional alienation, and, in turn, disunity.  This prevents federal 
representatives from focusing on the tasks upon which they were constitutionally 
entrusted to legislate.   
Federal involvement in provincial affairs, despite their well intentions, corrodes 
the virtues the founders’ believed that exclusive spheres of jurisdiction would inculcate.  
The national legislature is supposed to be conducive to focus and reflection.  By clouding 
the table with local matters, which are most dear, members of parliament have less time 
to reflect and more time to quibble.  And with more quibbling, comes less camaraderie 
and fewer instances of political friendship, which makes deliberation on national issues 
less fruitful and effective.       
Political Choice and Consequence  
 
When the jurisdictional lines between federal and provincial levels of government 
are muddied, it is difficult for voters to evaluate the failure or success of provincial ruling 
parties because track records are masked by federal contributions.  The founders 
understood that if the people of a province, through the principle of representative 
democracy, were in charge of managing local affairs, they must live out the consequences 
of their political decisions.  For example, if the ruling party of a province mismanages its 
finances, the people of that province will hold the ruling party accountable and vote them 
out of office.  In the alternative, if the electorate wishes to vote in a government that 
makes social programs a priority, they must devise a strategy as to how to fund, and 
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subsequently, sustain it.  The founders understood that with local control, a greater level 
of responsibility followed.  But if voters are no longer clear as to which level of 
government is responsible for what, it is difficult for them to hold elected officials 
accountable.  And it is for this reason that the Supreme Court’s embrace of blurred 
jurisdictional lines contributes to this problem.   
Ideally, under a federalized system, the mismanagement of affairs of one province 
does not affect, or take away from, the fiscal standing of another.  Indeed, the founders 
understood that federalism protects fiscally prudent and industrious provinces from 
having to bailout or subsidize the political mismanagement of other provinces.  But when 
the roles of different levels of government become entwined, citizens are unable to see 
the consequences of their political decisions.  That is to say, if provinces desire programs 
or infrastructure initiatives, they must use the local or provincial treasury to fund them.  If 
a province wishes to administer costly social programs, they alone must pay for it.  On 
the other hand, if one lives in a province that fails to provide adequate health care 
services, he or she can move to a province that does.  At the end of the day, it is up to the 
constituents of a province to measure the success of the decisions of their elected 
representatives.  If taxes must increase in order to pay for initiatives that are desired by its 
constituents, the legislature must justify a tax increase to its voters.  Upon seeing the 
consequence of greater service levels (i.e. tax hikes), voters will have the opportunity to 
evaluate whether that is a political course they wish to sustain. 
As we demonstrated, the Supreme Court has allowed Canada’s constitutional 
waters to murky.  They have done so directly, by selecting flexible doctrines that allow 
for a great deal of jurisdictional overlap.  They have also done so indirectly, by allowing 
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behind-the-scenes intergovernmental arrangements to grow and evolve.  What the 
Supreme champions and tolerates in the formal and informal realm is inconsistent with 
the political ideals the founders intended federalism to serve.  The consequences of their 
post-Charter jurisprudence have eroded provincial autonomy, clouded the relationship 
between political choice and consequence, and detracted parliamentary focus.  The 
Supreme Court’s posture of “restraint” suppresses the civic virtues that naturally emanate 
from a classical, originalist reading of the division of powers.  The question then 
becomes, whose job is it to rediscover the forgotten principles of the past: government or 
the Courts?  
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